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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is a theoretical project that explores the conceptual nexus between civil
war and power. It maps out a lineage of thought which posits civil war as a framework for
explicating politics, not as a pre-political stage of savagery or a deteriorated condition of
the socio-

-lived civil war

thesis, which situates civil war as the matrix of relations of power, this investigation
traverses the work of several theorists and philosophers who have drawn on, or departed
the concept of
civil war as the fundamental threshold of (bio)politics in an epoch marked by the 9/11
s on the question of
how civil war relates to contemporary capitalism. A central theme of the dissertation is the
unresolved tension between the productive and repressive sides of power inherent in
eorists position themselves in
relation to this aporia, and the success or failure of their attempts to resolve this tension.
perspective that prioritizes the uncertain and volatile nature of the relationship between
civil war and power. I contend that such a perspective could address the strange overlap
between the contemporary modalities of diffused political violence and decentralized
regimes of power characterizing our present and provide us a theoretical account on the
relationship between power and civil war that does not culminate in a ratification of
domination and sovereignty.

Keywords:
Civil war, power, biopolitics, governmentality, sovereignty, Foucault, Hobbes, Spinoza,
Hardt & Negri, Alliez & Lazzarato, Agamben
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SUMMARY FOR LAY AUDIANCE
The primary aim of this project is to build up a theoretical inquiry that explores the
relationship between civil war and power. I have examined the work of several theorists
and philosophers and mapped out a lineage of thought through which civil war is presented
as an integral aspect to socio-political existence in contradistinction to the state-centric
theorizations that drive civil war to the outer margins of the political or frame as a complete
breakdown of the socio-political order.
as the paradigm
of bio

perspectives on the question of how civil war should be thought of in relation to
contemporary capitalism. I have particularly stressed the unresolved tension between the
and the
success or failure of the subsequent theorists in resolving it.
political philosophy to generate an alternative theoretical perspective to rethink the
relationship between civil war and power with the intention to deal with the cluster of issues
and problems that arise from such a line of thought.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
This project is a theoretical investigation into the nexus between the concepts of civil war
and power. It attempts to map out a lineage of thought through which civil war is posited
as an integral aspect to politics, rather than denoting a pre-political condition of savagery
or complete breakdown of the socio-political order.
yet short-lived civil war thesis, which situates civil war as the matrix of relations of power,
this theoretical inquiry traverses the work of several theorists and philosophers who have
drawn on this line of thought
war as the fundamental threshold of (bio)politics in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the
It then
Alliez & Maurizio L
relates to contemporary capitalism. A central theme of this dissertation is the unresolved

formulation of the civil war thesis, the way subsequent theorists position themselves in
relation to this aporia, and the success or failure of their attempts to deal with a cluster of
issues such a formulation brings about. I

ophy

to generate an alternative theoretical perspective that allows us to rethink the relationship
between civil war and power that does not culminate in a ratification of domination and
sovereignty.
Why does a theoretical inquiry like this matter? This dissertation adds insight to an
undertheorized phenomenon. Let alone the rarity of the studies that investigate its
relationship to power, a
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and in the making of the history of western political thought, even when taken
into consideration, civil war is either associated with a pre-political stage of savagery or
posited as a condition that implies the complete disintegration of the political community
(Agamben, 2015, p. 2). While the notion of civil war did not have a place in the context of
classical Greece

such a conceptualization originated in Rome

their notion of stasis, the

internal strife, nonetheless designates a grave danger threatening the well-being of the polis
akin to a social disease that must be averted at all costs. For the Romans, to whom we owe
the exact term bellum civile, civil wars had an enormous role in the making of their history,
yet it implied an inglorious internecine war that threatened the bonds that made up the civic
order:
The status attributed to civil war does not change that much either within the
political paradigm of modernity. A
political project of modern theories of sovereignty

liberal and nonliberal alike

was to

put an end to civil war and destroy the constant state of war by isolating war at the margins
(Hardt & Negri, 2004, p. 5). In fact,

likely that the difference
, civil war does

not even meet the same status as the modern notion of revolution. While the latter is usually
associated with progress and carries within itself a possibility for emancipation or
liberation, the former implies a breakdown of the socio-political order, associated with
gruesome and stupefying violence that drags humankind to its pre-political stage.
Today, however, it is at least possible to speak of a growing interest in the theme
of civil war. What is at issue here is not only a prevailing theoretical tendency to challenge
the state-centric political theories but also the mainstream appropriation of the notion of
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civil war. Recently published books such as Stephen Marche
Dispatches from the American Future, Barbara F. Walter

The Next Civil War:

How Civil Wars Start: And

How to Stop Them, and articles appearing in the popular media outlets, most notably an
op-ed written by three retired US army generals in The Washington Post 1, use the notion
of civil war not just as a metaphor but seriously consider it as a real threat to the foundations
of

formal democracies (Eaton, Taguba, & Anderson, 2021; Marche, 2022; Walter,

2022).
Such an increasing interest in civil war is by no means unsubstantiated. We live in
a world that is traversed by

civil wars, such as the ones in Syria, Libya,

Yemen, or Myanmar, in the Global South and their overspill to nearly every corner of the
globe, albeit in varying degrees and forms. Today, war itself could not be thought of as a
quasi-regulated armed conflict between the states, a formulation that has held since the
Treaty of Westphalia: not only
s as the dominant form of armed
conflicts, but also with the emergence of new modalities of warfare, such as the small wars,
hybridized warfare and proxy wars, it is even possible to speak of a blurring of the line of
demarcation between wars proper and civil wars, rendering the latter a much wider
phenomenon (Armitage, 2017, p. 5).
We find another reason for interrogating the theme of civil war in the emergence of
a new modality of politics more and more resembling, or becoming almost
indistinguishable from, a latent civil war in the making. We live in times marked by the

1

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/12/17/eaton-taguba-anderson-generals-military/

4
, personified in the controversial figures of Donald
Trump, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Jair Bolsonaro, and alike whose power depends less on
bureaucratic organizations as it did in the totalitarian dictatorships of 20th century and
more in their capacity for creating ever-deepening political polarizations and deepening the
already existing lines of fault

. Coupled with the rise of far-right

ideologies and neo-fascist movements2, lone wolf attacks, mass shootings driven by
explicit or implicit political aims, and the culmination of multiple forms of struggle and
resistance most visible in the global waves of protests and uprisings as in the cases of the
Yellow vests movement in France, the Arab Spring, or much more recent wide-scale
protests in the United States following the killing of George Floyd

this new political

landscape of ours harbours seemingly irreconcilable conflicts and intensified degrees of
political violence. All these experiences that we witness firsthand make civil war more than
a timely thematic to study.
However, this dissertation neither aims at establishing a comprehensive theory of
civil war, nor identifying a generalized condition of civil war as the paradigm for
understanding contemporary politics. The primary aim of this project is to build up a
theoretical inquiry that explores the uncertain and volatile relationship between civil war
and power through the examination of the work of several theorists and philosophers who

2

Bernard E. Harcourt highlights how civil war becomes a theme in the discourses of the far right. As he
writes:
The New Right explicitly adopted a warfare paradigm of political conflict.
boldface. And the relation to Maoist
insurgency theory is explicitly made, for instance by Rich Higgins, who argues that Trump was the
target of what he calls
is one
employ
synchronized violent and non-violent actions that focus on mobilization of individuals and groups
(Harcourt, 2020, p. 515)
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strive to rethink civil war as an integral aspect to socio-political existence and, at the same
time, challenge the state-centric theorizations that drive civil war to the outer margins of
the political. Stressing on the relationship between civil war and power in a context like
ours, in which both warlike confrontations and relations of power become so diffused,
provides us with a theoretical vantage point for making sense of this strange overlap
between the ever-reaching mechanisms of the market, the apparatuses of control and
security, and the processes of subjectification and desubjectification through subtle yet
effective techniques and procedures of power at work in neoliberal forms of governance,
irreconcilable conflicts, and intensified degrees of political violence that shape our sociopolitical climate.
Methodologically, I take a genealogical approach to map out a lineage of thought,
tracing the work of several philosophers and theorists to situate civil war in relation to
power. This theoretical inquiry explores a cluster of issues and problems arising from their
formulations. It is important to mention here that such a research trajectory is greatly
influenced

civil war thesis, particularly his formulations dating to the early

1970s in which he posits civil war as the matrix for relations of power.
works not only serve as a point of departure for this inquiry, but also my examination
focuses on the unresolved tension between the productive and repressive sides of power
which stands as a central theme of this
dissertation. Indeed, I critically evaluate how Agamben, Hardt and Negri, and Alliez and
Lazzarato position themselves in relation to this aporia, and attempt to illuminate both the
success and failure in their attempts at resolving it. As an alternative reading, I offer a
reinterpretation of

with the intention of generating a
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perspective that prioritizes the uncertain and volatile nature of the relationship between
civil war and power. The following is a brief breakdown of the chapters.
The second chapter, From Civil War to Governmentality

is structured as an

the making of his account. I start with an inthe 72-73 Collège de France lectures, the civil war thesis, and demonstrate how Foucault
advanced the idea of civil war as the matrix of relations of power. I discuss how this
particular formulation stands as a unique and potent critique of juridical theories of power
by challenging the Hobbesian political theory that strives to cast civil war out of the domain
of politics. I then explain the reasons why Foucault abandons such a position not that much
later: as we will see, becoming well aware of the risk of giving rise to a complete
denunciation of power by reducing power to domination, and thus neglecting the way
power can also function as a productive network,

he nearly reconstructs his

conceptualization of power from the ground up in his now well-known analyses of
biopolitics and liberal governance during the late 1970s and the 1980s. The second part of
this chapter examines the transformation of
warlike relationship to the

, from a
nister
2014, p. 382).

Lastly, I interrogate whether it is possible to re-establish a conceptual passage between the
notions of power and civil war within the theoretical framework of
The third chapter, Civil War as the Paradigm of (Bio)politics

is devoted to an

seminar at Princeton University. I primarily discuss how Agamben posits civil war as the
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paradigm of (bio)politics and point out the limits of his approach. There are three
interrelated points that I focus on: the first one is how Agamben situates civil war as the
paradigm for understanding politics.
insistence on positing civil war as the paradigm of politics; in his words,

(Agamben, 2015, p. 22). I discuss how Agamben

the work of Nicole

Loraux, a historian of classical Greece, enables him to formulate civil war as the
fundamental threshold of politicization throughout Western political history. The second
focal point of

understanding of biopolitics as the production of

bare life under the sovereign ban and as the permanent state of exception. I show how his
formulations of biopolitics radically differ from that of
life by the exposure to death

as the politicization of

highlighting the significant role that sovereignty plays in

and how he attempts to integrate civil war into his broader framework
of biopolitics. Third, I stress the implications of

framing of civil war as the

originary political violence that both initiates and shapes the juridico-political structure of
sovereignty and his equation of civil war with terrorism, in which he identifies the passage
into the dimension of global civil war in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and rampant
exceptionalism during the so-

(Ibid., p. ix). I interrogate

whether such an equation, which essentially involves a complete erasure of the line of
demarcation between political violence and power, is a viable way to rethink the
relationship between civil war and power, and more importantly, if it provides any kind of
resolution to the tension between the productive and repressive sides of power inherent to
formulation.
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The fourth chapter
Alliez and

explores Hardt and Negri, and

differing perspectives on the relationship between civil war and

contemporary forms of capitalism. The first half of this chapter is devoted to a close reading
of Hardt and Negri formulation of civil war as an incessant conflict between Empire and
the multitude that shapes our contemporary world both on global and local levels. Starting
with explicating the concepts of Empire

the tendency for the emergence of a novel form

of global sovereignty in the service of capital

and the multitude

a democratic political

project that could bring a post-capitalist future

I demonstrate how Hardt and Negri locate

civil war amid an absolute antagonism between these two opposing political forces. I also
highlight how

formulations are grounded on a conception of two

opposing modalities of power, a constituent and productive power of the multitude and the
which is to a great extent drawn from
Spinoza. In so doing, I show how Hardt and Negri manage to
abstain from painting a picture of an over-encompassing model of domination and
repression. Nonetheless, I interrogate the efficacy of their approach as a means of
examining the relationship between civil war and power today. I find a potential limitation
in the rather strict dichotomy they establish between the two modes of power and an almost
Manichean narrative that emerges in this formulation.
In the second half of the fourth chapter, I analyze

diagnosis

of a global civil war in the circuits of global capitalism. First, I show how their account
furthers
perspective, especially through an emphasis on
Second, I focus on their formulation of neoliberalism as governance by civil wars,
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specifically as

minorities,

wars on women, [and]

the model of

colonial war (Alliez & Lazzarato, 2016, p. 27). I then demonstrate how Alliez and
Lazzarato establish a theoretical perspective that presents power more or less as the sum of
techniques and procedures that initiates and maintains capitalist subjugation and
domination that is, in a way, no longer distinguishable from the war itself. I critically
evaluate whether such a formulation provides us with an adequate theoretical framework
for understanding the multiple ways in which power operates today and if it manages to
overcome the issues that led Foucault to abandon his civil war thesis.
In the fifth and final chapter, Rethinking Civil War and Power from a Spinozist
Perspective I draw from

to suggest an alternative way to

rethink the relationship between civil war and power. My primary aim is to devise a
conceptual passage between civil war and power without establishing a mutual exclusivity
between political power and civil war

without framing them within an either/or logic,

thus giving rise to an unresolvable dichotomy

but at the same time without reducing

relations of power solely to a violent confrontation in which a segment of a society
dominates others. To do so I focus on two interrelated issues: first, I suggest an alternative
reading of the distinction between two concepts, potentia and potestas, which Spinoza uses
for denoting power. Rather than assuming an absolute antagonism between potentia and
potestas, I demonstrate how this pair of concepts function in a complementary yet
irreducible way, exposing the limits of the exercise of power. Second, I give an account of
critique of and alternative to the Hobbesian understanding of politics in the
passage from the state of nature to state sovereignty. I especially stress how, in
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formulation, the state of nature could never be completely consumed and superseded, and
politics always contain conflict in varying degrees. Rather than denoting a pathology of
political life, I show how civil war emerges as a violent process of the reconfiguration of
forces that shape the realm of politics. I trace these two themes in
and in

those by Negri, Deleuze,

Matheron, and Del Lucchese. In so doing, I argue that this new approach to Spinozist
political philosophy provides us with an adequate theoretical vantage point for examining
this strange overlap between the culmination of diffused forms of political violence,
deepening polarizations, and the decentralized and productive regimes of power that seem
to be characterizing our epoch.
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CHAPTER 2: FROM CIVIL WAR TO GOVERNMENTALITY
In a letter to Daniel Defert dating to 1972, Michel Foucault wrote that he wanted to analyze

least at first glance, seems perplexing: the theme of civil war was never a primary area of
interest for Foucault in the same way as punishment, madness, or sexuality; his later work
on power could hardly be seen as constructed on the basis of civil war. In the early 1970s,
however, Foucault posits ci
away throughout
the following years, and, for this reason, invites us to question the weight of the civil war
theme in

work, but also manifests a cluster of issues that runs across his oeuvre. This chapter

t from its initial
bellicose model to the analysis of (neo)liberal governmentality in which the notion of
power seems to be posited less and less as primarily a matter of confrontation and conflict.
The central problem that I address is why Foucault abandons civil war as a grid of
intelligibility for analyzing relations of power in favor of others; first, biopolitics and later
on, governmentality.
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2.1 Civil War and Power

. 18). To

conceptualization of power is by no means a monolithic one and it is subject to radical
revisions throughout his works. While Foucault never devoted any work solely to power
he strongly rejected the idea that his was an attempt for outlining a general theory of
power

e issue is central, not because

Foucault makes it into a stated object of research, but because it keeps returning in different
it in a different way, power appears as a
recurring theme that runs across Foucault
studies on the prison system, sexuality, and analyses of biopolitics and governance. What,
then, does power mean to Foucault?
2.1.1
While it is difficult to tend to this question with a single blow
reworked his earlier formulations and revised them over years
power, in French pouvoir

Foucault constantly
his guiding notion of
d, p.

340). While such a definition may appear overly simple, it nevertheless denotes one of the

of relation; rather than denoting the existence of a stable entity, substance, or form, a
structure abov
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-

the

be an erroneous and futile attempt to locate power at some center, such as the state or any
specific institution. By the same token, power is not something that an individual or group
over
others in an economic sense. In his own words,
power is not something that is divided between those who have it and hold it
exclusively, and those who do not have it and are subject to it. Power must, I think,
be analyzed as something that circulates, or rather as something that functions only
when it is part of a chain. It is never localized here or there, it is never in the hands
of some, and it is never appropriated in the way that wealth or a commodity can be
appropriated. (Foucault, 2003, p. 29)
ost a kind of relationship that runs

Such an understanding implies a radical break from the juridico-political theories
of power that have dominated Western political thought at least since the Middle Ages. 3

3

While Foucault has never focused solely on law, the said subject matter nonetheless is one of the important
ode according to which power
- 88). In an interview, published

But just as with madness, crime and prisons, I encountered the problem of rights, the law, and the
question that I always asked was how the technology or technologies of government, how these
relations of power understood in the sense we discussed before, how all this could take shape within
a society that pretends to function according to law and which, partly at least, functions by the law.
(Foucault, 2007b, p. 142)
However, for Foucault, the model law provides us with does not adequately explicate how relations of power
operate: the law is nothing more than a representation or crystallization of power at best and manifests itself
as an effect that the exercise of power produces. Indeed, throughout his works, Foucault explicitly remarks
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For Foucault, from the perspective of juridico-political theories, the question of power is

within the theoretical framework of sovereignty. Every question regarding power either

solely a thing both culminating in and dependent on the state. Foucault persistently

turning the machinery of the State into the privileged, central, major, and nearly unique

overlooked in the state-centric formulations of power is how relations of power operate in
multiple ways, in specific contexts, and how they are diffused through a wide spectrum of
social relations.
In this sense, for Foucault, there is always something inassimilable regarding
power; there is a dynamism in relations of power that even resists theorization. Redirecting

of the specific domain formed by relations of power, and toward a determination of the
. 82). In other words,

an analytics of power
connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies and so on which
at a given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and

(Foucault, 1978, p. 90).
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power is a product of a stern and conscious methodological choice that prioritizes
relationality, multiplicity, and immanence before anything else. 4
2.1.2 Civil War as the Analyzer of Relations of Power

to the notion of civil war. The short answer is that civil war provides us with the first

an interest in departing

model of Leviathan, outside the field delineated by juridical sovereignty and the institution

e, p. 122) in political theory.
beyond
the model state-

the claim that the

4

even though the latter is not a concept widely associated with his work. Indeed, in his monograph on Foucault,
Gilles Deleuze points out this very connection. In Deleuze's own words:
In the first place, we must understand that power is not a form, such as the State-form; and that the
power relation does not lie between two forms, as does knowledge. In the second place, force is
never singular but essentially exists in relation with other forces, such that any force is already a
object other
1988, p. 70)
As Deleuze claims
e
relation between forces is a power relation

(Ibid., p. 70).
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political community starts to exist when the condition of primordial civil war comes to an
end. It is worth noting that Foucault's reading of Hobbes is an unconventional one. Unlike
a theorist who had
laid the foundations of the political realm in the condition of war; the model of
commonwealth Hobbes proposes is not as much of an outcome of the condition of civil
war as it might seem at first sight. For Foucault, what lies at the hea
is something quite different: it is nothing other than an attempt to drive (civil) war away

Hobbes turns war, the fact of war and the relationship of force that is actually
manifested in the battle, into something that has nothing to do with the constitution
of sovereignty. The establishment of sovereignty has nothing to do with war.
birth to States, and it is not really war that is transcribed in relations of sovereignty
or that reproduces within the civil power and its inequalities the earlier
dissymmetries in the relationship of force that were revealed by the very fact of the
battle itself. (Foucault, 2003, p. 97)
For Foucault, what Hobbes strives for is a warding-off of the permanent civil war by
pushing it to the outer limits of the political, limiting war by making it dependent on the
contract. Foucault argues that Hobbes does this to lay secure grounds for the Leviathan
state by nullifying the possibility of struggle and resistance from the very beginning.
Foucault locates the Hobbesian account in the gradual socio-political
transformation that was taking place in Europe at least since the Middle Ages. In the
Collège de France lecture from 21 January 1976, which was later published under the title
Society Must Be Defended, Michel Foucault provides us with a succinct account of how he
formulates the monopolization of warfare by the state. Foucault directly associates the
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as the late Medieval era European context. 5
We can indeed say, schematically and somewhat crudely, that with the growth and
development of States throughout the Middle Ages and up to the threshold of the
modern era, we see the practices and institutions of war undergoing a marked, very
visible change, which can be characterized thus: The practices and institutions of
war were initially concentrated in the hand of a central power; it gradually
transpired that in both de facto and de jure terms, only State powers could wage
wars and manipulate the instruments of war. The State acquired a monopoly on
war. (Foucault, 2003, p. 48)
From this passage, one can clearly understand that Foucault locates the foundations of this
very transition in the gradual process of the proliferation of centralised states in the West.
However, one of the most crucial points of inflection Foucault locates is the emergence of
a carefully defined and controlled military apparatus that effectively pushes war to the outer

warfare implies a tendency for the cleansing of warfare from the sphere of everyday life.
He writes:
The immediate effect of this State monopoly was that what might be called day-tothe social body, and from relations among men and relations among groups.
Increasingly, wars, the practices of war, and the institutions of war tended to exist,
so to speak, only on the frontiers, on the outer limits of the great State units, and
5

However, it should not be forgotten that the historical tendency Foucault depicts here was to a great extent
particular to the sociothe bracketing of war:
In the 18th and 19th centuries, European international law achieved a bracketing of war. The opponent
in war was recognized as a justus hostis and was distinguished from rebels, criminals and pirates.
To the same degree war lost its criminal character and punitive tendencies, thereby ending
discrimination between a just and unjust side. Neutrality was able to become a true institution of
international law, because the question of the just cause, the justa causa, had become juridically
irrelevant for international law. (Schmitt, 2006, p. 309)
For Schmitt, the notion of the bracketing of war designates the inter-state political order in Europe during the
18th and 19th centuries in which warfare had a limited and quasi-regulated character between states on the
continent; however, the rest of the globe was posited as a free land mass waiting to be appropriated and more
importantly as the space for unlimited war.
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only as a violent relationship that actually existed or threatened to exist
between States. But gradually, the entire social body was cleansed of the bellicose
relations that had permeated it through and through during the Middle Ages. (ibid.,
p. 48)
The crucial question is how far this cleansing of bellicose relations from the social body
reaches, or more precisely whether the establishment of the State or any kind of structure
of sovereignty completely rules out the possibility of civil war.
During the early seventies, the answer Foucault gives to these questions is
straightforward and radical. As Bernard E. Harcourt writes:
As opposed to the Hobbesian idea of a war of all against all, ending with the
establishment of public order, Foucault sought to reinstate the notion of civil war
within the Hobbesian commonwealth. Civil war, for him, is not the collapse of a
political union that would plunge us back into a state of nature. It is not opposed to
political power; rather, civil war constitutes and reconstitutes it. Civil war is, in his

to what political theory usually assumes, civil war is not prior to the constitution of
power; no more than it is what necessarily marks its disappearance or weakening.
[...] Civil war takes place on the stage of power. (Harcourt, 2020, p. 285)
In other words, for Foucault, power at its core denotes a warlike relationship of domination,
and civil war is integral to the domain created by the relations of power to an extent that
civil war functions as a matrix for the relations of power. To better understand how
Foucault comes to this conclusion, we must take a closer look at the 1972-1973 lectures at
the Collège de France, recently published under the title of The Punitive Society, in which
Foucault provides the clearest formulation of his perspective.
2.1.3 The Revolt of Nu-Pieds and the 72-73 Collège de France Lectures
The Collège de France lectures between 1971 and 1972, published recently as Penal
Theories and Institutions, contains a detailed analysis of the revolt of Nu-Pieds and the
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following regime of repression. The revolt of Nu-Pieds was the culmination of a series of
popular uprisings that took place in the Normandy region of France in 1639. The primary

royal budget, mostly due to the growing cost of the French military intervention in the

prosperous provinces, though weakened by a plague epidemic, was required to make the
ation policy initially created a
noticeable discontent amongst the Norman population and was met with various degrees
of resistance during a period that lasted more than a decade. However, starting with the
assassination of a tax collector in 1639, the events took another turn: the unrest rapidly
spread throughout the whole region and brought people together almost from all social
groups. Peasants, laborers, poor city dwellers, and the members of the clergy took up arms,
joined the ranks of d'Armée de souffrance (the army of suffering), and confronted the

-Pieds revolts were
thing extraordinary, neither from a quantitative nor a qualitative

one among many other popular uprisings during the same period (Elden, 2017, p. 48). But
he finds the violent process of suppression and the following period of restoration
particularly notable.
For Foucault, the suppression of the revolt of Nu-Pieds was significant for three
reasons. First, the revolt of Nu-Pieds implies the emergence of a new repressive system in
the context of the demise of feudalism and the subsequent development of centralized states
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in the 17th
d a precursor to, or better,

p. 59). Second, it was indeed the site of the birth of a novel dispositif
-insurrection tactics, deployed by the French state
apparatus as a systemic response against riots. In the particular case of the revolt of NuPieds, this counterinsurgency campaign consisted of the deployment of the French army
led by Chancellor Séguier to the region of Normandy, the designation of the entire
population as internal enemies, effectively denying their status as legal subjects, and
consequently leading to the extremely violent suppression of the uprising before the legal
-

longer has the function of ensuring the circulation of wealth, as in the Middle Ages, but the

into the faults of the old system [...] overlays it, pushes it back, disrupts it, [and] will finally

modality of power in the circuits of the newly born centralized state apparatus. According
to Foucault, this new regime of power was qualitatively different than the royal power: the
primary aim was not about preserving the rights of the King, but it functioned more as a
repressive system deployed by the State apparatus that puts the population in crosshairs.
However, it would be erroneous to und
relations of power are completely dependent on the state apparatus. As Stuart Elden writes:
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It is significant that Foucault stresses the clash of competing exercises of power:
this is not power imposed simply from above. The study of the Nu-Pieds is one of
to set power and law on one side and the peasant refusals, struggles or resistance
on the other. The King, the State, individuals such as Séguier, and the peasants all
-Pieds, the rejection of the law is at the same time a law
(it is like the other side of the law [...]); the rejection of justice is like the exercise
of justice; the struggle against pow
As well as delineating a network in which both relations of power and violence are encoded
and recounting an unconventional politico-historical narrative on the birth of the
centralized state apparatus, Foucault

-Pieds not only lays the

groundwork for the civil war thesis, but also foreshadows his analyses on disciplinary
power.
The clearest formulation of the civil war thesis can be found in the 1972-1973
lectures, The Punitive Society, devoted to the theme of penality (Foucault, 2015). 6 More
specifically, the lectures on January 3 rd and January 10th are extremely important for our
discussion here for two reasons: first, we find a clear answer to the question of how
Foucault formula

6

-73 at Collège de France were devoted to studying the changing nature of the penal
regimes starting from the 18th century and could easily be seen as a historical document showing the gradual
transformation from the repressive dimension of
k.
Moreover, these lectures stand as a clear predecessor to what would later become Discipline and Punish: The
Birth of the Prison and harbors an earlier conceptualization of disciplinary power (Foucault, 1979). It is
important to note here that this formu
research on penality:
The penal laws, intended for the most part for one class of society, are made by another. I
acknowledge that they concern the whole of society no one can be sure of always escaping their
rigor but it is true, nevertheless, that almost all crimes, and especially certain of them, are
committed by the part of society to which the legislator does not belong. Now this part differs almost
completely from the other in its mentality, mores, and its whole way of being. So to make suitable
laws for it, it seems to me that the legislator should, above all, endeavor to forget what he is himself
disposed mind of the people for whom he works. (Foucault, 2015, p. 22)
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understanding of the concept. Second, we see how Foucault identifies civil war as the
matrix of relations of power.
To begin with the first point of discussion, Foucault describes civil war as

two reasons (Ibid., p. 11). First is the apparent negativity attributed to the concept of civil
war. For Foucault, in the making of Western politic

(Ibid., p.11). This is because civil war is either a) typically directly associated with
something akin to the Hobbesian state of nature, in terms of the pre-political condition of

diffusion of wa

e

more importantly, it is the mutually exclusive relationship that is posited between the
notions of civil war and power: given the prevalence of state-centric theories of power,
civil war is only thought of as a phenomenon in which relations of power become
dysfunctional, or the complete subjection to the sovereign is in a state of disarray. However,
on that civil war does not exist,

The strategy Foucault follows while dealing with the question of civil war involves
undoing these two interrelated tendencies. He generates an alternative theoretical
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perspective to the canonical understanding that disassociates civil war from power and
formulates it solely in terms of a return to the war of all against all. Unsurprisingly,
account appears to be
the perfect example of the canonical formulations that drive civil war outside of the domain
of politics.

political philosophy. Particularly in Leviathan, civil war appears as a thematic that is
directly related to the concept of the state of nature and designates the pre-political
condition of humankind (Hobbes, 2005). The concept of the state of nature delineates a
domain of unlimited freedom, yet, at the same time, it is marked by the omnipresence of

beings are motivated by their passions rather than following the dictates of the reason,

objects of interest coincide, they are positioned as competitors and become distrustful of
each other, and on top of that,

is the inevitable consequence

the bellum omnium contra omnes, or war of all against all.

How then could human beings overcome this apparently despicable condition? For
Hobbes, an escape from this state of terror could only be possible through the establishment
of a political community guided by a supreme power materialized in the image of the
mighty Leviathan. Yet, there seems to be a hefty price to pay: peace and security require
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the unconditional obedience and the transference of all thinkable and exercisable power to
the personae of the sovereign. This is a terrifying peace only possible when the right to
exercise political power is exclusively reserved for the sovereign and any form of resistance
and disobedience is banished from the scene for good. In such a theoretical framing, the
appearance of the Leviathan-state is thought to bring an end to the war of all against all.
Civil war can only become intelligible as the dissolution of the political community and
slippage to the state of nature, or in other words, it can only be a resurgence of the war of
all against all.
opposing
the disavowal or expulsion of civil war from the political realm and its equation with the
war of all against all. What alternative does Foucault propose? The first step of his strategy
is to target the identification of civil war with the war of everyone against everyone. For
ements:

vil war is not much of a
resurgence of a war between individuals qua individuals but always emerges as a
relationship between groups qua groups. Second, Foucault argues that civil war does not
necessarily imply the dissolution of the political community: a

collective order to the war of all against all, civil war is the process through which and by
which a number of new, previously unknown collect
28). Third, Foucault strongly objects to the claim that civil war and power are mutually
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exclusive conceptual categories. Indeed, for Foucault, the exact opposite seems to be the
case:
Moreover, contrary to what political theory usually assumes, civil war is not prior
to the constitution of power; no more than it is what necessarily marks its
disappearance or weakening. Civil war is not a sort of the antithesis of power, what
exists before or reappears after it. Civil war and power are not mutually exclusive.
Civil war takes place on the stage of power. There is civil war only in the element
of constituted political power; it takes place in order to keep or conquer power, to
confiscate or transform it. It is not that which is oblivious of or purely and simply
destroys power, but always depends on elements of power. (Ibid., pp. 28-29)
Thus, for Foucault, civil war is neither prior to the relations of power nor implies their
demise or breakdown; on the contrary, civil war is
all struggles of power, of all strategies of power, and, consequently, it is also the matrix of
7

In fact, civil war stands as the

very grid of intelligibility for analyzing relations of power.
To briefly summarize what we have discussed up to this point, in Foucault's works
dating to the early 1970s, the notion of power denotes a warlike relationship: civil war is
integral to the domain created by the relations of power and operates as the very model for
both the exercise of power and also resistance to it. This perspective delineates a dynamic
understanding of the political in which struggle and conflict stand as constituent forces
rather than being seen as anomalies that should be completely subordinated to the notion
of order. Power here no longer appears as a phenomenon originating from sovereignty, but

7

Yet there seems to be an exception in which one can speak of some sort of an antithesis between the civil
war and power.
war appears as a threat from the outside.
Third, it will be said that there is at least one region where we can recognize an antithesis between
power and civil war: this is the level of established power, which is indeed what expels all civil war.
Civil war is, indeed, what threatens power from the outside. In fact, we could show that civil war is,
rather, what haunts power, not in the sense of a fear, but inasmuch as civil war occupies, traverses,
animates, and invests power through and through. (Foucault, 2015, p. 31)
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as only intelligible through an understanding of the tactics and mechanisms of domination
and of various forms of resistance to them. Understanding how relations of power operate

p. 34). What has taken place is the replacement of the juridical schema with that of a model
-repression2.2 Power beyond the Civil War Thesis
In the early 1970s, Foucault formulates power in terms of a warlike relationship of
domination. Yet, the civil war thesis does not seem to last long. Starting from the second
ber of
instances in which Foucault expresses his reservations regarding the bellicose model 8, the
way in which he understands power changes substantially. First, he associates power with
the regularizing and normalizing procedures deployed by the state
biopolitics

in other words,

and second, in terms of more subtle strategies for directing conduct through

his studies on liberal governmentality. In this sense, there seems to be a discontinuity
distinguishing his earlier formulations from the subsequent ones. How can we make sense
of such a discontinuity? One way is to understand it as a radical break and assume that
Foucault has radically revised his position. From such a perspective, one would argue that
all to lead to an extremist
denunciation of power
the

8

Most notably, in an inter

P
(Foucault, 1980, p. 164).

, he openly stated that he did not
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ground (Pasquino, 1993, p. 79). Such a reading seems plausible as the three conceptual
elements at work in the making of the civil war thesis, repression, domination, and violence

2.2.1 Limits of the Civil War Thesis
In the f

genealogical studies on sexuality and

gradually extending over the broader theoretical framework of power, the notion of

effects of power as repression [...] one identifies power with a law that says no

power is

e, p. 120). For
Foucault, this more and more becomes a serious problem as,
[w]hat makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it
things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be
considered as a productive network that runs through the whole social body, much
more than as a negative instance whose function is repression. (Ibid., p. 120)
Understanding power purely in terms of repression carries the risk of failing to notice the
productive aspect of how power operates and doing so will eventually end up with a onesided and partial understanding of the concept. As one might easily see coming, the notion
of domination also suffers a similar scrutiny. Foucault no longer seems to be formulating
domination as the primary effect that power produces and the distinction between the
former and the latter becomes much more noticeable. The following passage shows how
Foucault now formulates domination in a different way from power:
When an individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of power relations,
immobilizing them and preventing any reversibility of movement by economic,
political or military means, one is faced with what may be called a state of
domination. In such a state, it is certain that practices of freedom do not exist or
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exist only unilaterally or are extremely constrained and limited. (Foucault, 1997, p.
283)
Domination now designates a specific configuration in which relations of power are
blocked and go side by side with the use of violence and coercive techniques. More
importantly, domination appears as one possibility amongst others, and, for Foucault, it is
highly erroneous to equate the exercise of power with that of domination. Similarly, while
Foucault does not posit a strict dichotomy between power and violence

(Foucault, 2000d, p. 340)

as he argues,

Foucault still underscores a distinction between the two
a body or upon things; it forces,

p. 340), the exercise of power is more of a matter of arranging or directing those
possibilities.
What we have, then, is a new and quite different conceptual vantage point that does
not concentrate solely on the repressive effects of the exercise of power but also one that
strives to give an account of how relations of power can function in multiple ways. The
task to which F
for emancipation or subjugation, and at what point power turns into a system of
domination. Indeed, the Collège de France lectures in 74-75 and Discipline and Punish
were mostly devoted to exploring the normative effects of power; the conceptual framing
of biopower emerges in the first volume of History of Sexuality and throughout the 75-76
lectures, and the question of power is situated within the theoretical framework of
governmentality starting from the mid-1970s onward. What we have is a new way of
formulating power that goes beyond the model based on the triangulation of civil war-
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repression-domination, and a theoretical move from the repressive dimension of power to
that of the productive, extending first to an analysis of the normative and regulative
modalities of power and later on to technologies for directing conduct, in which power
seems to be posited less and less as primarily a matter of confrontation and conflict.
As I have discussed above, the assumption that Foucault has completely abandoned
the bellicose model and radically revised his position in the following years would be one
possible way to make sense of this transition. From this perspective, the civil war thesis
would stand as a provisional answer to the question of how power operates, a conjectural
reading culminating from a peculiar socio-political context, perhaps a transient phase
towards the path of a more elaborate and refined conceptualization, or even be regarded as
a premature or unsuccessful take. In the end, one might argue that this model put too much
emphasis on the repressive dimension, and subsequently rendered the line of demarcation
between power and violence almost indistinguishable. Yet there is another way to
understand this transition. While acknowledging the inherent shortcomings of the civil war

later formulations, it is also possible to regard the civil war thesis, and its model of conflict

conceptualizations of power. I will therefore demonstrate how elements from the civil war
thesis complicate the subsequent conceptualizations of power in terms of both biopolitics
and governmentality.
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2.2.2 Biopolitics and Biopower
The term biopolitics is a portmanteau word, the combination of bios and politics.9 It can be
simply understood as the politics of life. Whereas the first use of the concept of biopolitics
could be traced back to the second lecture that Foucault gave at the State University of Rio
Birth of the
(Foucault, 2000b)10, a far more detailed account of the concept can be found in the Collège
de France lecture held on March 17, 1976, and in the final chapter of the first volume of
History of Sexuality,
1978). In both instances, Foucault defines biopolitics in terms of a general reconfiguration
of the order of the political or, more precisely, as a historical transformation that placed

9

also the term geopolitics) book, Stormakterna: Konturer Kring
Samtidens Storpolitik (The Great Powers), publish
is its introduction of the biological into the realm of politics by raising an organicist and naturalistic
continuation of nature at another level and therefore destined to incorporate and reproduce nature's original
. The theme of biopolitics can also be found in the works of those
Ibid.,
with racial themes, emerges
in the discourses of ideologues aligned with the National Socialist movement. Finally, during the 1960s, the
theme of biopolitics can also encountered in Anglo-American political science circles. This time, however,
the concept is
take up research from the biology of behavior, socio2009, p. 2). While it is an open question whether Foucault was influenced by the uses of the concept that
preceded his, the way he conceptualizes biopolitics is fairly different from previous iterations: the concept of
biopolitics, through Foucault's use of it, does not aim at constructing an organicist political theory but as a
concept to denote an historico-political paradigm shift that situates life in the realm of politics.
10
The Birth of Social Medicine is the first text in which Foucault uses the term biopolitics. The concept of
biopolitics here denotes political strategies that aim at maintaining the
especially within the context of the intensive process of medicalization in Western societies since the 18 th
century (Foucault, 2000b, p. 137). According to Foucault:
but also in the body and with the body. For capitalist society, it was biopolitics, the biological, the
somatic, the corporal, that mattered more than anything else. The body is a biopolitical reality;
medicine is a biopolitical strategy. (Ibid., p. 137)
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biological life in the matrix of power relations and at the center of politics in Western
societies from the second half of the 18th century.
Throughout the texts of 1976, the concept of biopolitics designates above all the
emergence of a new regime of power that functions on the basis of the biological
characteristics of the human species and whose primary goal is to produce effects of
regularization and normalization at the population level. Foucault refers to this novel
modality of power as biopower

influence on life, that

endeavours to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and

biopower is closely tied with the broader transformation that has been taking place from
the second half of the 18th century onwards in the European context. The technological and
scientific innovations, including the rapid increase in industrial and agricultural output,
developing scientific knowledge

especially the growing knowledge of human anatomy

and physiology due to the breakthroughs in medicine

and unprecedented growth in the

levels of the
importantly, for him, biopower denotes

142).

within the context of the historical transition from the classical model of sovereignty to that
of modern political regimes that deploy strategies and procedures where life becomes the
privileged object of relations of power. For Foucault, while the turn toward
biopoliticization of societies meant an increase
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this new regime of power also has another significant meaning. The culmination of
Western biopolitics goes side by side with the historical emergence of the capitalist mode
of production. This novel regime of power was vital to the emergence of capitalism as it
fulfilled two preconditions: first, the creation of productive bodies, and second, the
maintenance of calculable populations.
t the already existing regimes of
power, based on the classical model of sovereignty and the divine right of kings, could no
longer fulfil the urgent demands imposed by capitalism. For Foucault, power under the
model of sovereignty functioned more or less

(Foucault, 1978, p. 136) and through the exercise of absolute right to rule over a given
territory. This was clearly inadeq

How does biopower fulfil such a demand? What distinguished this new modality
of power, according to Foucault, was its operationality through
a set of processes such as the ratio of births to deaths, the rate of reproduction, the
fertility of a population, and so on. It is these processes the birth rate, the mortality
rate, longevity, and so on together with a whole series of related economic and
s it seeks to control. (Foucault,
2003, p. 243)
On the other hand, it was the invention of a new object for the exercise of power: the
population. Foucault argues,
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One of the great innovations in the techniques of power in the eighteenth century
was the emergence of population as an economic and political problem:
population as wealth, population as manpower or labor capacity, population
balanced between its own growth and the resources it commanded. Governments
perceived that they were not dealing simply with subjects, or even with a people,
but with a population, with its specific phenomena and its peculiar variables: birth
and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, state of health, frequency of illnesses,
patterns of diet and habitation. (Foucault, 1978, p. 25)
In other words, what biopower aims at is the creation of optimal outcomes, in that case, an
equilibrium or state of homeostasis, by the administration at the level of population. 11 That
means, the exercise of biopower does not involve direct interventions targeting the
individual bodies, but it functions primarily as a regulative technology of power exercised
-

12

In other

11

During the Collège de France lecture on March 17, 1978, Foucault states that:
The mechanisms introduced by biopolitics include forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall
measures. And their purpose is not to modify any given phenomenon as such, or to modify a given
individual insofar as he is an individual, but, essentially, to intervene at the level at which these
general phenomena are determined, to intervene at the level of their generality. The mortality rate
has to be modified or lowered; life expectancy has to be increased; the birth rate has to be stimulated.
And most important of all, regulatory mechanisms must be established to establish an equilibrium,
maintain an average, establish a sort of homeostasis, and compensate for variations within this
general population and its aleatory field. (Foucault, 2003, p. 246)
12
For Foucault, the disciplinarization of individual bodies and the regularization of populations are two fields
for the deployment of biopolitics. However, it is crucial to note here that the concept of biopower does not
denote a condition in which the disciplinary techniques simply diffuse through the whole social fabric. While
complementing each other, biopower and disciplinary power are still two distinct modalities of power. As
Foucault states:
Now I think we see something new emerging in the second half of the eighteenth century: a new
technology of power, but this time it is not disciplinary. This technology of power does not exclude
the former, does not exclude disciplinary technology, but it does dovetail into it, integrate it, modify
it to some extent, and above all, use it by sort of infiltrating it, embedding itself in existing
disciplinary techniques. This new technique does not simply do away with the disciplinary
technique, because it exists at a different level, on a different scale, and because it has a different
bearing area, and makes use of very different instruments. (Foucault, 2003, p. 242)
To put it in a different way, whereas disciplinary
organism-discipline-institutions series, and the population-biological processes-regulatory mechanismsFoucault, 2003, p. 250).
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over life which places it at the center of politics.
For Foucault, the most important aspect to this historical transition is the altered
status attributed to life. The emergence of biopolitics, as a radical change in the ways in
which power is to be exercised, implies a

start with the first part of the formula, for Foucault, the sovereign had an eerily large
repertoire of procedures and techniques for taking lives away, and the power he wielded

(Foucault, 2003, p. 248). 13

(Foucault, 1978, p. 136). Yet, there was a significant problem: the sovereign does not have
a similar capacity to establish control over life, and even less so to

hing more than a mechanism of
deduction and all he can do is to
not so much other than letting his subjects live. As Protevi writes, [s]o the sovereign has

his capacity for fostering and dismantling life (Ibid., p. 544).

13

Foucault traces the sovereign right of life and death back as far as patria potestas, the ancient Roman
familial law. For him, patria potestas
p. 135).
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on which biopolitical regimes operate (Foucault, 1978,
p. 138). For Foucault, biopower involves multiform strategies aimed at the enhancement
of the well-being of populations on the basis of their basic biological traits. However, the
most substantial difference involves the altered role death plays in this conceptual
framework. The highest function of biopower no longer denotes the capacity for
dismantling lives:
Now that power is decreasingly the power of the right to take life, and increasingly
the right to intervene to make live, or once power begins to intervene mainly at this
level in order to improve life by eliminating accidents, the random element, and
deficiencies, death becomes, insofar as it is the end of life, the term, the limit, or
the end of power too. Death is outside the power relationship. (Foucault, 2003, p.
248)
However, even though this new configuration might seem diametrically opposed to the
right of life and death wielded by the sovereign power now deemed obsolete, it is not so
much the case that, for Foucault, what is at issue here is the complete erasure of power of
death from the domain of politics. For him, this is not the case at all. In his 1982 lecture in
Vermont, Foucault claims that:
It [the modern state] wields its power over living beings as living beings, and its
politics, therefore, has to be a biopolitics. Since the population is nothing more than
what the state takes care of for its own sake, of course, the state is entitled to
slaughter it, if necessary. So the reverse of biopolitics is thanatopolitics. (Foucault,
2000c, p. 416)

modernity was marked by perhaps the most brutal political regimes ever to exist, ranging
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address this seeming contradiction through the concept of state racism. For Foucault, state

ng the

and it is indeed inscribed
in modern politics (Ibid., p. 62). The long and bloody history of ethnic cleansings, mass
murders, and racisms throughout the 19 th and 20th centuries went side by side with the
strategies and procedures for augmenting the living conditions of the population.
The problem is that while the notion of state racism could serve us well as a
descriptive politico-historical concept, it does not tell us much about the exact terms of the
reversibility between biopolitics and thanatopolitics. Should we take the concept of
thanatopolitics as some sort of an exception to biopolitics or as something integral to it
from the very start? As Roberto Esposito notes, Foucault does not draw a definitive
conclusion, and he oscillates between what Esposito identifies in terms of

if the thesis of indistinction between sovereignty, biopolitics, and totalitarianism
were to prevail the continuist hypothesis he would be forced to assume
genocide as the constitutive paradigm (or at least as the inevitable outcome) of the
entire parabola of modernity. Doing so would contrast with his sense of historical
distinctions, which is always keen. If instead the hypothesis of difference were to
prevail the discontinuist hypothesis his conception of biopower would be
invalidated every time that death is projected inside the circle of life, not only
during the first half of the 1900s, but also after. (Esposito, 2008, p. 43)
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This kind of indecision that could be lo
be seen as another expression of the long-standing tension that exists between the
productive and repressive dimensions of power.
of civil
war conflict, repression, and domination

now returns as an unresolved problem that

revolt of Nu-Pieds. The regime of repression that had designated almost the entire
population of the region of Normandy as social enemies and perhaps more significantly
what he called in terms of armed justice

the series of violent military operations equipped

to deal with the revolt with sheer force could be easily located in the framework of
thanatopolitics. Similarly, as the civil war thesis of 72-73 lectures demonstrates, the
conceptual framing of relations of power in terms of a ceaseless civil war wherein one
segment of society exerts itself upon others, denotes nothing but a thanatopolitical vision
as well. While it is more than evident that Foucault abandoned the civil war thesis due to
its inherent flaws

most notably, the risk it carries for reducing power to domination while

overlooking the productive dimensions of power

it nonetheless continues its existence as

2.2.3 Governmentality
After the one-year gap following the 1976 lectures, Michel Foucault originally planned to
devote the 78-79 and 79-80 lectures at the Collège de France for further analysis of
biopower. But something strange happens along the way. Though Foucault seems to be
inclined to develop his conceptualization of biopower in the subsequent years

even the

title of the 79-80 lectures, which was Birth of Biopolitics, strongly suggested this

his
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work takes another unexpected turn. After

research.14 During the lectures covering these two years, Foucault presents a detailed
analysis of government models starting from the 2 nd century Christian pastoral setting to
the late 20th century models of (neo)liberalism. According to Michel Senellart, who was
one of the editors of Security, Territory, Population, this shift changes the focal point from

Senellart, 2009, p. 370). What is extremely important
for us here is that this shift from biopolitics to governmentality denotes another turning

table is an understanding of power that moves even farther away from the civil war thesis.
Power now seems to be formulated in terms of the deployment of much more indirect and
subtle techniques for directing conduct rather than being a matter of direct intervention,
confrontation, and conflict.
What does the notion of governmentality imply and how is it differentiated from

ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and

2009, p. 108). This particular modality of power, having its roots in the Christian pastoral
setting, emerges as a politico-historical phenomenon circa the 16 th century as a general
14

Indeed, in one of the last interviews he gave before his death, he responds in the following way:
Foucault in Dreyfus
& Rabinow, 1983, p. 232).
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problem of governance.15 Before gaining its foothold in the sphere of the state, the question
of governance was posed to address the multiple aspects of social life: in terms of how one
should govern herself or himself, how to govern a household, how to govern souls, how to
govern children, and so on. For Foucault, what might be called the first historical phase of
governmentality correlates with the birth of the modern state. 16 This first phase delineates
a model of governance through regulatory techniques at the level of population in a way
that resembles his earlier formulation of biopower. However, it is with the emergence of

15

For Foucault, the model of pastorship has its roots in Ancient Near East civilizations, particularly Egypt,
Assyria, and Judaea, and also a common theme in Abrahamic religions. Pastorship involves a political or
social arrangement modeled akin to the one that exists between a shepherd and his/her flock; it functions as
a modality of power by way of constant care or ensuring, sustaining, and improving the conditions of life of
its members. In other words, the model of pastorship depends on the devotedness of the shepherd for ensuring
the salvation of his flock. Pastoral power, for Foucault, is an individualizing power; it is not exercised on the
level of community, but is based on individual attention to each member. According to Foucault, the theme
of pastorship gradually vanishes in the European continent throughout the Middle Ages, which can be
explained in part by the extreme poverty and ruralness of the medieval economy. However, for Foucault, the
most important factor was the emergence of feudalism, which presupposes different kind of intrapersonal
ties compared to the model of pastorship involves. According to Foucault, the model of pastorship does not
completely vanish away and continues to exist in a number of religious communities until its combination
with its opposite, the state, in the 16 th century.
16
For Foucault, there are two key concepts that explain the model of governmentality through which the
modern state operates:
and the technology of police. The concept of
refers to the
ntenance and preservation of the state once it has been founded, in
are not founded on the grounds
Ibid., p. 317) and do not advance a territorial definition of the State; in
this respect, they advance a substantially different form of governance compared to the traditional definitions
of sovereignty. From Foucault
, the governmentalization of the state also brings about the
statification (étatisation) of the society; various aspects of societies, matters such as education, health, or
economy, are presented as matters of the state and dealt within the rationality that ultimately aims the
). Drawing from Louis
Turquet de Mayerne's La Monarchie aristodémocratique, ou le Gouvernement composé et meslé des trois
formes de legitimes Republiques, Foucault writes:
The police includes everything. But from an extremely particular point of view. Men and things are
property; what they produce; what is exchanged on the market. It also considers how they live, the
diseases and accidents that can befall them. What the police sees to is a live, active, productive man.
Ibid., p. 319)
In other words, for Foucault, policing involves the implementation of rational ways of governing the
population within a specified milieu
through regulatory techniques and
procedures. For Foucault, the combination of
Ibid., p. 286).
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liberalism in the 18th century that Foucault sees the culmination of a genuinely novel
regime of power that departs from the juridical schema of sovereignty, the prescriptive
nature of the disciplinary model, and also the regularizing methods deployed by biopolitical
regimes of power.

population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses
of security as its essential technical instru

biopower was also a modality of power to be exercised on the level of population, but with
the emphasis on governmentality, Foucault proposes a more elaborated understanding of
this concept. In Security, Territory, Population, the concept of population is defined first

biologically bound to t
of people who exist in a given milieu (Ibid., p. 21). Second, Foucault remarks that

regularities and, more importantly, modifiable variables such as birth rates, death rates,
longevity, and so on (Ibid., p. 71). Such a formulation seems more or less in line with the
analysis of biopower. However, what differentiates population in the framework of liberal
governmentality, especially in the eye of 18 th-century liberal theorists, is that it no longer
denotes a passive aggregate of living beings or mere objects waiting to be regulated. In
light of the emphasis on governmentality, Foucault argues that the population gains the
the
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collective subject absolutely foreign to [...] pol
42). The concept of population now denotes a novel form of a subject-object of power
(Hoffman, 2014). To understand the true extent of this very claim, we have to discuss the
governmentality formula: political economy as its major
form of knowledge and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument
(Foucault, 2009, p. 108).
For Foucault, the historical emergence of liberal models of governance correlates
with the culmination of political economy as a mature scientific discipline and liberalism
flourishes within a paradigm of strategies and procedures seeking to maintain and amplify
rapidly expanding market and the emergence of
capitalism, the only viable strategy for achieving this was the prospect of a strong economy.
asuring its circulation,
determining the role of currency, and knowing whether it was better to devalue or revalue
a currency, insofar as it was a question of establishing or supporting the flows of external
ng of the market (Ibid., p. 76). This

of the market as a natural phenomenon

. That means, from the perspective

of political economy, the market was no longer taken primarily as a site of jurisdiction

seen as a self-sufficient domain that had its own rules and, more importantly, endowed
with intrinsic mechanisms for regulating itself. In other words, the liberal political

(Ibid., p. 131).
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From then on, running a prosperous economy was no longer a matter of
implementing interventions from above, but of enabling it to flourish naturally via the
supposed equilibrium between the cost of a commodity or service and the scale of demand.
not interfering, allowing free movement,
letting things follow their course; laisser faire, passer et aller

basically and

fundamentally means acting so that reality develops, goes its way, and follows its own

p. 48).
According to this analysis, liberal governmentality demanded a self-limitation on
governance. However, what was at issue was not solely a disdain for too much interference.
Liberal governmentality also meant the emergence of a new rationality, through the
maximization of efficiency or by achieving the greatest results with the least possible input.
Liberal models of government thus operate through the economization of governance. This
tendency only intensifies with the emergence of neoliberalism. Throughout the lectures
between 1979 and 1980 at Collège de France, which is later published under the title of
Birth of Biopolitics
nt of Chicago school driven US
neoliberalism in the second half of 20 th century (Foucault, 2008, p. 28). For the advocates
of the neoliberal school of thought, Foucault claims, what needed to be done was not so
much of a matter of limiting the state interv
but of taking the formal principles of a market economy and referring and relating them to,
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neoliberal governmentality ceaselessly sought various ways to further spread the economic
rationalities of the market to the almost entire political realm and spheres of society.
homo economicus
understanding neoliberalism:
someone who pursues his own interest, and whose interest is such that it converges
spontaneously with the interest of others. From the point of view of a theory of
government, homo economicus is the person who must be let alone. With regard to
homo economicus, one must laisser-faire; he is the subject or object of laissez-faire.
And now, [...] homo economicus, that is to say, the person who accepts reality or
who responds systematically to modifications in the variables of the environment,
appears precisely as someone manageable, someone who responds systematically
to systematic modifications artificially introduced into the environment. (Foucault,
2008, pp. 270-271)
Furthermore, homo economicus

ividual

and the power exercised on him, and so the principle of the regulation of power over the
-253). This new subject/object of the relations of power is no
longer the product of a regulation imposed externally, but should be thought of to be
functioning as self-regulating individuals who are expected to continuously invest in their
human capital and act in a way incentivized by the mechanisms of competition. In short,
for Foucault, what lies at the heart of the notion of homo economicus is a novel formulation
of the rational and autonomous subjects who are endowed with a capacity to act but are

the environment and systematically modify its
The intention, then, is to designate the exact mechanisms through which this new
modality of power operates, and this is where apparatuses of security come into play. What
is an apparatus or dispositif of security? For Foucault, an apparatus of security does not
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designate what one might first assume. What is implied here by security is not a matter of
defending the rights of the sovereign, the integrity of a state, or the protection of a given
aratus of security stands for a combination of multiform
procedures and techniques that target to achieve a relative degree of control over
contingencies, risks, or dangers a given population could ever face:
Putting it in a still absolutely general way, the apparatus of security inserts the
phenomenon in question [...] within a series of probable events. Second, the
reactions of power to this phenomenon are inserted in a calculation of cost. Finally,
third, instead of a binary division between the permitted and the prohibited, one
establishes an average considered as optimal on the one hand, and, on the other, a
bandwidth of the acceptable that must not be exceeded. (Foucault, 2009, p. 6)
o the rationality of the
market. The drive for efficiency and calculability are two indispensable aspects of the way

end to a nullification of phenomena in the

form of a progressive self(Ibid., p. 66).
The last part of thi

-cancellation of phenomena by
(Ibid., p. 66). Besides

denoting how apparatuses of security deal with the potential threats and contingencies, this
formulation foreshadows a radically different modality of governance. When the
apparatuses of security are taken into consideration, government cannot be seen merely as
a matter of intervention targeting an individual body

a Foucauldian security mechanism

does not seek to normalize, discipline, or prescribe anything on an individual body

rather,
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what is at issue here is more of a subtle interference within the circuits of action by

emerges as a
means for directing conduct or the conduct of conducts. That means, government no longer
relies on imposing restrictions but involves orienting, incentivizing, and organizing the
desired set of behaviors. From this perspective, the exercise of power, then, is neither a
matter of producing regularizing effects on the level of population, nor a matter of
establishing a state of homeostasis, but becomes more of coding and directing flows. Power
becomes synonymous with governance through the management of possibilities, risks, and
probable events, and incentivizing certain kinds of behaviors to enable societies to follow
ndeed, for Foucault, the rationality
imbued in apparatuses of security is intrinsic to the modern framing of the concept of
freedom. Freedom not only stands as a prerequisite for the operationality of liberal
governmentality, but
[a]n apparatus of security [...] cannot operate well except on condition that it is
given freedom, in the modern sense [the word] acquires in the eighteenth century:
no longer the exemptions and privileges attached to a person, but the possibility of
movement, change of place, and processes of circulation of both people and things.
I think it is this freedom of circulation, in the broad sense of the term, it is in terms
of this option of circulation, that we should understand the word freedom, and
understand it as one of the facets, aspects, or dimensions of the deployment of
apparatuses of security. (Foucault, 2009, pp. 48-49)

that takes population both as its subject-object, projects the principles of the market
economy to its dispositifs, functions by deploying techniques for directing conduct, and, in
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2.2.4 A New Formulation of Power
Foucault's formulation of (neo)liberal governmentality denotes a modality of power
differentiated both from the earlier model of civil war and, to a lesser extent, the model

that it is a mode of
action that does not act directly and immediately on others. [. . .] [I]t acts upon their actions:
d,
p. 340). In other words, what is at issue here is that power no longer denotes a warlike
relationship in which one tries to lay dominance over others or the production of
regularizing and normative effects throughout societies:
[a] power relationship [...] can only be articulated on the basis of two elements that
over whom power is exercised) is recognized and maintained to the very end as a
subject who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of
responses, reactions, results, and possible inventions may open up. (Ibid. p. 340)
There are two elements that need closer attention. First, what does it mean that the one over
whom power is exercised should be recognized and maintained as a subject capable of

exercised is no longer merely a static object but a semi-autonomous and active individual
endowed with subjectivity. Second, the exercise of power should be thought of as a process
that functions by opening up a whole range of new possibilities. The exercise of power
now becomes the management of contingencies, establishing a regime of control by
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wielding techniques of incentivization of certain behaviours rather than thought of as a
restrictive force that relies on the use of repressive tactics, or regulatory techniques and
procedures. On the contrary, Foucault makes a paradoxical claim that posits freedom as the
condition of the possibility of power:
Power is
this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of
possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and modes
of behavior are available. Where the determining factors are exhaustive, there is no
relationship of power: slavery is not a power relationship when a man is in chains,
only when he has some possible mobility, even a chance of escape. (Ibid., p. 342)
This surely does not mean that the one who exercises power and the one over whom power

is p
d
17

What then becomes of struggle, confrontation, or resistance? Apparently,

17

I influence your behavior, or I try to do so. And I try to guide your behavior, to lead your behavior.
The simplest means of doing this, obviously, is to take you by the hand and force you to go here or
there. That's the limit case, the zero-degree of power. And it's actually in that moment that power
ceases to be power and becomes mere physical force. On the other hand, if I use my age, my social
position, the knowledge I may have about this or that, to make you behave in some particular way
that is to say, I'm not forcing you at all and I'm leaving you completely free that's when I begin to
exercise power. It's clear that power should not be defined as a constraining act of violence that
represses individuals, forcing them to do something or preventing them from doing some other
thing. But it takes place when there is a relation between two free subjects, and this relation is
unbalanced, so that one can act upon the other, and the other is acted upon, or allows himself to be
acted upon. (Foucault, 1988, p. 2)
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proper to power would therefore be sought not on the side of violence or of struggle, nor
on that of voluntary contracts [...] but, rather, in the area of that singular mode of action,
(Ibid., p. 341).
But does Foucault completely drop the concept of resistance? Throughout 77-78
Collège de France lectures, Foucault clearly puts a great emphasis on what he calls
-

t much of a

process of top to down intervention and less so a relationship of coercion

in the end, it

needs actively participating subjects who are endowed with a relative freedom to act
what power presupposes in terms of the conduct of conducts is nothing other than counterconducts. Foucault formulates governance as a play between conducts and counterconducts and, at first glance, such a formulation manifests similarly to the way he positions
resistance to power.18 However, there seems to be a nonnegligi

a

not

mean is a position
opposed in a kind of face-off
preoccupation about the way to govern and the search for the ways to govern, we
identify a perpetual question which would be:
by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind
and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them. (Ibid., p.
44)
18

As I have discussed earlier, resistance appears as an integral part of Foucault's conceptualization of power
in the civil war thesis or the bellicose model and this is no different in the case of his analysis of biopolitics.
In the first volume of The History of Sexuality, resistance is presented as a phenomenon integral to how power
nce, and yet, or rather consequently, this
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What Foucault identifies in terms of the counter-conducts is not so much a radical refusal
of and a head-to-head struggle against power, as it was in the civil war thesis of the early

that challenges the already established circuits or matrix of governmentality from inside.
2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have focused on the relationship between the notions of civil war and
ly
1970s, in which civil war was posited as the matrix of relations of power and raised the
question of why Foucault abandoned it in the following years. The substantial change that
-standing tension
between the repressive and productive dimensions of power, though much in favor of the
latter, and brings about an arguably more refined understanding of power: first, in terms of
biopolitics, a regime of power that attends life at the level of population, and second,
through his analyses of governmentality, a projection of the principles of the market to the
general domain of politics. It could be plausibly argued that Foucault has successfully
overcome the intrinsic problems that the bellicose model carries within itself, that is to say,
the risk of reducing relations of power to domination and putting too much emphasis on its

procedures and strategies that aim to incentivize and orient certain behaviours over others.

itself as an analytics of power
supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies and so on which at a given moment establish
what subsequently counts as being self-
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p. 76). His approach
power fashion and traverse our lives, making us be what we are at the intersection of the

through also requires an understanding of the politico-historical context he ultimately
reflects upon. The civil war thesis, and also the reason Foucault dropped it, should be seen
in this light, as a response to the emergence of radical socio-political movements in the late

properly understood outside the context of the turbulent political atmosphere created by
the worldwide conflicts and struggles of the 1960s. As Alessandro Fontana and Mauro
Bertani puts it in:
[f]or the record, let us briefly recall that these were the years of war in Vietnam, of
(1971) three years be
in Ireland (1972), of the resurgence of the Arab Israeli conflict in the Yom Kippur
fall of Allende in Chile, of fascist terrorism in Italy, of the miners' strike in England,
power in Cambodia, and of civil war in Lebanon, Peru, Argentina, Brazil, and many
African states. (Fontana & Bertani, 2003, p. 285)

approach. Although, not being at France during the height of the
t the University of Tunis, whose

The Order of Things from
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1966, had been regarded by many as a book of the
19

,

starts to show an interest in the writings of Leon Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Che Guevara,
and the Black Panthers (Defert, 2013). His interest in subversive or revolutionary politics
is not just on a theoretical level. As Jan Rehmann notes:

dean of the philosophy department, and participates in the intellectual milieu of the
Gauche prolétarienne
-known
publishes the inhuman prison conditions and life stories of the prisoners. Within a
short time the group succeeds in building a network of up to 2,000 3,000
intellectuals and begins to support the revolts in the prisons with a publicly effective
prison-critical movement. (Rehmann, 2022, p. 136)
Moreover, the strong emphasis that the civil war thesis puts on repression also reflects the
regime of restoration following the

of
. Leaders and militants are imprisoned, its paper La
Cause du peuple is banned, and the editors of the paper are imprisoned. There is
always a very heavy police presence in the Latin Quarter. Access to the major
university buildings is controlled. Foucault is no doubt alluding to this in the first
sentences of the course. One still has to pass through several police cordons to enter
the Collège de France when Foucault is giving his lectures. (Ewald & Harcourt,
2019, p. 244)
In short, the understanding of power that the civil war thesis proposes, in terms of a
-repression-

19

The Passion of Michel Foucault (Miller, 1993).
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How, then, should we understand Fou

the civil war thesis?

raising from his analysis of (neoliberal) governmentality, emerge in the context of the
sustained defeat of the radical social movements of the 1960s and the rise of the triumphant

with that of flexible arrangements, the deregulation of the economy, and the containment
or the capture of revolutionary social and political movements in the circuits of a marketdriven neoliberalism created a substantially different political landscape. Indeed,

her would be elected exactly one month after the course [78-79 lectures]

s

(Foucault, 1988, p. 12), his new position is an attempt at reflecting this new configuration
of relations of power: less in terms of a warlike relationship where the repressive strategies
and restrictive force from above were commonplace and more in terms of the
viors, administer modes of life,

However, it is also clear that such a move is at the expense of the possibility of
formulating a clear passage between the notions of civil war and power. In fact, the theme

understanding of civil war is uniquely manifesting as one of the most potent alternatives to
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the Hobbesian conceptual framing of civil war. There is also another important outcome;

conceptualization of neoliberalism offers us an extremely fruitful way of rethinking how
power functions in the wake of the transformation
it at the same time carries the risk of overlooking the repressive dimension of neoliberalism,
especially the coercive side of financialization and the violence that it is both founded upon
and carries within itself. Indeed, it could be said that what pertains to the model of civil
war, the triangulation of struggle, domination, and political violence, still poses a
significant problem, however, this is due to its complete absence from the picture. As we
will discuss in the following chapter, this issue is taken up as a crucial theme and stressed
on reinvigorating the civil war
model.
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CHAPTER 3: CIVIL WAR AS THE PARADIGM OF (BIO)POLITICS
In the previous chapter, I discussed how Michel Foucault conceptualized civil war as the
matrix of relations of power in the early 1970s and why he abandoned such a formulation

canonical Hobbesian framing of civil war that had placed the concept at the outer limits of
the political. Yet this peculiar theoretical perspective was not a long-lived one and
ellicose model,

publishing of the 72-73 Collège de France lectures and their subsequent translations into
English. In the early 2000s, however, one can speak of a revival of interest in the theme of
civil war and Giorgio Agamben is one of the first thinkers who is keen to explore and put
the concept of civil war into use, without an explicit reference to Foucault's work
nonetheless resonating, while establishing his theoretical perspective. 20 In this chapter, I
will discuss how Agamben positions civil war as the paradigm of politics and how his
account opens up a possibility for rethinking the said concept in the framework of
biopolitics.
3.1 Civil War as the Fundamental Threshold of Politicization
In a series of public lectures at Prin
claims after almost 30 years, expresses his discontent with the lack of a current theory of

20

theorists and philosophers who made different interpretations and readings. Some, most notably Tiqqun and
Invisible Committee, took Foucault's earlier formulations and strived to develop them further for laying the
groundwork for an insurrectionary theory (Tiqqun, 2010; The Invisible Committee, 2009). Others, including
Judith Butler and Bernard E. Harcourt while acknowledging the merits of the primacy that is given to
struggle as the constituent force that shapes the political were more reserved about the risks it carries for
binary logic (Butler, 2015; Harcourt, 2020).
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comparable to
(Agamben, 2015). While establishing a full-fledged theory of civil war was not among the
goals of these seminars
as it appears within Western political thought at two moments in its history: in the
testimonies of the philosophers and historians of Ancient Greece and in the thought of
the 2001 Princeton seminars, which were later published
under the title of Stasis: Civil War as a Political Paradigm and would eventually become
Homo Sacer project, provide us with a succinct yet
thoughtconcept of civil war but also shows how he links the said concept to his reinterpretation of
Foucauldian notion of biopolitics.
For Agamben, civil war is not a phenomenon that points to the demise of the
political but stands as the very paradigm of politics in the wake of the War on Terror, a
period in which he sees the culmination of a global civil war. In the first part of 2001
seminars at Princeton University, titled Stasis, Agamben makes a rather bold claim that
situates civil war as the very foundation of Western politics: for him, civil war has been
functioning as nothing but the fundamental threshold of (bio)politicization dating back to
classical Greece. In the first part of the 2001 Princeton seminars, and in the short text
arising from it, Agamben attempts to rethink the classical Greek notion of stasis in the
wake of the 21st century and, more importantly, within the theoretical framework of
biopolitics.
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3.1.1 The Concept of Stasis
In Stasis
seminal work on classical Greece. There are two reasons why Loraux is important for
Agamben. First, Agamben claims that what distinguishes Loraux from her contemporaries
and predecessors, including highly prominent figures such as Jean-Pierre Vernant, Gustave
Glotz, and Fustel de Coulanges, is the strong emphasis she puts on the notion of stasis, or
more precisely the role she attributes to civil war in the making of history of classical

importance of stasis in the Greek polis

immediately situates the problem in its specific locus, which is to say, in the relationship
between the oikos, the family or the household, and the polis

-6). In

effect, for Agamben, what Loraux did was nothing less than redrawing the commonplace
topography between the oikos and polis by introducing the notion of stasis right into the
play.
How does Loraux do that? For Agamben, the answer lies in the ambiguity Loraux
attributes to civil war while she was tracing the said notion in the context of classical
Greece.
invented civil war in terms of bellum civile

it was the Romans who
and polemos, the word they use for

designating war, stood as a form of conflict that pitted the polis against the external threats,
tation:
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Stasis

partisanship, faction, sedition, and

as we say in an expression with very Roman

connotations

osition

should become a party, that a party should be constituted for the purpose of sedition, that

24). According to Loraux, what the Greeks saw in stasis

he abomination of

glance, stasis designates a destructive force that is capable of dissolving the established
socio-political order of the polis.
When it comes to the question of where the Greeks identified the source of civil
war, things get more complicated. Loraux points out two contradictory historical traditions
that designate different loci; first, the outside of the polis and, second, within the polis
itself. The first explanation, which Loraux thinks was the more common one among the
Greeks, defines the notion of civil war as an evil coming from the outside:
outside the city, perhaps even outside humanity, civil war is a catastrophe that rains
down on human societies like a plague (loimos), an epidemic, a tempest, or like the
nefarious consequences of an external war; battling the storm, the city is weakened,
even wounded, yet it waits hopefully for the moment when it will recover its
integrity after ridding itself of an evil that has come from the outside. (Ibid., p. 65)
However, Loraux adds, there also exists another

and to some extent contradictory

narrative that posits civil war as the culmination or intensification of the internal strife

21

oikeios polemos is, to the Greek ear, an oxymoron: polemos
designates external conflict and, as Plato will record in the Republic (470c), refers to the allotrion kai
othneion (alien and foreign), while for the
(familiar and kindred) the appropriate term
is stasis
6-7).
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(eris), or in other words, one that formulates civil war as something emerging from the
polis itself:
[T]here is also the much more dreadful feeling, which is rarely expressed and
when it is, always fleetingly, reluctantly, and incompletely that stasis is born from
within the city: in Theognis, it is what the city is pregnant with the terrible
gestation of murders between fellow citizens and, more generally, Greek tradition
interprets civil war as a sickness of the polis. (Ibid., p. 65)
It is this second way of framing civil war, emerging within the boundaries of the polis, that
Loraux primarily focuses on.
For Loraux, the crucial problem then becomes a matter of identifying how civil war
or stasis arises within the boundaries of the polis.

emos (our war at home)
in the Menexenus dialogue as her point of departure, Loraux carefully traces the origin of
stasis to the oikos (the household) or the family. 22 For Loraux, civil war is indeed an
internecine war that emerges from the oikos and is fought within the members of phylon

[c]ivil war is the stasis emphylos; it is the conflict particular to the phylon, to blood
kinship. It is to such an extent inherent to the family that the phrase ta emphylia
ty, as a
2015, p. 7)
-political
conflict that threatens to dissolve the bonds of the phylon and the prevailing order in the

22

(Agamben, 2015, p. 6) and is usually reserved for war proper.
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oikos

insofar as it is, that is

to say, an oikeios polemos
inherent to the city, an integral part
point, the origin of stasis or civil war according to Loraux might appear straightforward.

notion of stasis its ambiguity. For Loraux, the oikos is not solely the origin from which

itself constitutes the very possibility of reconciliation. It is in this sense that stasis, in the
context of classical Greece, functions both as a process of association and disassociation.
stasis, according to Loraux, is thus attributable to the
ambiguity of the oikos
In the 2001 Princeton seminars, Agamben stresses the dual characteristic that
Loraux attributes to the oikos

oikos, insofar as it contains

strife and stasis within itself, is an element of political disintegration, how can it appear as
the mod
following way: while it is true that civil war, in terms of stasis, denotes a condition through
which familial bonds are broken down and the oikos is shattered

in the end, civil war is

nothing other than an internecine war among those who were previously bonded by the
relations of kinship. However, for Loraux, the notion of stasis also carries the very
possibility of reconciliation by way of the creation of another kind of bond: citizenship.

polis
words:
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The oikos, the origin of civil strife, is excluded from the city through the production
of a false fraternity. The inscription that has transmitted this information to us
specifies that the neo-brothers were to have no family kinship between them: the
purely political fraternity overrules blood kinship, and in this way frees the city
from the stasis emphylos. With the same gesture, however, it reconstitutes kinship
paradigm of this kind that Plato had employed when suggesting that, in his ideal
republic, once the natural family had been eliminated through the communism of

In other words, Loraux argues that the citizenship model that the polis brings about could
indeed be thought of as another kind of phylon, this time at the level of the polis, which is
only to be realized by a reconciliation following stasis or civil war. For Loraux, civil war
is a crucial dimension of politicization in the context of classical Greece: it is precisely the
process through which the polis overcomes the oikos and the familial bonds are replaced
with that of citizenship. In this sense, civil war functions as the revealer of the constant
tension between these two poles that are at work in the making of political communities
(Loraux, 1997).
While there is no doubt that Agamben greatly appreciates the emphasis that Loraux
laid on the notion of stasis in her analysis of classical Greece, his formulations of civil war
differ from hers on several points. First, Agamben does not agree at all that civil war should
be understood as it is confined to the limits of the oikos

would civil war

the location and generation of the stasis within the oikos
to take for granted, needs to be verified and corrected

that the polis overcomes the oikos or that the latter is excluded from the former through the
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stasis. For him, what is taking place should not be understood in terms of a simple process

(Ibid., p. 13).
What, then, exact
Agamben provides us with a clear answer to this question in the form of two short theses:
1) The stasis does not originate in the oikos
forms part of a device that functions in a manner similar to the state of exception.
Just as in the state of exception,
, natural life, is included in the juridical-political
order through its exclusion, so analogously the oikos is politicised and included in
the polis through the stasis.
2) What is at stake in the relation between oikos and polis is the constitution of a
threshold of indifference in which the political and the unpolitical, the outside and
the inside coincide. We must therefore conceive politics as a field of forces whose
extremes are the oikos and the polis; between them, civil war marks the threshold
p. 22)
While these two theses may seem straightforward, to get a better understating of the full

will reveal how Agamben situates the notion of civil war in the broader theoretical
framework of biopolitics

a conceptual pairing absent fr

3.1.2 Life in terms of

and Bios

What does Agamben mean when he refers to the inclusion of

to the juridical-political

order by way of its very exclusion? To better understand this distinction, we need to focus
o

Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life to discuss the exact terms of

the distinction he posits between two different conceptualizations of life:

and bios
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(Agamben, 1998)

distinction has a

role of central importance and, for him, lays the foundations of the Western political
tradition. As Agamben explains:

used two terms that, although traceable to a common etymological root, are
semantically and morphologically distinct:
, which expressed the simple fact of
living common to all living beings (animals, men, or gods), and bios, which
indicated the form or way of living proper to an individual or a group. (Agamben,
1998, p. 1)
In other words, whereas the concept of bios denotes the politically qualified form of life
that is thought to be the basis of the life in the polis
politikos

and is almost always framed as bios

has no such political significance; rather, it indicates the mere natural or

biological existence which is only confined to the oikos
23

For Agamben, the polis is built upon the

exclusion of natural or biological life from the political realm. Indeed, as Agamben

(Agamben, 1998, p. 1).
However, for Agamben, what is at issue here is not a simple exclusion. There is
more to the distinction between

and bios than a separation of biological or natural life

from political life. The distinction between the two functions as a complex dispositif in
excluded from, and included in, the sphere

23

that Agamben draws from.

polis, especially The Politics (Aristotle, 1992), is one of the sources
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community (Mills, 2018, p. 39). In other words, the inclusion of biological life in the
political order by its exclusion animates the processes involved in the politicization of life.
The question then becomes identifying the exact mechanisms that are at work in
process of separation of political life from that of the biological. Two concepts play a
pivotal role here: bare life and the sovereign ban. Agamben derives the concept of bare life
from the historical figure of homo sacer, the sacred man, in archaic Roman law.24 For
Agamben, homo sacer
p. 101). The figure of homo sacer was banished from both the political and the social
domain; killing homo sacer was not considered an act of homicide, and sacrificing him was
not permitted. Thus, the figure of homo sacer involves a conceptualization of life different
from both bios and
understand how bare life is conceptualized in a radically different way compared to, or
perhaps diametrically opposed to, life in terms of bios; for him, the concept of bios implies
a form of life that is qualified to participate in political life whereas bare life is banished
from it. And while both bare life and

exist para-politically,

p. 5). Where, then, should we locate bare life in relation to the distinction between bios and
? The answer Agamben gives is that the concept of bare life constitutes a zone of
indistinction and the threshold that separates

24

from bios, mere biological life from

De Verborum Significatione (On the Significance of
Words) presents us a definition of the figure of homo sacer in the context of Rome:
The sacred man is the one whom the people have judged on account of a crime. It is not permitted
to sacrifice this man, yet he who kills him will not be condemned for homicide; in the first tribunitian
law, in fact, it is noted that if someone kills the one who is sacred according to the plebiscite, it will
not be considered homicide . This is why it is customary for a bad or impure man to be called sacred.
(Agamben, 1998, p. 71)
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political life. Or in more precise words, the production of bare life is the process through
which natural life becomes politicized. In other words, for Agamben, the production of
bare life is nothing other than the originary political relationship.
How to situate the concept of the sovereign ban in the conceptual schema Agamben
depicts, then? The answer lies in how Agamben conceptualizes the figure of homo sacer
as the one who is essentially banned from the social and political domain and the
production of bare life as an act of banishment. In more precise words, for Agamben, bare
irreparable exposure of life to death in the sovereign ban, such
that the politicization of life is ultimately nothing other than its exposure to death,
45). In this sense, the
concept of th
It is also important to note here that
what is at issue regarding the production of bare life is not simply a relationship of
abandonment or exclusion. Agamben claims:
[W]ho has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and made
indifferent to it but rather abandoned by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the
threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable. It is
literally not possible to say whether the one who has been banned is outside or
inside the juridical order. (Agamben, 1998, p. 28)
That means that, for Agamben, bare life is not located entirely outside of the juridicopolitical domain nor is it merely relegated to the margins of the juridico-political order. On
the contrary, the production of bare life through the sovereign ban precisely lays the very
grounds required for the implementation of the political structure of sovereignty. Agamben
claims that it is only through the production of bare life that the sovereign power
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between who deserves to live and who does not. For Agamben, this process of banishment
is nothing other than the dispositif that inscribes life to the political order, or in other words,
how the politicization of life takes place. In the end, it is in the production of bare life
through the sovereign ban that Agamben locates the foundation of Western (bio)politics.
3.1.3 A Permanent State of Exception

Agamben departs from the traditional juridico-political formulations of sovereignty which
equate the concept with the right to legislate laws, ruling accordingly, and wielding violent

sovereignty involves the concept of the state of exception. 25 In order to understand
the state of exception, we need to start with Schmitt.
conceptualization of sovereignty could be encapsulated in the following formula:
005, p. 5). As such a
formulation suggests, from Schmitt

, the sovereign is not necessarily the one

who exercises his power according to laws but is the one who can make the decision that
s positing of sovereignty as a capacity
for deciding on the exception marks a radical difference that separates his from the
traditional juridical formulations upon which that Western political theory is built upon. It
especially challenges the liberal theories of the state in which the normative nature

25

Carl Schmitt was a German political philosopher and legal theorist whose work is often overshadowed by
his relationship with the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) between 1933 and 1936.
Schmitt was heavily influenced by the Labandian school of legal thought, which attributes the state to a
central role in the juridico-legal system and the preservation of order and unity was posited as the primary
goal to be pursued at all costs. Schmitt s work challenges theories of political liberalism and has been
reinterpreted in a variety of ways by theorists from both left and right traditions. For a detailed biography of
Carl Schmitt, see: The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt (Balakrishnan, 2000).
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attributed to the law stands as the grounds for the possibility of the exercise of power. In

without being tethered to it. However, this does not mean that Schmitt locates the sovereign
entirely outside of the juridico-legal order; this would contradict with his aims. After all,

has a
paradoxical nature.
How are we to understand the paradoxical nature of the Schmittian notion of
-outside, and yet belonging: this is the
topological structure of the state of exception, and only because the sovereign, who decides
tion has a temporary
nature for Schmitt, it is important to mention here that what is at issue with the concept is
not just a last-ditch effort to preserve the state, or it should not be understood merely as a
state of emergency. Rather, the notion of exception plays a central role in the making of
juridical theory.26 From Schmitt's perspective, there is a crucial distinction that

26

It is worth noting that the state of exception also plays an epistemological role
account: he argues that to understand the rule properly, one should have a clear grasp of the exception.
Indeed, Schmitt ends the first chapter of Political Theology with a quote from Søren Kierkeg
Repetition:
The exception explains the general and itself. And if one wants to study the general correctly, one
only needs to look around for a true exception. It reveals everything more clearly than does the
general. Endless talk about the general becomes boring; there are exceptions. If they cannot be
explained, then the general also cannot be explained. The difficulty is usually not noticed because
the general is not thought about with passion but with a comfortable superficiality. The exception,
on the other hand, thinks the general with intense passion. (Kierkegaard, in Schmitt, 2005, p. 15)
only the rule but also its existence, which derives
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separates the juridical norm and its applicability: the former on its own does not necessarily
guarantee the latter. Schmitt writes:

its totality. He has the monopoly over this last decision. Therein resides the essence
of the state's sovereignty, which must be juristically defined correctly, not as the
monopoly to coerce or to rule, but as the monopoly to decide. The exception reveals
legal norm, and (to formulate it paradoxically) authority proves that to produce law
it need not be based on law. (Ibid., p. 13)
In other words, for Schmitt, there are instances in which the applicability of juridical norms
necessitates the suspension of the norm itself. In this sense, the state of exception
designates a lacuna in the midst of the juridico-political order. As he puts it, his notion of

Agamben takes one step further than Schmitt to conceptualize the notion of the
state of exception as permanent, especially in the context of biopolitical regimes of
modernity.

the state of exception loses all of its

temporary nature; it is no longer a safeguard in a latent form waiting for its activation but
becomes an essential part of day-to-day practices of government. In other words, for

subtract itself from the rule; rather, the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception

(Agamben, 1998, p. 18). In this sense, the integrity and continuity of the juridico-political
domain are sustained almost always by the use of extra-juridical violence. In other words,

abyssal act of violence (violent imposition) which is grounded in itself; that is, every
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positive order to which this act refers, to legitimize itself, is self-referentially posited by

between the production of bare life under the sovereign ban and the state of exception. For
him, the permanent state of exception that we are living through is the ever-growing lacuna,
or a zone of indistinction, in which both bare life and sovereign authority are in an almost
symmetrical relationship27. In effect, for Agamben, the state of exception becomes the only
paradigm of contemporary biopolitics.
3.2 Civil War and Biopolitics
I would like to shortly summarize what we have discussed up until now. First, for
Agamben, the distinction between

and bios is central to the politicization of life, which

occurs when biological or natural life is included in the juridico-political domain by way
of its exclusion. Second, the production of bare life through the sovereign ban is the precise
mechanism at work in the process of inscription of life into the juridico-political order.
And, finally, the politicization of life takes place in a juridico-political lacuna manifested
by a permanent state of exception in which the exception itself becomes the sole rule.

the oikos and the polis
proposes as an alternative could be reformulated in the following way: civil war no longer
denotes a war within the oikos or the phylon

27

as in the

homo sacer present two
symmetrical figures that have the same structure and are correlative: the sovereign is the one with respect to
whom all men are potentially homines sacri, and homo sacer is the one with respect to whom all men act as
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state of exception,

, natural life, is included in the juridical-political order through its

exclusion, so analogously the oikos is politicised and included in the polis through the
stasis

ppears as a process through which

the polis overcomes the oikos

a field of forces whose extremes are the oikos and
the polis

is precisely the expression of the irresolvable tension between these opposite poles, a
condition that could never be completely warded off from the domain of politics. 28
One issue that is surprisingly undertheorized in the 2001 Princeton seminars is the

28

From a certain perspective, it is possible to speak of a parallelism between Agamben's formulation of civil
war as the threshold of politics and the Schmittian understanding of the political as the friend-enemy
category for understanding politics is none other than the distinction he posits between the figures of friend
and enemy. It is important to note that the friend and enemy figures here are not taken
individualistic sense as a psychological expression of private emotions and tendenci
28). On the contrary, for Schmitt:
The enemy is not merely any competitor or just any partner of a conflict in general. He is also not
the private adversary whom one hates. An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting
collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy, because
everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to a whole nation,
becomes public by virtue of such a relationship. The enemy is hostis, not inimicus in the broader
sense (Ibid, p. 28).
It is also important to note here that Schmitt uses the friend-enemy distinction to refer to an existential and
concrete struggle, not a metaphorical one. Furthermore, Schmitt asserts that the friend-enemy distinction
26) and, for him, virtually anything can be politicized as long as it accommodates a sufficient degree of
antagonism that groups people as friends and enemies. Therefore, since the enemy figure always harbors with
it the notion of an existential threat, for Schmitt, the political realm is always a site of struggle or conflict,
and as such, extreme cases of conflict with the enemy are a real possibility. Although Schmitt claims that his
tangible possibility on the horizon. Indeed, war, or forms of violent confrontation in general, constantly
haunts the political realm and this appears to be one of the most significant characteristics of Schmitt's
political thought.
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paves the way for establishing such a link, he does not pursue such a trajectory to its fullest
extent, only briefly mentioning it at the very end of these lectures. Situating civil war in
the theoretical framework of biopolitics opens up the possibility of rethinking what was

does indeed converge with the definitions of the civil war thesis, there is a discontinuity
between his earlier formulations in which civil war was the very matrix for understanding
how relations of power operate and his understanding of biopolitics, the regime of power
in which life becomes the object for the exercise of power. As I have discussed in the

repressive hypothesis. From the mid-70s on, it has become apparent that Foucault was more
concerned about the risks his earlier formulations carried in reducing power to means of
repression and overlooking how power functioned as a productive network as well. Indeed,
with his formulations of biopolitics and governmentality, his work took a turn that led to
the abandonment of the civil war thesis. What I would like to discuss now is whether

biopolitics and provide a satisfactory solution to the problematic relationship between the
repressive and the productive dimensions of power while doing so. I will start by
considering what the Agambenian notion of biopolitics involves and how it differentiates
from Foucault earlier formulations.
3.2.1 Agambenian Concept of Biopolitics

concept, biopolitics no longer denotes a historical shift that situates biological life within
the matrix of power relations in Western societies beginning in the late 18 th century, but it
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prior formulation of the concept, the first point of departure,
and perhaps the most apparent one, is how Agamben delineates the proximity between the
notion of sovereignty and biopolitics. Whereas the notion of sovereignty
negative pole
and denotes a modality
ne

. When it comes to
Agamben, this is not so much the case: biopolitics does not denote the emergence of a new
regime of power that is radically different than the model of sovereignty, nor does
biopolitics render sovereign rule obsolete. As the politicization of life occurs through the
production of bare life under the sovereign ban
political relationship

which is nothing other than the originary

any political system based on the structure of sovereignty is already

co-institutional and the biopolitical

[T]he inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original-if
concealed-nucleus of sovereign power. It can even be said that the production of a
biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power. In this sense,
biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception. (Ibid., p. 6)

power is exercised under the political structure of sovereignty or under the conditions of
what Foucault calls biopolitics; in fact, these two concepts are almost synonymous.
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This brings us to the second line of difference. In his works, Agamben
dehistoricizes the concept of biopolitics. For Foucault, the notion of biopolitics more or
less involves the emergence of a novel regime of power in Western societies beginning in
the 18th century that situated biological life within the matrix of the relations of power. In

his formulation of sovereign rule is ahistorical. Why this is so? As the Agambenian concept
of biopolitics is essentially synonymous with the production of the bare life through the

p. 181). In other words, the notion of biopolitics does not imply a discontinuity or a point
of inflection in the ways in which power is exercised, on the contrary, it effectively
constitutes a continuum in the making of Western political history. Another important
distinction, which is closely related, involves the status that is attributed to modernity. As
we have discussed earlier, for Foucault, the emergence of biopolitical regimes of power

This is not so much the case i
biopolitics from the beginning

what modernity brings to the scene is not that

inconsequential:29

29

Jacques Derrida
:
[If] biopolitics is an arch-ancient thing, why all the effort to pretend to wake politics up to something
that is s
unconscious, wants to be twice first, the first to see and announce, and the first to remind: he wants
both to be the first to announce an unprecedented and new thi
firs
it dates from year zero. (Derrida, 2009, p. 330)
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Placing biological life at the center of its calculations, the modern State therefore
does nothing other than bring to light the secret tie uniting power and bare life,
thereby reaffirming the bond (derived from a tenacious correspondence between
the modern and the archaic which one encounters in the most diverse spheres)
between modern power and the most immemorial of the arcana imperii. (Agamben,
1998, p. 6)
While Agamben seems to be in agreement with Foucault in terms of a shared interest in
illuminating the politicization of life, there remains an important difference between these
two theorists: what is at issue for Agamben is the further generalization of bare life within
the procedures and mechanisms of the modern State. For Agamben, the modern State not
only functions as the revealer of the hidden tie between the production of bare life and the
sovereign power, but at the same time, it involves an intensification or absolutization of
the biopolitical nature of Western politics. What is important for Agamben is that, in the
circuits of the modern State, bare life no longer represents a precarious existence at the
limits of the political sphere. Rather, in the socio-political context of modernity, biopolitics
in terms of the production of bare life under the sovereign ban becomes the sole and hidden
paradigm of politics.
Within the context of the genocidal political regime established by National
Socialism, Agamben argues that the 20 th century bears witness to the highest degree of
biopoliticization.30 The phenomena of the Nazi camps and the final solution have a central
s analysis: by making the ultimate decision on who
deserves to live and who does not, producing perhaps the most explicit example of bare

30

Agamben and Foucault approach the question of the final solution in different ways. For Foucault:
Nazism is the product of an extreme state of crisis, the final point towards which an economy and a
politics unable to overcome their contradictions are carried, and Nazism as the extreme solution
cannot serve as an analytical model for general history, or at any rate for the past history of
capitalism in Europe. (Foucault, 2008, p. 110)
On the contrary, for Agamben, the final solution is the concealed paradigm of politics.
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life, the uncanny figure of Musselmann of the Nazi death camps, is nothing other than what
expresses the true, yet at the same time hidden, nature of the modern biopolitics (Agamben,
2008)31. Agamben writes:
Insofar as its inhabitants were stripped of every political status and wholly reduced
to bare life, the camp was also the most absolute biopolitical space ever to have
been realized, in which power confronts nothing but pure life, without any
mediation. This is why the camp is the very paradigm of political space at the point
at which politics becomes biopolitics and homo sacer is virtually confused with the
citizen. (Agamben, 1998, p. 171)
While Agamben topically focuses on the Nazi death camps in his works, for him, the camp
is not a phenomenon exclusive to Nazism. It would be erroneous to understand Agamben's
conceptualization of the camp simply as an extreme historical case or an anomaly. On the

Socialism, the refugee detention centres of
(Panagia, 1999, p. 3). However, what is more significant
is the following. For Agamben, the emergence of the camp:
appears as an event that decisively signals the political space of modernity itself. It
is produced at the point at which the political system of the modern nation-state,
which was founded on the functional nexus between a determinate localization (the
territory) and a determinate political juridical order (the State) and mediated by
31

For Agamben, the Musselmann stands as the most explicit figure of bare life. He writes:
Now imagine the most extreme figure of the camp inhabitant. Primo Levi has described the person
der Muselmann a being from whom humiliation,
horror, and fear had so taken away all consciousness and all personality as to make him absolutely
apathetic (hence the ironical name given to him). He was not only, like his companions, excluded
from the political and social context to which he once belonged; he was not only, as Jewish life that
does not deserve to live, destined to a future more or less close to death. He no longer belongs to the
world of men in any way; he does not even belong to the threatened and precarious world of the
camp inhabitants who have forgotten him from the very beginning. Mute and absolutely alone, he
letter. (Agamben, 1998, p. 185)
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automatic rules of the inscription of life, enters in a lasting crisis, and the State
(Agamben, 1998, p. 174)
But how does the camp fun
169). From this perspective, the camp does not need to be defined by any fixed spatiotemporal boundaries; it delineates a socio-political model. While it is true that Agamben
sees in the camp the unprecedented spatial absolutization of biopolitics, given how
Agamben reformulates the Schmittian state of exception in terms of the permanent state of
excepti
p. 181). In other words, for Agamben, the camp is nothing other than the ever-growing
lacuna where the exception becomes the rule and where the bare life is produced: The camp

Another crucial distinction is due to the repressive nature that Agamben attributes
to biopolitics.
bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never
ormidable

these two opposing forces, power of life and power of death, create a nearly unresolvable

reformulation, it is hard to speak of any sort of tension between the productive and the
Agamben
does not see in biopolitics regimes of power that foster life; on the contrary, the very
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concept becomes the name that he attributes to the process through which life undergoes

very exclusion (Agamben, 2015, p. 24). Biopolitics, by definition, is a process marked by
violence, subjugation, and domination.

power. In fact, these two theorists tend to conceptualize power in nearly opposite
directions. While his formulations radically changed over time, Foucault always strove to
understand power at the capillary level and within localized contexts. From a
methodological perspective, he prioritized relationality, multiplicity, and immanence
before anything else. Such an approach meant a head-on challenge against the oncedominant juridico-political theories of power that posit the notion of sovereignty both as

critique of We

(Foucault, 2000e, p. 122) in political theory.
Foucault's positing of

was indeed both an alternative to and a criticism of enduring juridico-political theories of
power. As one might expect, given his proximity to the Schmittian theory of sovereignty

does not have any intention to discard the concept of sovereignty at all. On the contrary,
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power is more or less a relapse to the Western juridico-political canon due to his heavy
reliance on the conceptual framework of sovereignty which renders his understanding of
-

(Ibid., p. 31).
Perhaps the starkest difference between the two theorists lies in the negativity that
Agamben ascribes to power. For Agamben, power is fundamentally a relationship of

2021, p. 48). From such a point of view, the
exercise of power no longer requires a degree of freedom, denotes a process of
subjectification, and even less so a productive network running through the veins of a given
society as it clearly did for Foucault. For Agamben, power is a plain and simple relation
that functions through violence, desubjectification, and subjugation. 32 In the end,

precisely the sort that Foucault strongly argued against.

of resistance. For Foucault, power and resistance are inseparable, particularly in the first
32

The following
Contemporary societies, therefore, present themselves as inert bodies going through massive
processes of desubjectification without acknowledging any real subjectification. Hence the eclipse
of politics, which used to presuppose the existence of subjects and real identities (the workers'
movement, the bourgeoisie, etc.), and the triumph of the oikonomia, that is to say, of a pure activity
of government that aims at nothing other than its own replication. The Right and the Left, which
today alternate in the management of power, have for this reason very little to do with the political
sphere in which they originated. (Agamben, 2009, p. 22)
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volume of History of Sexuality where he explicitly claims that what the exercise of power
presupposes is nothing other than resistance, and in his later work on governmentality, in
which he describes the process of governing as a play between various forces in terms of
conducts and counter-conducts. When it comes to Agambe
while not being in a relationship of complete exteriority to power, the possibility for
resistance seems to be deferred indefinitely. Resistance can only emerge at the level of
r is a silent one that is always too late

it

is, at best, a last-ditch effort. Power, on the other hand, is an all-encompassing and
totalizing political phenomenon.33
To summarize, biopolitics, for Agamben, is in effect the politics of the production
of bare life. Given that Agamben sees the genesis of politics in the production of bare life
under the sovereign ban, biopolitics thus stands as an ahistorical concept rather than
designating the emergence of a novel regime of power that eclipses the political paradigm

(Foucault, 1978, p. 137). For Agamben, there is no such categorical distinction between
biopolitics and political systems based on the exercise of sovereign power; the two have
always been closely linked together. While claiming that Western politics has always been

33

dispositif shows such a difference quite well:
Further expanding the already large class of Foucauldian apparatuses, I shall call an apparatus
literally anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model,
control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings. Not only,
therefore, prisons, mad houses, the panopticon, schools, confession, factories, disciplines, juridical
measures, and so forth (whose connection with power is in a certain sense evident), but also the pen,
writing, literature, philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, navigation, computers, cellular telephones
and-why not-language itself, which is perhaps the most ancient of apparatuses-one in which
thousands and thousands of years ago a primate inadvertently let himself be captured, probably
without realizing the consequences that he was about to face. (Agamben, 2009, p. 14)
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biopolitics from its inception, with the emergence of the modern State, Agamben sees a

does not exist any noticeable tension between its productive and repressive dimensions. As
far as life becomes politicized through an unconditioned exposure to death, it could be
conveniently ar
repression and marked by an elevated degree of violence. In this sense, it is almost

meaningful difference seems to be effectively flattened to the extent that the latter could

catastrophic endpoint of a political tradition that originates in Greek antiquity and leads to

3.2.2 Civil War as the Paradigm of Biopolitics
How can a connection be made between the notions of civil war and biopolitics? There is

Agamben, biopolitics simply means the politicization of life: it is the process that results
in the inclusion of life into the sphere of the political through its very exclusion and, more
significantly, by its exposure to death. (Bio)politicization takes place in the juridicoright to decide on
exception and marks the threshold that separates the natural life from the political life

or

in other words, the oikos from the polis
war: civil war, or stasis, stands precisely as the fundamental threshold of politicization. In
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well as revealing the tension between the oikos and the polis, civil war functions in a quite
similar way to the state of exception by way of creating a zone of indistinction between
them. In this sense, it would be more than plausible to argue that besides functioning in the
exact same conceptua
civil war and biopolitics also rely on similar procedures and mechanisms: functioning both
as the threshold for the politicization and the hidden paradigm of politics.
More significantly,
work, Agamben provides us with a relatively clear perspective on how he delineates the
connection between the notions of civil war and biopolitics. In the wake of the political
atmosphere following the 9/11 attacks and the US-led Global War on Terrorism, Agamben
argues almost in an enigmatic way that the key to understanding this conceptual connection
lies in global terrorism. While he does not elaborate much on this claim
refers to as global terrorism is loosely defined

and what he

the following passage nonetheless provides

context to the conceptual link:

[G]lobal terrorism is the form that civil war acquires when life as such becomes the
stakes of politics. Precisely when the polis appears in the reassuring figure of an
oikos
economic management then stasis, which can no longer be situated in the
threshold between the oikos and the polis, becomes the paradigm of every conflict
and re-emerges in the form of terror. (Agamben, 2015, p. 24)

the demarcation line between the economy and politics in the age of triumphant
neoliberalism and how he frames such a configuration in terms of a global civil war. Given
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between the oikos and the polis presents two possible outcomes: either civil war fades out
in the circuits of global capitalism and becomes an outdated concept, or such an erasure
results in the diffusion of stasis or civil war to the entire political sphere on a global scale.
Needless to say, for Agamben, civil war is far from being an outdated concept; what he
t zone of

on terrorism. How exactly could terrorism function in a way that entangles life into this
seemingly globalized form of civil war? Without any surprise, for Agamben, the answer

its unconditioned exposure to death

production of bare life

civil war under

the guise of global terrorism functions as the very paradigm through which our
contemporary biopolitical societies operate.
3.3 Conclusion

perspective, there exists
a close affinity between the concepts of biopolitics and civil war. But does this mean that
Agamben manages to overcome the cluster of issues that create an incompatibility between
the civil war thesis and later formulation of biopolitics that eventually led Foucault to
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abandon the former? If that is the case, what kind of a relationship does Agamben posit
between these two concepts from the theoretical vantage point of power? It is more than

power relations and resistance, nor does it evidence an alternative model to sovereignty as
it did for Foucault. Instead, Agamben emphasizes the intensified degree of political

constituent or originary political violence that both initiates and shapes the juridicopolitical structure of sovereignty. This is the exact point for establishing a conceptual
connection between civil war and biopolitics: if civil war is the threshold of politicization
and politics has always been biopolitics
production of bare life through the sovereign ban

these two concepts are rendered almost

indistinguishable from each other.

politics and how to situate his work
ccount of civil war involves an additional degree of difficulty. First,
Agamben is primarily a political philosopher who seems to be more attentive to the
questions of origin and hidden paradigms embedded in political phenomenon rather than
giving an account of how political phenomena historically unfold themselves in concrete

(Connolly, 2007, p. 27). Furthermore, as Sergei Prozorov writes:
The readers interested in what Agamben has to say about various issues in
contemporary politics, from the financial crisis to the war on terror, from the Arab
Spring to anti-Putin protests, from gay marriage to gun control, are bound to be
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contemporary or historical events and when they do, it is usually in an abstruse
historico-philosophical context that is apparently devoid of immediate political

philosopher who loftily dismisses all present-day concerns and has little to say to
us about contemporary politics. (Prozorov, 2014, pp. 1-2)
However, this does not mean that Agamben is altogether apolitical in his philosophical

references or allusions to politics and the most esoteric philosophical formulations are

same historically grounded methodology Foucault deploys while framing the concept as a
historical shift in the regimes of power, his work nonetheless provides us with an account
of how the history of Western politics, starting from Greek antiquity, unfolds itself as a
history of politicization of life through the continual exposure to death. In so doing, he
reveals a hidden paradigm in contemporary politics; the National Socialist concentration
camps are far from a disastrous legacy of the past. In the backdrop of the Rwandan
genocide that shocked the entire world, the ethnic cleansings during the Bosnian war that
brought genocide to the European continent once again, and the detention centers that are
part of harsher anti-

Homo

Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, gains a lot of attention both in the academic and
non-academic circles in the early 2000s.

formulations resonate with the political state
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in October 2001, barely a month after the 9/11 attacks that irrevocably altered the sociopolitical terrain on both global
fundamental paradigm for understanding our contemporary politics may appear strange,
but his diagnosis of a global civil war in the context of global terrorism eerily foreshadows
what is yet to c
a grid of intelligibility for understanding the historical process that starts with the invasions
of Afghanistan and Iraq and soon turns into temporally and spatially indefinite series of
armed conflicts, including the counter-insurgency techniques that blur the line of
demarcation between combatants and civilians in seemingly never-ending wars waged
against a spectral enemy on a planetary level.
he permanent characteristic of the state of
exception reflects upon the culmination of the widespread extra-juridical practices of
security apparatuses of the states. The culmination of counterterrorism acts
Act is an almost perfect example34

the US Patriot

which enables the states and security agencies to

enjoy almost unlimited powers outside the boundaries of both national and international
legal boundaries proves
or the politicization of life by an originary violence or
exposure to death, points out the biopolitical significance of this new political landscape
shaped by the political paradigm of terrorism and counterterrorism. The status of the
detainees of Abu Ghraib Prison or Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp animates

34

Signed into law by the former US president George W. Bush in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the Patriot
Act, or formally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, dramatically expands the reach of the US security
apparatus by making provisions such as expanding the scope of surveillance, indefinite detention without
trials, giving law enforcement agencies the permission to search property without a warrant, and alike. For
the act itself, see: https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ56/PLAW-107publ56.pdf

85

status of an individual, thereby producing a being that is juridically unnamable and

promising conceptual framework for delineating a zone of indifference where the
production of bare life, intensified political violence, and unhinged political power become
intertwined. However, it is worth asking whether the situation that Agamben depicts is
really a civil war or merely a theoretical account of terrorism. It is not too farfetched to

conceptualization of terrorism. Besides attributing a purely negative connotation to the
concept of civil w

civil war; it is not much of a play between various forces with an uncertain outcome.
Instead, such an equation of civil war with terrorism attributes an instrumental and
predetermined role to the concept. Second, even though Agamben seems to have
established a conceptual link between biopolitics and civil war, this seems only possible
due to his reduction of biopolitics purely to thanatopolitics. In other words, Agamben also
completely strips off the productive dimension that we can locate in the Foucauldian

possible or even meaningful to discuss any kind of tension between the civil war model
and biopolitics when considering relations of power. Third, this time from the perspective
of power, as long as power is equated with domination and coercion, any kind of distinction
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between political violence and power seems to be flattened; there is no way to tend to the
reversibility of civil war and power
While these criticisms should be taken seriously, it does not necessarily mean that
Agam

theoretical perspective can still inform discussions around our contemporary political
context, especially on the political regimes that rely upon an unprecedented degree of
polarization, extra-juridical means, and multiple forms of intensified political violence.
his insight of thinking civil
war alongside the erasure of the line of demarcation between economy and politics, where
governmental and juridico-political rationalities merge

provides us with a promising

means of reinterpreting civil war. As we will discuss in the following chapter, both Eric
Alliez and Maurizio Lazzarato, and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri push such a line of
thinking to its limits when they attempt to locate civil war within the circuits of global
capitalism.
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CHAPTER 4: CIVIL WAR AND CAPITALISM
The previous chapters traced the role the concept of civil war plays in the making of Michel

discussed how Foucault posits civil war as the matrix of relations of power and why this
formulation does not last long in his later works. The third chapter, on the other hand,

fundamental threshold of (bio)politics in the wake of the 21 st century. This chapter now
analyzes theoretical perspectives that emphasize the relationship between civil war and
capitalism, particularly in the context of globalized regimes of neoliberalism. I introduce
and discuss two contemporary theoretical approaches that explore the conceptual nexus

conceptualization of global civil war as an incessant conflict between two opposing global
socio-political tendencies, Empire and the multitude, which shape the politics in our

how (neo)liberal governance functions akin to civil war in the circuits of financialized
global capitalism and provide a reassessment of their theoretical perspective.
4.1 Civil War in the Circuits of Global Capitalism
In line with Foucault and Agamben, the concept of civil war also plays a significant role in
Multitude: War
and Democracy in the Age of Empire, the second installment of the trilogy that starts with
Empire
le from a condition of civil war
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assessments. First, in a quite similar way to Agamben, Hardt and Negri stress the
generalized nature of civil war in the making of the contemporary socio-political world.
Second, as we will discuss later, much like Alliez and Lazzarato, they also establish a close
affinity between globalized forms of capitalism and civil war. What distinguishes Hardt

derstanding of their theoretical perspective, I begin
my analysis with an explanatory primer of these two concepts to demonstrate how they
function in an antagonistic relationship.
4.1.1 The Concept of Empire
What does the concept of Empire denote? Hardt
global order, a new logic of structure and rule

(Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. xi). Even though Hardt and Negri characterize Empire as a form
of sovereignty, it would be an error to understand their conceptualization as an attempt at
revitalizing or adapting traditional conceptions of sovereignty to explicate the sociopolitical contexts of the 21st century. On the contrary, for them, such conceptions should
be dismantled:
Just as Kant sweeps away the preoccupations of medieval philosophy with
transcendent essences and divine causes, so too must we get beyond theories of
sovereignty based on rule over the exception, which is really a holdover from old
notions of the royal prerogatives of the monarch (Hardt & Negri, 2009, p. 6).
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For Hardt and Negri, the problem a return to the notion of sovereignty creates is the risk it
carries for establishing an
and mystifies the dominant forms of power that continue to rule over us today

power

-4).
On the contrary, the concept of Empire proposes a different way to understand
sovereignty from what is implied in the traditional use of the concept: for Hardt and Negri,
Empire neither has a territorial center nor is transcendental to the domain created by
relations of power and production. Instead, Empire is immanent to and diffused through
the vast networks of power and production on a global scale. In this sense, Empire proposes
a hybrid model of sovereignty that first and foremost functions as a machine of command
characterized by the tight interlocking of economic structures
with juridicoMoreover, the passage to Empire delineates a globalized political system in which
the nation-states seem to be losing their privileged status in the matrix of global politics.
In addition to losing their decisive role to the supra-national political and economic
organizations such as the European Union, United Nations, the World Bank, or
International Monetary Fund, their status was also challenged by the unprecedented growth
of multi-national corporations in a global market where in which all boundaries are
removed. It is also extremely important to mention here that Hardt and Negri neither
attempt to revive old theories of imperialism in the context of the 21 st century globalism

different model than what is at issue with the theories of imperialism:
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The boundaries defined by the modern system of nation-states were fundamental to
European colonialism and economic expansion: the territorial boundaries of the
nation delimited the center of power from which rule was exerted over external
foreign territories through a system of channels and barriers that alternately
facilitated and obstructed the flows of production and circulation. Imperialism was
really an extension of the sovereignty of the European nation-states beyond their
out
and the entire world map could be coded in European colors: red for British
territory, blue for French, green for Portuguese, and so forth. Wherever modern
sovereignty took root, it constructed a Leviathan that overarched its social domain
and imposed hierarchical territorial boundaries, both to police the purity of its own
identity and to exclude all that was other (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. xii)
Rather than denoting the subordination of the periphery to the center, and a rigid
segregation separating the world into two separate camps, the concept of Empire involves
an all-encompassing and intensified system of capitalist exploitation and a novel political
regime of subjugation that goes beyond the boundaries of any nation-state, or any kind of
fixed or pre-existing boundaries at all. To put it in a different way, according to Hardt and
Negri, there does not exist an outside to Empire,
pessimistic
and, in a sense, fatalistic?
4.1.2 The Concept of the Multitude
Quite the contrary; for Hardt and Negri, there does exist an alternative to, or better put a
possibility of an

n than

did the modern regimes of power because it presents us, alongside the machine of
command, with an alternative: the set of all the exploited and the subjugated, a multitude
. 393). This
is where the concept of multitude enters the scene. Whereas Empire stands as a global
system of control and machine of command in the service of capital, from the perspective
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project that must be

for the creation of a post& Negri, 2000, p. 61).
f it, the concept of the multitude has three distinct yet
interconnected connotations: the multitude a) as an irreducible multiplicity, b) as a concept
of class, and c) as a concept of power. First, as an irreducible multiplicity, the multitude is

2004, p. 113). It denotes a heterogeneous and irreducible multiplicity that consists of
identity
different cultures, races, ethnicities, genders, and sexual orientations; different forms of
labour; different ways of living; different views of the world; and different desires" (Hardt
and Negri, 2004, p. xiv). In short, the multitude manifests itself as a manifold of irreducible
singularities.

As a concept of class, the multitude implies three things: first, a change in the site of
production that involves the diffusion of labor to the entire society; second, a change in the
composition of the working class extending to the segments of society which are usually
excluded in more traditional analyses; and third, a change in the nature of labour itself. We
should analyze each of these elements separately. First, in order to understand why the
multitude means the diffusion of production to the whole society, we should start with the
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35

. The

Autonomist Marxist theorists locate a transformation in the circuits of production in the
context of the gradual passage from Fordism to post-Fordism 36 that results in an increased
degree of socialization of labour (Negri, 1989). In other words, what is at issue here for
Hardt and Negri is the diffusion of labour processes into the entire range of social relations
-time, casual and domestic work, the absence of job

c
can no longer be properly thought of as it is limited to the physical boundaries of a factory
or solely defined by the production of commodities. 37

35

For further readings on the history of Autonomist Marxism,
Composition and Struggle in Italian Autonomist Marxism, Michael Hardt
in Italy: A Potential Politics, and Sylvère Lotringer and Christian Marazzi
Politics (Wright, 2017; Virno & Hardt, 1996; Lotringer & Marazzi, 2007).
36
The Autonomist Marxist account of the socialization of production cou

ds:

Storming Heaven: Class
Radical Thought
Autonomia: Post-Political

further diffusion of relations of power through the networks of the social (Deleuze,
1995):
the use of electronic tagging to force offenders to stay at home between certain hours. In the school
system: forms of continuous assessment, the impact of continuing education on schools, and the
ever
potential cases and subjects at risk and is nothing to do with any progress toward individualizing
on for individual or numbered bodies of
products, and men, no longer channeled through the old factory system. (Deleuze, 1995, p. 182)
For Deleuze, such a transformation involves a change in the ways in which power is exercised. Power no
longer operates by shaping individual bodies in strictly organized sites of confinement, but through the
a selftransmuting molding continually
p. 179). For Deleuze, this transition from disciplinary societies to societies of control involves a radical
c
37

Negri writes:
While production is carried on through social networks and is closely connected with the processes
of commodity-circulation, and while productive labour (which, though diffuse, is above all socially
integrative) is to be found everywhere, by means of the social, production and reproduction
nt of view, work has
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At the highest level of capitalist development, this social relation becomes a
moment of the relation of production, the whole of society becomes an articulation
of production, the whole society lives in function of the factory and the factory
extends its exclusive dominion over the whole society.
The process of the
unitary composition of capitalist society, imposed by the specific development of
its production, no longer tolerates the existence of a political terrain even formally
independent of the web of social relations. (Tronti, 2019, pp. 26-27)

into a giant f
Hardt and Negri take one step further: not only production now extends to all social
spheres, but it also starts encompassing life in its entirety. In other words, from the vantage
point the concept of multitude provides us with, production becomes biopolitical

, p. xiii).
Second, the concept of multitude also marks a substantial change in the class
composition: it signifies a break from the factoryist conceptualizations of the working class
by extending the concept

-time, and non-guaranteed work and the

underground economy, as well as housework and non-

-

standing dichotomy between production and reproduction (Thoburn, 2003, p. 86). 38 Lastly,
the multitude is both the driving force behind and at the same ti

even less to do with the factory. The latter is no longer recognized or considered to be the specific
site of the consolidation of labouring activity and its transformation into value. Work abandons the
factory in order to find, precisely in the social, a place adequate to the functions of concentrating
productive activity and transforming it into value. The prerequisites of these processes are present
in, and diffused throughout, society (Negri, 1989, p. 89).
38
For Hardt and Negri, the conceptual framing of the
the working class is a limited one both
from the point of view of production (since it essentially includes industrial workers), and from that of social
cooperation (given that it comprises only a small quantity of the workers who operate in the complex of
(Negri, 2008, p. 115).
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historical transformation of capitalist production itself to include language, subjectivity,
-26), and defined in terms of the subject of
production not simply as the
production of things but as the production of relations and subjects, as the constitution of
the world

-26). Hardt and Negri write:

[T]he dominant form of contemporary production, which exerts its hegemony over
communication, and relationships. In such immaterial labor, production spills over
beyond the bounds of the economy traditionally conceived to engage culture,
society, and politics directly. What is produced in this case is not just material goods
but actual social relationships and forms of life. (Hardt & Negri, 2004, p. 94)
In short, as a concept of class, the multitude delineates a new regime of socialized labour
outside of the walls of the factory and the emergence of a new collective subject of
production composed not only of the members of the industrial working class, but also a
one in which virtually every individual is incorporated into the relations of production,
thus, meaning an unprecedented increase in social cooperation.
Third, Hardt and Negri describe the multitude also as a concept of power. It is

of further subordination and exploitation of labor by capital. While it is true that Hardt and
Negri are well aware that the multitude exists in a sociointegration of labor into capital becomes more intensive than extensive and society is ever
more comp

or where the

transition from the processes of formal subsumption to the real subsumption of labor under
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capital is nearly complete39

unlike many critiques of neoliberalism, Hardt and Negri, as

well as a number of other post-Autonomist Marxist theorists and philosophers, stress how
these changing labor processes also create viable conditions for the emergence of new
forms of struggle. Indeed, the concepts of the multitude and Empire harbor two different
modalities of power that are diametrically opposed to each other.
It is important to note here that such an innate antagonism between
tuted power
on Spinoza.40 In
presented to us as two
opposing concepts, in terms of potentia and potestas, and
interpretation unique is his inclination to elevate the difference between these two concepts
to an antagonistic level: Negri locates a non-negotiable antagonism between potentia and
potestas, rendering the former the horizontal, immanent, affirmative power which is
productive and constituent, and the latter as the hierarchical, transcendental, constituted
power of command and appropriation.

39

accumulation. Marx identifies two stages of the subsumption process: formal subsumption and real
subsumption. The concept of formal subsumption describes the situation in which the accumulation of capital
takes place within the already existing modes of production and reproduction, i.e. workers may still have
access to some means of subsistence beyond the reach of the capital. In other words, the accumulation of
existing labor relations; nothing changes but th
009, p. 350). On
the other hand, the concept of real subsumption refers to the situation in which all existing relations of
production and reproduction are completely integrated into the circuits of capitalism. It denotes the condition
in which all modes of labor and social relations conform to the demands of capital. For Marx, [w]ith the real
subsumption of labor under capital a complete (and constantly repeated) revolution takes place in the mode
of production, in the productivity of the workers and in the relations between workers and capitalists (Marx,
1992, p. 1035). For further readings: see, the appendix, Results of The Immediate Process of Production ,
of the first volume of Capital (Marx, 1992)
40
interpretation is reserved for
the following chapter.
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This distinction is carried further, possibly to its limits, when Hardt and Negri apply
it to explain the antagonistic relationship between Empire and the multitude. As a concept
of power, the multitude is formulated as a creative, horizontally organized, creative and
subversive network of power that is diametrically opposed to the overarching model of

mechanism that seeks to represent desire and to transform the world

more accurately: it

wishes to recreate the world in its image and likeness, which is to say to make a broad
horizon of subjectivities that freely express themselves and that constitute a community of

4.1.3 Global Civil War
How do Hardt and Negri conceptualize civil war? From a certain perspective, Hardt and

civil war as

be the fundamental threshold for politics; and, as we will discuss, it does not share Alliez
war with neoliberal governance.

traditional use of the concept as a deterioration of an already existing political order or as
an internecine political violence. Moreover, they also seem to posit some sort of a
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However, what makes their account quite distinct is how Hardt and Negri situate civil war
within the conceptual framework of Empire and the multitude.
Given that Hardt and Negri formulate Empire as the tendency for the transformation

waged across the globe today, some brief and limited to a specific place, others long lasting

(Ibid., p. 3). Moreover, Hardt and Negri write:
civil war should be understood now not within the national space, since that is no
longer the effective unit of sovereignty, but across the global terrain. [...] From this
perspective all of the world's current armed conflicts, hot and cold in Colombia,
Sierra Leone, and Aceh, as much as in Israel-Palestine, India-Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and Iraq should be considered imperial civil wars, even when states
are involved. This does not mean that any of these conflicts mobilizes all of
Empire indeed each of these conflicts is local and specific but rather that they
exist within, are conditioned by, and in turn affect the global imperial system. Each
local war should not be viewed in isolation, then, but seen as part of a grand
constellation, linked in varying degrees both to other war zones and to areas not
presently at war. (Ibid., p. 3)
Indeed, for Hardt and Negri, from the conceptual vantage point of Empire there is no
feasible or meaningful way to distinguish war proper from that of civil war: the passage to
Empire renders every single armed conflict as a theater of a looming global civil war.

upon two different standpoints. The first one is from the vantage point of Empire. For Hardt
and Negri, the concept of Empire denotes a tendency rather than a fully established global

s of Iraq and Afghanistan exemplify how,
for Hardt and Negri, civil war stands as an integral element in the passage to Empire.
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Besides the forceful integration of new territories into the circuits of global markets or
networks of governance, the global civil war also involves armed conflicts in varying
intensities between the states or non-

(Hardt & Negri, 2004, p. 4).
The second, and perhaps more significant, Hardt and Negri
war has its roots in the antagonistic relationship between Empire and the multitude. As I
have discussed above, whereas the concept of Empire signifies the tendency for the
emergence of a novel form of global sovereignty that operates as a machine of command
and apparatus of control in the service of capital, the multitude stands as an irreducible

project that must be brought into existence throu
could dismantle Empire and replace it with a postcapitalist democracy. In other words, as
well as denoting a political landscape that is marked both by an intensified degree of
exploitation and subjection, the passage to Empire also suggests the emergence of new
forms of resistance and struggle. Indeed, it is in this very antagonism, without the
possibility of any kind of mediation, that Hardt and Negri locate a globalized condition of
civil war: precisely between
creative yet at the same time subversive resistance. From this perspective, on the one hand,

the regu
239). On the other hand, it implies the emergence of multiple forms of resistance,
insurgencies, and incessant political conflict. Under the conditions of the innate antagonism
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between Empire and the multitude, civil war becomes a permanent condition that traverses
the entire globe.

post-capitalist future embodied in the political project of the multitude? Not so much, the
political strategy that they propose is not a call for accentuating the globalized condition of
civil war embedded in the circuits of Empire, nor does it suggest a deepening of political
polarization in the hopes that violent action spurs an anti-capitalist revolution that could
hit capitalism a death blow. Their alternative is, in a sense, more subtle and nuanced. While
Hardt and Negri abstain from completely dismissing the role of some forms of political
violence their discussions on the democratic use of violence and how they characterize
EZLN and the Intifada clearly show us this

they nonetheless point out the limits of

political strategies that advocate armed struggle (Hardt & Negri, 2004). For Hardt and
Negri, what needs to be done is nothing other than a rigorous experimentation of new ways
of life in common

which is a call for the invention of horizontal political bodies, creating

new lines of alliances and new forms of resistance

and creative yet subversive democratic

politics that could transgress and challenge the boundaries of Empire, this novel system of
global sovereignty in the service of capital:
It is not unreasonable to hope that in a biopolitical future (after the defeat of
biopower) war will no longer be possible, and the intensity of the cooperation and
communication among singularities (workers and/or citizens) will destroy its
possibility. A one-week global biopolitical strike would block any war. In any case,
we can imagine the day when the multitude will invent a weapon that will not only
allow it to defend itself but will also be constructive, expansive, and constituent. It
is not a matter of taking power and commanding the armies but destroying their
very possibility. (Ibid., p. 347)
In this sense, the post-capitalist democratic future that the multitude embodies is a project
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simply as the absence of war, but the peace in strictly Spinozist terms: a harmonious
existence between one and others, or in Hardt and Negri
41

.

4.2 Civil and Neoliberalism
Written in the aftermath of struggles that began with alter-globalization and accelerated
with the occupation movements and popular uprisings of the early 2010s, and within the
context of the rise of the New Right, ever-deepening social and political divisions, and
intensified and widespread political violence, Eric
coauthored work, Wars and Capital
In a similar
way to

formulations, civil war also plays a significant role in the making
; they depict a condition of generalized civil war in the

circuits of global capitalism.
rior
formulations due to their strong emphasis on the all-encompassing nature attributed to civil
metaphysical political concept as it did for Agamben. Theirs is more of an attempt to frame
a politico-historical phenomenon that resonates with the development of capitalism,
stressing especially the question of how civil war becomes an intrinsic aspect to how
financialized capitalism operates. Indeed, Wars and Capital could be well read in this light
as a genealogy of capitalism in terms of a counter-history that traces its points of

41

2016a, p. 530) or consists in a union or harmony of minds
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intersection with the culmination of multiple modalities of warfare. In this sense, Alliez

historical approach, if we recall his formulation of civil war as the paradigm of relations of
power in the wake of the emergence of the modern state. Does this mean that Alliez and
Lazzarato simply repeat what Foucault argued in the early seventies? While it would not

formulations from the early 70s, drawing from Marx, they provide us with a unique way
of

ar thesis.

4.2.1 Capitalism and Civil War
Let me start with the question of how Alliez and Lazzarato conceptualize civil war and
relate it to politics. First, for these authors, civil war is not a condition that implies the
deterioration of an already existing political order. Quite the opposite:
Far from being that moment of atomic disintegration requiring the intervention of
a constitutive and pacifying mediation (the sovereign as founding principle of the
social body), civil war is the very process through which new communities and
their institutions are established. It is not limited to being the expression of a
temporally limited, constitutive power since it is always at work. (Alliez &
Lazzarato, 2016, p. 274)
Largely resonating with
does not come after civil war, it does not follow a conflict like its pacification; inversely,

and stasis structure and de-structure power; they form a matrix within which elements of
-275). Here, we see a

perspective of the early 70s. The difference, however, becomes much more noticeable
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when it comes to the question of how civil war should be understood in the context of
neoliberalism.
While it is true that neoliberalism appears to be characterized as an intensified or
generalized condition of civil
assume that their diagnosis is only particular to the neoliberal forms of capitalism. For
Alliez and Lazzarato, from its emergence as a dominant mode of production, civil war is
immanent to how c
, at first sight, a model of
production, implicate civil war and why does neoliberalism coincide with an intensified or
generalized form of civil war?
To answer these questions, we need to first take a closer look at how Alliez and

formulation is that capitalism is not solely a mode of production or purely an economic
category. They argue that capitalism is nothing other than the historical product of the

Lazzarato insist on the role money plays in the development of capitalism. Being nothing

enslavement (asservissement
movement of capital and as the apparatus

argue, it would be a mistake to
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then becomes: how does money produce and maintain positions of power in society? 42 This

they write,

monopoly on force sustain each other reciprocally. Without war being waged
externally (colonial and inter-state war) and without the state waging civil war and
internal wars of subjectivities, capital would never have formed, and inversely:
without capture and the valorization of wealth operated by capital, the state would
on the organization of an army. (Ibid., p. 44)
es side by side with
the history of states and the history of wars. How do these three constituent forces intersect
and give rise to capitalism? The answer, according to Alliez and Lazzarato, is plain and
simple: throughout the process of constant primitive accumulation.
4.2.2 Primitive Accumulation and Colonialism

of the genesis of capitalism and appears in Part 8 of Capital,
Vol. I

-Ca

42

ssical Greece.
As they put it:
The institution of money, as Foucault asserts in his first course at the Collège de France (1970
1971) focusing on its introduction in ancient Greece, cannot be explained for market, commercial,
or mercantile reasons: while t
e traced back to the Hoplitic revolution. For further readings see:
Lectures on the Will to Know (Foucault, 2013).
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differing moral attitudes43, the emergence of capitalism as a dominant mode of production
is more complex
presupposes surplus-value; surplus-value presupposes capitalistic production; capitalistic
production presupposes the pre-existence of considerable masses of capital and of labor
power

siphoning of surplus value, its emergence as a dominant mode of production depends on
the pre-existence of a reservoir of labouring subjects, the proletariat, who exchange their
labor power for wages. For Marx, under feudalism or any kind of pre-capitalist regime of
production the proletariat simply does not exist and the creation of a class of wage laborers
stands as the very objective to be attained in setting up the conditions for the accumulation
process of transition from one mode of production to another, but the separation of the
laborer from the means of production. That is to say, the sale of labor power in exchange
for wages is not decided upon by mutual consent. On the contrary, what Marx saw was a
history of violence, expropriation, and the use of force: the birth of capitalism arose from

43

In Anti-Capitalist Chronicles, David Harvey provides us with a succinct account of how classical liberalism
frames the origins of capital accumulation:
The political economists of the time presented the story of how capital began as a virtuous story.
There were some people who were careful and thoughtful, abstemious and responsible, who looked
to the future and were capable of deferring gratifications. Then there were those who were profligate
and who chose to spend their time in riotous living. The virtuous people became the entrepreneurs
who deferred gratification, who saved, accumulated and looked to the future. The profligate
individuals were left with the only possibility of making a living; which was to offer their labor
power to the frugal capitalists who took responsibility for how it might be fruitfully put to work.
(Harvey, 2020, p. 113)
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osenberg, 2019, p. 364).
In the first volume of Capital, Marx provides us with a brief history of how this
separation from the means of production takes place. For Marx, the point of origin is the
movement of enclosures. Starting in 16 th century England and expanding to the whole of
Europe not long after, the movement of enclosures turns the common lands into private

t people, displaced from their lands
and expropriated from their means of subsistence, were turned into a class of wage laborers
overnight. What enclosures entailed was the forced immigration of the now-dispossessed
agricultural population to the urban centers. 44 For Marx, this process was akin to an all-out
war against the preof the regime of the guilds, the breakdown of the system of peasant landownership, and the
massive disintegrati

as liberal theorists argue, but one in which the state had a role of central importance, waging
an implicit warfare, or a war by other means, to dismantle any kind of obstacle that would
impede the development of capitalism. 45

44

In the eyes of the state and the capitalist class, this newly formed group of people was indeed something
akin to what Foucault called the dangerous individuals. For further reading, see: Discipline and Punish
(Foucault, 1979).
45
However, it would be a mistake to understand the role the states played only in terms of the use of brute
force, as it was in fact legislatures targeting vagrancy with harsh punishments. An example Marx gives is
how the invention of public debt and credit system was crucial for primitive accumulation:
The public debt becomes one of the most powerful levers of primitive accumulation. As with the
stroke of an enchanter's wand, it endows unproductive money with the power of creation and thus
turns it into capital, without forcing it to expose itself to the troubles and risks inseparable from its
employment in industry or even in usury. The state's creditors actually give nothing away, for the
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Furthermore, for Marx, primitive accumulation was not limited to the confines of
any one nation. The history of capitalism goes side by side with the history of colonialism.

discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in
mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East
Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins,

words, colonialism sets the conditions for the emergence of capitalism by siphoning
resources, concentrating immense amounts of wealth in the hands of the complicit state
sponsored actors or funneling it to the soon-to-be capitalist class, and opening up new
foreign markets for commodities ensuring the realization of surplus value. For Marx,

other words, where the true nature of primitive accumulation is exposed: The history of
primitive accumulation in the colonies was a history of brutality, intensified violence, and
coercion before anything else (Marx, 1992, p. 935).
If we return to how Alliez and Lazzarato make use of the concept of primitive
accumulation, two points should be highlighted. First, for Alliez and Lazzarato

along

with a growing number of contemporary theorists including David Harvey, Silvia Federici,
and Jason Read

primitive accumulation is not just an originary event that has happened

once, but an enduring aspect of capitalism that repeats itself almost on a daily basis

sum lent is transformed into public bonds, easily negotiable, which go on functioning in their hands
just as so much hard cash would. But furthermore, and quite apart from the class of idle rentiers thus
created, the improvised wealth of the financiers who play the role of middlemen between the
government and the nation, and the tax-farmers, merchants and private manufacturers, for whom a
good part of every national loan performs the service of a capital fallen from heaven. (Marx, 1992,
p. 919)
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(Federici, 2004; Harvey, 2003; Read, 2003). This brings us to the second significant aspect
of their use of the concept of primitive accumulation. Second, the colonial form of
primitive accumulation designates the point where the state, war, and money perfectly
align.

has another significant role that goes well beyond the siphoning of wealth that primes the
genesis of the capitalist mode of production. Colonialism functions as a hotbed for the
emergence of a particular

and against the population, where the distinctions between war and peace, between
combatants and non-combatants, between economy, politics, and military were never
modality of warfare involves a bloody
strategy of counter-insurgency and violent suppression of the most basic rights of colonial
subjects.

warfare was only limited to the colonial settings

or at least not for long. On the contrary,

they argue that with the rapid globalization of capitalism, colonial war, or at least the logic
at work behind its practice, colonialism expands to nearly every corner of the earth and
effectively becomes the matrix of global civil war. Borrowing from Michel Foucault, what
46

46

The

t should never be forgotten that while colonization, with its techniques and
its political and juridical weapons, obviously transported European models to other continents, it also had a
considerable boomerang effect on the mechanisms of power in the West, and on the apparatuses, institutions,
and techniques of power. a whole series of colonial models was brought back to the West, and the result was
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techniques of power and violence that were utilized to subjugate populations and siphon
resources from the colonial world now are brought home by the capital in order to be used
in the service of capital to be exercised on their own populations. In other words, for Alliez
and Lazzarato, the internal colonization or what Paul Virilio once called endocolonization
goes side by side with the external one. 47
The kind of civil war Alliez and Lazzarato locate in the circuits of global capitalism
should not be taken solely in terms of class warfare in a traditional Marxist sense. On the

operate on the basis of the model colonial war provides (Alliez & Lazzarato, 2016, p. 27).
For Alliez and Lazzarato, the practices of and logic behind colonial warfare first return
home with the movement of enclosures effectively transforming the European peasants
into a class of wage laborers. C

Alliez and Lazzarato

argue, they go side by side with the witch-hunts that aim to forcefully integrate women into

that the West could practice something resembling colonization, or an internal colonialism, on itself
(Foucault, 2003, p. 103).
47
Alliez and Lazzarato refe
endocolonization:
[T]he concept of endocolonization, which Paul Virilio used to define the change in the army and
war after 1945 into war amongst and against the population, can be useful in several ways. It
immediately configures governmentality as a set of civil war apparatuses (dispositifs). It politically
primitive accumulation, race war and the war on women for control of bodies, is now applied
machine of Capital are mobilized to organize an endocolonization of all social relations. and finally,
the concept presents in a new light the reality of contemporary civil wars: 1/ because
endocolonization establishes an immediate continuity between the Norths and Souths of the worldeconomy and reveals the way the Souths are lodged in the Norths; 2/ because all the wars of which
we have described the nature and development since primitive accumulation converge on the
endocolonized; 3/ because the techniques of colonial wars, first applied to the populations of the
protests and the use of police violence in all evidence crossed a threshold in relation to the security
state) (Alliez & Lazzarato, 2016, p. 374).
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the patriarchal order of reproduction, and this time in reference t

-76 College

de France lectures, they surface in the discourses of racism and race wars of the 19 th
century, which paved the road for the worst atrocities of 20 th century (Marx, 1992; Federici,
2004; Foucault, 2003).
For Alliez and Lazzarato, the kind of civil war that capitalism carries within itself

gender and the colon
accentuating already existing divisions and creating new ones (Alliez & Lazzarato, 2016,

primitive accumulation

the procedures of expropriation of labor, appropriation of the

land, control mechanisms over production and reproduction, and violence

capitalism

4.2.3 Neoliberalism and Civil War
Why do Alliez and Lazzarato argue that neoliberalism corresponds to an intensification of
studies on (neo)liberalism that made him drop his
civil war thesis? However, the way Alliez and Lazzarato frame neoliberalism is quite
different than how Foucault did so. In fact, their formulation of neoliberalism harbours a

chapters, with the expansion of his analysis over (neo)liberal theories of governmentality
during the second half of the 70s, a radical shift emerges in the way in which Foucault
formulates power. For Foucault, what neoliberalism brought to the scene was the
culmination of a modality of power based on the
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on, for Foucault, power was less a matter of a warlike relationship of forces through which
one tries to establish dominance over others, but more an ensemble of more subtle
strategies that rely more and more upon incentivization of certain behaviours rather than
trying to suppress them with violent means. Such a formulation of power, in terms of the
conduct of conducts or action upon actions, was indeed a radically different way to
understand power compared to what was at issue in the civil war thesis or bellicose model.
While this departure from the civil war thesis permitted the possibility to conceptualize
power beyond repression

precisely by distinguishing power from domination and

violence it risked losing sight of the role that conflict, violence, and resistance play. This,
in the end, also carries a considerable risk of establishing an overly optimistic viewpoint
on what the neoliberal future could bring about.
Where Foucault saw in neoliberalism a novel regime of power imbued with the
possibility for more autonomous and less governed societies

an alternative to the

hierarchical power structures that maintain the modern state form, and perhaps as a
safeguard from the repeating of the atrocities of the early 20 th century

Alliez and

Lazzarato see a grave theoretical and political error in this line of thinking for two reasons.
First, as Lazzarato highlights in his 2019 book Capital Hates Everyone: Fascism or
Revolution, he criticizes the methodology Foucault uses in his analysis of neoliberalism:

of the market, etc., all these fine concepts that Foucault found in books and never
measured against real political processes. (Lazzarato, 2021, pp. 21)

neoliberalism, incarnated by the bloody dictatorshi
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tested out for the

equation of power with governance

the conception of power in terms of the conduct of

conducts instead of a direct relationship of force that is exercised upon bodies

that could

Capital Hates Everyone:
Fascism or Revolution,
The conception of power that results from this is pacified: action upon action,
government upon behaviors (Foucault) and not action upon persons (of which war
and civil war are the peak expressions). Power would be incorporated into
impersonal apparatuses that exert a soft violence in an automatic way. Quite to the
contrary, however, the logic of civil war that is at the foundation of neoliberalism
was not absorbed, erased, replaced by the functioning of the economy, law, and
democracy. (Ibid., pp. 8-9)
Third, and closely related to their critique of the formulation of power in terms of the
conduct of conducts, Alliez and Lazzarato also take issue with the relatively rigid

them,

The crucial question that needs to be answered is how neoliberalism can be

their reading of the historical development of neoliberal modes of governance. For Alliez
and Lazzarato, neoliberalism is not only a response to crisis-ridden and dilapidated
Keynesianism. In other words, the rise of neoliberalism does not occur purely in an
economic sense, but first and foremost appears as a counteroffensive, or in more precise
terms as a counterrevolutionary strategy, to contain the revolutionary movements of the
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60s. What Alliez and Lazzarato saw in these movements was a revolt against what they

women challenging the patriarchal order, radical workers movements who imagined a life

liberation, and anti-imperialist movements fighting the neo-colonial tendencies of capitalist
nations culminated in the Cold War period. For Alliez and Lazzarato, the response of
capital was an attempt to capture these radical socio-political forces that are escaping them,
and thereby rerouting them into a relatively stabilized grid of relations of power.
For Alliez and Lazzarato, this neoliberal counteroffensive was multifaceted and
involved a wide repertoire of strategies. The brutal dictatorships, military juntas, the
relentless dismantling of the welfare state, and the war against the trade unions were surely
on the table for proponents of neoliberalism, but the driving force behind this

financialization
domain

the spread of economic rationality to almost every social and political

does not appear to Alliez and Lazzarato as the least intrusive and violent regime

of power, it does not guarantee the dismantling of the arbitrary norms of disciplinary
institutions. While Alliez and Lazzarato agree that the triumph of neoliberalism involves a
discontinuity in the lineage of the sovereignty of centralized states and the normative order
of disciplinary societies, it only replaces them with another kind of centralization and
forms and
transnational organizations of power, the plurality of political-institutional ensembles

(Ibid., p.18). Moreover,
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with their human capital. Rather, neoliberalism is a r

p. 27).
Indeed, this is one of the key aspects to understand the close affinity between civil
war and neoliberalism in the
Lazzarato writes, neoliberalism

particularly with the war against populations, for which it will constitute the most
formidable weapon. Indeed, the global market, especially with neoliberalism,
doesn't integrate without differentiating through racist, segregationist, sexist
techniques; or homogenize without worsening inequalities; or unify without
-states, wars of class, of sex, and of race.
(Lazzarato, 2021, p. 71)
It is important to mention here that this very tendency for accentuating already existing
divisions and inequalities that they attribute to neoliberalism effectively changes the
meaning of governance. For them, the neoliberal governmental model becomes
indistinguishable from an endless campaign of counter-insurgency that strives to maintain
the very conditions that render capital accumulation a generalized and permanent condition
of crisis. In this sense, the triumph of neoliberalism fundamentally alters the nature of war.
For Alliez and Lazzarato, within the context of neoliberalism, it is no longer possible or
even meaningful to distinguish war from peace, or war proper from civil war. Alliez and
Lazzarato point out that how even inter-state wars have become more and more waged
through unconventional tactics since the end of the Cold War period: the rise of small wars,
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the use of economic and informational means

for example, trade wars, currency

manipulation operations, targeted sanctions on individuals and corporations, the
culmination of cyber-war and information warfare

have become commonplace practices

obtained by any means ( bloody and not bloody
short, far from rendering civil war an obsolete idea, for Alliez and Lazzarato, civil war is
the model that defines neoliberalism; it is immanent to how power operates under this
regime.
4.2.4 The Invention of Democratic and Anti-capitalist War Machines
Do Alliez and Lazzarato think that whether there is a way to exit from this seemingly
hellscape created by neoliberalism? It is more than plausible to argue that while Alliez and

the relations of power are grounded in civil war, which itself denotes a groundlessness, and
is by its very definition open to dynamic confrontations, they argue that there still exists a
potential for creating ruptures in the relations of power and polarizations against the forces
of capital. Such a task requ
invention of anti-

Deleuze and Feli
between the apparatus of capture and war machines. In order to get a clear understanding
of the political strategy that Alliez and Lazzarato suggest, we need to discuss Deleuze and
Guatt
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A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and
Schizophrenia, the distinction between the apparatus of capture and war machines has a
role of central importance: it delineates a constant struggle at the heart of politics, an

2017, p. 203).48 The concept of apparatus of capture stands as the kernel of Deleuze and

49

This

formulation of state apparatus as a capacity for internalizing and appropriating primarily

48

One of the most important sources for Deleuze and Guattari was anthropologist Pierre Clastres, whose
work resonated for a couple of reasons: first, Deleuze and Guattari argue that Clastres challenges the
Hegelian/Marxist evolutionary thesis that identifies societies without a state as primitive or less complex
social organisations compared to those that develop state structures. For Clastres, this is not the case; there
does not exist a succession from the so-called primitive people to that of the state. What is at stake is
something quite different. For Clastres, fully fledged and complex social formations could well exist outside
the state fo
& Guattari, 1987, p. 357). In other words,
for Clastres, war wards off the formation of the state apparatus. But how does war function in such a way?
(Clastres, 2015, p. 35).
2010, p. 277). In this sense, for Clastres, war is a permanent condition in stateless societies, and what the
state essentially does is nothing but to prevent the very condition that makes war possible. However, it is
important to mention here that this does not mean that war ceases to exist in the sphere of the state. As
Clastres remarks, it is civil war that the state cannot endure,
(Clastres, 2015, p. 54). One can see that
words, for Hobb
link institutes itself between men due to a common Power to keep them all in awe: the State is against war.
What does primitive society as a sociological space of permanent war tell us in counterpoint? It repeats
Hobbes's discourse by reversing it; it proclaims that the machine of dispersion functions against the machine
of the relationship between war and the state was to a great extent adopted by Deleuze and Guattari, they
: the absence of the path from the stateless societies to the states
and more importantly the relative autarky that Clastres attributes to stateless societies, especially in his later
writings.
49
-European societies were organised through a
class or caste structure that consists of priests, warriors, and herders-cultivators. For Dumezil, this
hierarchical division maintains three social functions: Sovereignty, military force, and production. Dumezil
argues that while this socio-political formation gradually fades away, it nonetheless continues to manifest
itself, in terms of what he calls the tripartite ideology, through myths, religious beliefs, and legends. While
these three functions are distinct, they permeate each other and sustain the unity of the social structure. For
Mitra-Varuna: An Essay on Two Indo-European
Representations of Sovereignty (Dumezil, 1988).
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denotes how the state-form operates by appropriating land and power, by establishing
systems taxation and levies, and by imposing bonds on the basis of the creditor-debtor
relationship. On the other end of the spectrum, there lies the war machines. Whereas the
State functions by producing a striated internality and centralization, for Deleuze and
Guattari, the war machine implies a pure form of exteriority and a constant movement. The
concept of war machine also entails a different kind of socio-political composition. While
states proceed with the territorial organization of populations, turning both the land and the
people into objects of calculation and production, war machines rely on the arithmetic
organization of multiplicities that are distributed through smooth spaces. 50 In fact, Deleuze

populations within a smooth space, a steppe or a desert. Nomads are the
multiplicities of the nomos. They are deterritorialized but, above all, they are the
ones who deterritorialize the earth. It even seems as if it is not nomads but the earth
that moves, while they remain stationary on their mounts, being reterritorialized on
their movement itself. (Lapoujade, 2017, p. 235)
By their very definition, nomadic war machines point out another kind of social
arrangement that harbors a revolutionary or liberatory exit strategy.
The crucial question now is how should one situate war in this polar opposition

question may seem paradoxical. On the one hand, they argue that the State is not capable

50

It is important to mention here that, for Deleuze, while the state apparatus and nomadic war machines
designate two distinct poles, this does not mean that they cannot form mixtures. In other words, the states
could emerge from war machines, or the opposite, a state apparatus could break down into nomadic war
machines.
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of conducting war by itself. On the other hand, Deleuze and Guattari also argue that war
machines do not have war as their object. While it is true that the State does not have a war
machine at its disposal initially, land, money, and populations are not the only things that
the State can capture; the State can also capture and subjugate a war machine.
How the State can capture a war machine, then? The answer lies in the two poles
Deleuze and Guattari attribute to the concept of war machine. For them, the first pole
seems:
to be the essence; it is when the war machine, with infinitely lower "quantities," has
as its object not war but the drawing of a creative line of flight, the composition of
a smooth space and of the movement of people in that space. At this other pole, the
machine does indeed encounter war, but as its supplementary or synthetic object,
now directed against the State and against the worldwide axiomatic expressed by
States. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 422)
In other words, war is not the w
that the nomadic war machines have an extremely variable relation to war itself. War is a

centralization of their s
encounter with states. However, there also exists another pole which:
takes war for its object and forms a line of destruction prolongable to the limits of
the universe. But in all of the shapes it assumes here-limited war, total war,
worldwide organization-war represents not at all the supposed essence of the war
machine but only, whatever the machine's power, either the set of conditions under
which the States appropriate the machine, even going so far as to project it as the
horizon of the world, or the dominant order of which the States themselves are now
only parts. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 422)
This is exactly what enables the State apparatuses to capture or appropriate war machines,
make them their own, and deploy them purely as a destructive force. In fact, for Deleuze
and Guattari, this moment of appropriation of a war machine by the State marks the genesis
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of the military organizations as purely destructive apparatuses through which the State
conducts warfare.
However, from such a perspective, war, and especially civil war, is still in a
relationship of exteriority to the State. In other words, wars take place in a zone of
indistinction or gray area that exists between the State apparatus and war machines. In this
sense, there is always a possibility of a war machine turning against the State. As Deleuze

ambiguous moments, and it can occur under the f
-capitalist, democratic
-laden
elentless civil war waged on populations worldwide also

resistance and attack, the accumulation and exercise of force, and processes of
subjectivation have as their condition the neutralization of these divisions and the

2016, p. 392).
4.3 Conclusion
As we have discussed above, in their writings, both Hardt and Negri along with Alliez and
Lazzarato stress a close affinity between civil war and capitalism. Whereas Hardt and Negri
formulate civil war as an incessant conflict between Empire

the tendency for the

emergence of a global system of control and machine of command in the service of
capital

and the multitude

a radical democratic political project in becoming that carries

the potential for building a post-capitalist future through collective struggle

Alliez and
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Lazzarato tend to locate civil war as an integral aspect to how power operates embedded

political landscape beginning in the 21 st century. In order to evaluate their successes and
failures while thinking civil war alongside power, we need to situate them historically.

they make in their coauthored trilogy, Empire, Multitude, and Commonwealth, cannot be
properly understood outside of the socio-political context of the early 2000s. Hardt and

socialisms, the retreat of social democracies and welfare states, and the triumph of
neoliberalism that goes side by side with the rise of market ideologies that cherish the

of the culmination of the neoliberal model that has its roots in the 1980s

a paradigm shift

resulting in a condition in which the market norms were diffused to the entire spheres of
the social and the global politics was shaped largely by the interests of global corporations
and supervised by supranational political and economical organizations. At least at first
glance, the early 2000s was a period of time marked by a decisive victory of capitalism
which now seems to become the only game in town.
However, it would be a mistake to understand the political state of affairs of the
early 2000s purely in terms of a unilateral and full-spectrum domination by the forces of
global capitalism. On the one hand, this new political terrain was laden with a new kind of
global warfare that had destabilizing effects on politics both on global and local levels, of
which Hardt and Negri see as a violent and accelerated process of the integration of new
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-state actors competing
for appropriating the machine of command of this novel model of global sovereignty. They
also see this period as a hotbed for the emergence of a new kind of subversive politics, the
alter-globalization movements, that challenged the intensified capitalist subjugation
-globalization
movements manifested in the widespread protests targeting the summits of supranational
organizations, such as the 1999 Seattle WTO and 2001 Genoa G8 protests, anti-war
movements, the emergence of alternative global organizations such as the World Social
Forum (WSF), and indigenous political movements such as the Zapatista Army of National
Liberation (EZLN). These movements were not nostalgic and reactive in their intention to

nationalistic politics; in fact, they were novel social and political movements that began to
develop in an opposition to global capitalism and strived to reinvent another kind of
globalization beyond the dictates of neoliberal logic.
Indeed, the way in which Hardt and Negri identify civil war as an incessant conflict
in the circuits of global capitalism both reflects upon and draws inspiration from such a
configuration of politics. From their perspective, civil war becomes an encounter between
the repressive forces of a global structure of sovereignty, Empire, and the productive and
subversive networks of constituent power, the multitude. In this sense, Ha
formulation of civil war is not simply a return
painting a picture of an over-encompassing model of domination in which power is
understood purely in terms of warlike relation, they draw from Spin
between potentia and potestas to establish a conceptualization of power that addresses both
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account falls short, however, is in the dichotomous logic such a formulation harbors: it
risks a Manichaean understanding of politics wherein sides are clearly marked. This is the

questionable whether civil wars such as the one in Syria or the divisive politics of the New
Right fit into this clearly defined antagonistic model. Such an approach in the end attributes
too much certainty to a condition that is essentially complex, uncertain, and ambiguous.

fairly different political terrain, and they address fairly different theoretical exigencies as
well. First, the late 2010s signifies an era of the sustained defeat of the radical social
movements that
Indignados in Spain, the student movements in Chile and Quebec, and Greece in 2015

protests in Brazil, and the Gezi
movements have not resulted in the invention of new lines of alliances that could pave the
road to a non-capitalist future and, more importantly, not in the creation of lasting political
organizations that could counter the ever-deepening exploitation, the looming climate
catastrophe, or the racial injustices inherent to neoliberalism (Ibid., p. 11-12).

political visions of multiculturalism, that have culminated in early 2000s neoliberalism,
begin to fade from view. In their place,

-

democracy managed by market technicians to stoke the flames of its predatory economic
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policies
novel forms of intensified
political violence in the wake of the rise of the far right

whose power depends on their

mobilize their followers into taking political actions that would previously be deemed
unimaginable

not only corresponds but also helps to explain how Alliez and Lazz

understanding of our contemporary political world as one ridden by civil war.

conceptualization of primitive accumulation, they extend the scope of such a theoretical
model to explicate neoliberal modes of governance. There is no doubt that Alliez and
Lazzarato offer us an extremely rich, and at the same time, timely theoretical perspective.
Yet, in a
risk of embracing a radical denunciation of power: the story Alliez and Lazzarato tell us is
a one that of a unilateral system of domination where power is presented to us more or less
as the sum of techniques and procedures that initiates and maintains capitalist subjugation.

formulation threatens a reductive understanding of how power functions in multiple ways.
It especially neglects to explain how regimes of power at work in late capitalist societies
function as a productive network as well as through multiform processes of subjectification
and desubjectification via the circuits of capital and market relations. Second, it overlooks
the difference between war and power, flattening any meaningful distinction between the
two. In this sense, Alliez and Lazzarato arrive at the same position Foucault held in the
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early 70s, without either addressing or offering a viable solution to the issues that led
Foucault to abandon it.
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CHAPTER 5: RETHINKING CIVIL WAR AND POWER FROM A SPINOZIST
PERSPECTIVE
In the previous chapters, starting with an informulations in the 72-73 College de France lectures and continuing with the discussions
on the works of more contemporary theorists, I attempted to map out the conceptual nexus
between civil war and power. A central theme of our discussions was the unresolved
tension between the productive and repressive sides of power while situating the concept
within the theoretical framework of civil war. I have discussed how Foucault, Agamben,
Hardt and Negri, along with Alliez and Lazzarato position themselves in relation to this
aporia, and the success or failure of their attempts. In this chapter, I will offer an alternative
st that a Spinozist
perspective opens another pathway to rethink the relationship between civil war and power
without being constrained by such a dichotomy, and, at the same time, without a ratification
of domination and sovereignty.
Unlike other theorists and philosophers whose work I have discussed so far,

presents us with an extremely rich conceptual toolset for thinking the conceptual nexus
between civil war and powe
focusing on two interrelated issues: first, the relationship between power in terms of
potentia and potestas, and second his critique of

and alternative to

a Hobbesian

understanding of the passage from the state of nature to the political realm. As well as
examining primary texts written by Spinoza, I will also trace these two themes in the
, including those of Antonio Negri, Gilles
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Deleuze, Alexandre Matheron, and Filippo Del Lucchese, and I will discuss whether
Spinozist political philosophy could provide us with a conceptual toolset for pinpointing
the uncertain and volatile nature of the relationship that exists between civil war and power.
5.1

Conceptualization of Power

Be it in his metaphysical works or later political writings, the concept of power plays a

explicitly defines his concept of power, and his use of two separate Latin terms for denoting
power, potentia and potestas, creates a degree of difficulty, especially when such
distinction is carried into English.51 Analyzing the difference between these two distinct
and at the same time, closely interrelated

terms denoting power is not only crucial for
ntral to our exploration of the conceptual

nexus between civil war and power.
Before moving any further, a clarification seems necessary. The trajectory that I
propose here may seem suspiciously similar to what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri
pursued in their attempt to locate civil war in the antagonistic relationship between two
modalities of power denoted by the concepts of Empire and the multitude, which was also

differentiates my approach. Rather than assuming the inherent antagonism of potentia and
potestas, I will propose an alternative reading that shows how this pair of concepts function

51

While most of the Indo-European languages have two distinct words to designate this difference (potentia
and potestas in Latin, puissance and pouvoir in French, potenza and potere in Italian, Vermögen and Macht
in German), both meanings in English are covered by a single word: power. In order to prevent any confusion,
I will use the Latin versions of the concepts.
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in a complementary yet irreducible way. But before presenting my own reading of Spinoza

5.1.1

Interpretation of Spinoza

In the second half of the 20th century, there was renewed interest in Spinoza, especially the
cluster of issues revolving around his conceptualization of power. This theoretical revival

Louis Althusser, Alexandre Matheron, Étienne Balibar, and to some extent Gilles
his was an almost complete revaluation and, perhaps
more importantly, an adaptation of Spinozist political concepts and categories to address
the issues of the present.52

his emphasis on the distinction between two terms, potentia and potestas, that Spinoza uses
The Savage Anomaly:
Metaphysics and Politics

Throughout Negri's writings we find a clear division between Power and power,
both in theoretical and practical terms. In general, Power denotes the centralized,
mediating, transcendental force of command, whereas power is the local,
immediate, actual force of constitution. It is essential to recognize clearly from the
outset that this distinction does not merely refer to the different capabilities of
subjects with disparate resources and potentialities; rather, it marks two
fundamentally different forms of authority and organization that stand opposed in

52

Spinoza: Expressionism in Philosophy predates a
be seen as dealing with the question of politics (Deleuze, 1992).
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both conceptual and material terms, in metaphysics as in politics-in the organization
of being as in the organization of society. (Hardt, 1991, p. xiii)

non-negotiable antagonism Negri locates between potentia and potestas: while the former
implies the horizontal, immanent, affirmative power which is productive and constituent,
the latter designates the hierarchical, transcendental, constituted power of command and
appropriation.53 Second, for Negri, potentia has primacy over potestas by definition, or put
it differently, the latter is ontologically subordinate to or a degenerated form of the former.
For Negri, this leads to
a real antimony: potentia and potestas, power against Power. Potentia as the
dynamic and constitutive inherence of the single in the multiplicity, of mind in the
body, of freedom in necessity power against Power where potestas is presented
as the subordination of the multiplicity, of the mind, of freedom, and of potentia.
(Negri, 1991, p. 191)
Third, Negri argues that Spinoza equates the notions of constitution and production
precisely by way of framing potentia both as a productive force, in terms of cupiditas or
desire, and at the same time as a constituent social force that could bring about subversive
collective modes of existence. 54 For Negri, Spinoza provides a theoretical perspective in

posed at the intersection between production force and the positive constitution of the

53

As Negri writes,
Power (potestas) is subordinated to power (potentia). Political constitution is always set in motion
by the resistance to Power. It is a physics of resistance: No complexity of constitution is given that
is not also a complexity of declarations of power, of expressions of production. Political constitution
is a productive machine of second nature, of the transformative appropriation of nature, and
therefore a machine for the attack and the destruction of Power. Power (potestas) is contingency.
The process of being, the always-more-complex affirmation of subjective power, and the
construction of the necessity of being all excavate the basis of Power, to demolish it. Power
(potestas) is superstition, the organization of fear, nonbeing; power opposes it by constituting itself
collectively (Ibid., p .226).
54
In other words, [i]t is power (potentia), the power of being and the infinite extension of the productive
Ibid., p. 57).
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The Savage Anomaly offers the reader an almost completely new
conceptual
persona rather than presenting him as an obscure rationalist thinker of early modernity.

between potentia and potestas, with primacy given to the former over the latter, and the

political project. It lays the foundations for a Spinozist Marxism; both a Marxist reading of
Spinoza and a Spinozist reading of Marx. 55

on is an attempt at

establishing an immanent materialist philosophical point of view, warding off Hegelian
metaphysics by displacing the dialectical framing of contradiction with that of an absolute
antagonism without any kind of mediation. Translated into a Marxist theoretical
framework, such a move not only envisages a non-dialectical antagonism between the
productive forces and the relations of production, but also points to an immediate passage
from productive forces to collective praxis by way of a struggle between constituent and
constituted powers.56 In this sense, Negri outlines a novel political program for the passage

55

Cesare Casarino divides Spinozist Marxism into five categories:
(1) Thinkers who have written about Marx and Spinoza in separate yet closely related works. For
ose entire thought is imbued
-Marx relation indirectly yet
significantly via the examination of a

56

Frédéric Lordon is one of them. (Casarino, 2011, pp. 218-219)
As Negri puts it:
Spinoza, pushing forward the identity of production and constitution, at the origins of capitalist
civilization, destroys the possibility of a dialectic of Power (potestas) and opens the perspective of
power (potentia). Scientifically, this rupture expresses the necessity for and shows the form of a
phenomenology of collective praxis. Today, in an epoch characterized by the crisis of capitalism,
this rupture between (capitalistic) relations of production and (proletarian) productive force has
again reached a point of extreme tension. Potestas and potentia are presented as an absolute
antagonism. The independence of productive force, then, can find in Spinoza an important source
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to communism beyond the constraints of the state-form, a viable alternative to the

Yet it involves an oversimplification that risks overlooking the richness and complexity of

types of power may end up with a Manichaean understanding of politics and attribute too
much certainty to a condition that is essentially uncertain and ambiguous. In this chapter,
I offer an alternative path by discussing two interrelated issues: first, an alternative reading
of the distinction between potentia and potestas

unterargument

to the Hobbesian understanding of politics in the transition from the state of nature to state
sovereignty. While I will primarily focus on these two interrelated issues from a
perspective that prioritizes their political implications, given
theory, ontology, and theory of affects are closely intertwined, tracking the trajectory
running from the ontological framing of power to the political one seems necessary.
5.1.2 The Concept of Potentia
To start with power in terms of potentia: what does it denote? Although potentia is an

goes for the concept of potestas and indeed for how these two concepts of power diverge
from each other. Yet this does not mean that we are completely left in the dark. A very
general way to define potentia would be to associate the concept with the ability to do
something. It is important to point out here that the concept of potentia has nothing to do

of reference, it can find in the development of his hypothesis a line on which to historically organize
itself. (Negri, 1991, p. 229)
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with potentiality in an Aristotelian sense. This observation is consistent with both the

potentia with
the capacity to act, potentia is always actual or in action; it is usually used as potentia
agendi, or power to act.
As power to act, potentia is not a relational concept of power; rather, it implies a
degree of intensity. For Spinoza, each thing acts in various ways proportionately according
to its power. But what is the source of their power to act? The answer Spinoza gives may
not please everyone, at least not at first sight: for him, the source of potentia is none other
than God. Does this mean that Spinoza simply gives a theological explanation of power?
While operating within the conceptual vocabulary of Scholastic philosophy and Hebrew
theological thought, Spinoza provides a conceptualization of God quite different than what

philosophical or ontological concept rather than a theological one. Spinoza defines God as
the singular substance, an infinite and eternal entity whose essence necessarily involves
existence.57 God is perceived through its attributes, extension and thought, and each of
these attributes expresses the eternal and the infinite essence of God. 58 All other existing
things, corporeal or incorporeal, are produced by God through its attributes in infinite ways

conceptualization so provocative and revolutionary in his time, and eventually paved the

57

function
via emanation, in other words, God or Nature is the immanent cause, not the transitive one.
58
For Spinoza, humans conceive two attributes: extension and thought. For further reading, see: the first part
of Ethics (Spinoza, 1985).
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road to his excommunication from the Jewish community in Amsterdam and a failed
attempt at assassination59
God, if not entirely synonymous with Nature, is interchangeable with it, and best expressed
by his famous formula: Deus sive Natura,
God is posited as Natura Naturans, nature naturing, and involves an active, expansive, and
productive potency.60 In this sense, Spino

sovereign over his subjects.61

potentia) is precisely its

inexhaustible productive activity and is distributed among the modifications that it
produces.
When we move from God or Nature to its modifications, the finite things that are
part of Natura Naturata, Nature natured or the created nature, potentia is now posited as

59

For a detailed biogra
Spinoza: A Life (Nadler, 1999).
Spinoza defines the concepts of natura naturata and natura naturans
by Natura
naturans we must understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, or such attribute of substance
as express an eternal and infinite essence, i.e.
, God, in so far as he is considered as a free cause
by
60

attributes, i
and can neither be nor be conceived without God
p. 434).
61
As he puts it in Ethics:
By God's power [potentia] ordinary people understand God's free will and his right over all things
which are, things which on that account are commonly considered to be contingent. For they say
that God has the Power [potestas] of destroying all things and reducing them to nothing. Further,
they very often compare God's power with the power of Kings. But we have refuted this
and
we have shown that God acts with the same necessity by which he understands himself, i.e., just as
it follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as everyone maintains unanimously) that God
understands himself, with the same necessity it also follows that God does infinitely many things in
infinitely many modes. And then we have shown
that God's power is nothing except God's
active essence. And so it is as impossible for us to conceive that God does not act as it is to conceive
that he does not exist. Again, if it were agreeable to pursue these matters further, I could also show
here that that power which ordinary people fictitiously ascribe to God is not only human (which
shows that ordinary people conceive God as a man, or as like a man), but also involves lack of power
For no one will be able to perceive rightly the things I maintain unless he takes great care not
to confuse God's power with the human power or right of Kings. (Spinoza, 1985, p. 449)
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the essence of every existing thing.62 For Spinoza, each thing expresses a degree of God or

power to act is determined through the encounters (occursus) one has with others, be it

r in terms of
potentia is strictly tied to the effort or striving for preserving existence, or what Spinoza
simply calls as conatus (Jaquet, 2011, p. 293).63 From this perspective, potentia stands as
word he employs as a synonym [to
potentia agendi]: vis existendi

64

included in its essence proportionately to its powe
sense that power in terms of potentia does not have a definite object: it is a relationship
formed with the totality of the world, as we will discuss, in ways both productive and
destructive, constituent and destituent.

62

that which, being given, the thing is necessarily posited and which, being taken away, the thing is necessarily
taken away; or that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which can neither be nor
(Spinoza, 1985, p. 447)
a
person is born, from
body muscles, bones, veins, blood, and so on, are determined to compose a body on the basis of what Deleuze
would later call a characteristic relationship or a ratio corresponding to its essence. Yet, for Spinoza, things
neither come into being nor exist in a vacuum (E1p15s), as the individual is not a substance but primarily a
set of relations, or put differently, individuation always involves transindividuation (Balibar, 2020).
63
The concept of conatus means the striving or the effort for preserving existence
definition in
Ethics
Spinoza, 1985, p. 498).
64
It is important to note that, for Spinoza, modal essences do not necessarily involve existence, as finite
modes always have an external cause different from themselves.
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5.1.3 The Concept of Potestas
I defined the concept of potentia in terms of the intrinsic power to act and the force of

use of the concept of potestas, things get more complicated. Not only does Spinoza not
provide us with a clear-cut definition of how he deploys the concept of potestas, but also
potestas
potentia
However, there also are other instances where the contrast between the two concepts
becomes much more noticeable. Indeed, ranging from positing an absolute antagonism and
equating potestas
of the relationship between potentia and potestas as that of an alienation, or to framing
potentia and potestas
potestas and its
relationship to potentia.
What then does the concept of potestas denote and how can it be distinguished from
potentia? To start with the general use in Latin: having its roots in the ancient Roman law,
potestas

concept, however, covers a rather broader meaning: potestas denotes power in a transitive

ver something to produce some effect (Terpstra, 2011, p. 295). Power in terms
of potestas involves an attempt for colinearization of forces through which the targeted
pt
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of potestas cannot be simply reduced to power arising in an institutional context. With
potestas
he unchanging

forces (Matheron, 2020). Does power in terms of potestas solely involve a relationship of
subjugation wherein the power to act is limited, as some argue so, or is there another way
to think of it? To answer this question adequately, there is one last thing that needs to be
s conceptualization of power and his theory
of affects.
5.1.4 Power and Affects
Affects, for Spinoza, in Latin affectus, are the affections (affectio) or the modifications of
the body and the mind, of which Spinoza rejects any kind of dualism between the two, and
they express the effects of external causes. 65 Although translated into English as emotions

affectus
and, more precisely, to the constant variation in our power or capacity to act depending on
the nature of the encounters we have. For Spinoza, there are two main categories of affects:
the active ones and the passive ones. While I will be focusing more on the second category,
a quick definition of the active affects would be to frame them as the class of affects that

65

For
distinction between the concepts affectus and affectio, see: Deleuze
Vincennes lecture on March 31, 1981 (Deleuze, 1981).
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the mind without an external cause, directly flowing from adequate ideas or common

people ever attain them and their role in politics is rather limited. 66 In Ethics, compared to
a total of forty-

When it comes to the passive affects, or the passions, things are different. For
Spinoza, all passions have an external cause and, subsequently, they have a lesser status
compared to the active affects: they are partial and confused ideas of effects without an
adequate understanding of the causes. In this sense, the passions signify the capacity of
being acted upon or being affected. Deleuze, who emphasizes the affinity between power
and theory of affects in his Vincennes lectures on Spinoza and his short monograph titled
Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, explains this in the following way:
Hence the capacity for being affected is manifested as a power of acting insofar as
it is assumed to be filled by active affections, but as a power of being acted upon
insofar as it is filled by passions. For a given individual, i.e., for a given degree of
power assumed to be constant within certain limits, the capacity for being affected
itself remains constant within those limits, but the power of acting and the power
of being acted upon vary greatly, in inverse ratio to one another. (Deleuze, 1988, p.
27)
At first glance, for Deleuze, the ratio between the power to act and the capacity to be acted
upon is inverse and it is the passions that seem to be separating us from our power of acting.
But is this really a denunciation of the passions? While it is clear that Spinoza contrasts

66

As Miriam van Reijen writes,
re necessarily subject to their affects. Society and the state are inevitably
passions and not actions. Philosophers might meditate about the transformation of the passions, but
the politicians have to deal with them. In ruling the state they will neglect the difference between
passions and active affects. (Van Reijen, 2011, p. 282)
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complete annulment of the role passions plays in our lives is nearly impossible. For
the freedom of the will and its
67

long as an entity is located in a causal chain

As

for Spinoza, every finite thing is so situated

for every capacity to act, there corresponds a capacity to be acted upon. As Deleuze puts it

affects, constant passages to greater or lesser perfections, continual variations of the

theory of affects is not so much an opposition between actions and passions but lies
elsewhere between two kinds of passions: the sad and the joyful ones. What differentiates

that accompany a decrease in the power to act, with the joyful ones it is the inverse. Why
is that so? The effectuation of potentia or the power to act is strictly tied to the effort or

the nature of the encounters (occursus). These encounters may be beneficial or agree to its

67

As Spinoza writes in the fourth part of Ethics:
But human power is very limited and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. So we
do not have an absolute Power to adapt things outside us to our use. Nevertheless, we shall bear
calmly those things which happen to us contrary to what the principle of our advantage demands, if
we are conscious that we have done our duty, that the power we have could not have extended itself
to the point where we could have avoided those things, and that we are a part of the whole of nature,
whose order we follow. If we understand this clearly and distinctly, that part of us which is defined
by understanding, i.e., the better part of us, will be entirely satisfied with this, and will strive to
persevere in that satisfaction. For insofar as we understand, we can want nothing except what is
necessary, nor absolutely be satisfied with anything except what is true. Hence, insofar as we
understand these things rightly, the striving of the better part of us agrees with the order of the whole
of nature. (Spinoza, 1985, pp. 593-594)
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Sad passions are those that involve a fixation, a reactive investment of the power to act in
order to prevent or minimize the effects of a bad encounter. On the other hand, joyful

In the contrary case, when we encounter a body that agrees with our nature, one
whose relation compounds with ours, we may say that its power is added to ours;
the passions that affect us are those of joy, and our power of acting is increased or
enhanced. This joy is still a passion, since it has an external cause; we still remain
separated from our power of acting, possessing it only in a formal sense. This power
of acting is nonetheless increased proportionally; we "approach" the point of
conversion, the point of transmutation that will establish our dominion, that will
make us worthy of action, of active joys. (Deleuze, 1988, p. 28)
, and,
be it relative or absolute, every joyful passion involves an increase in the power to act.

potentia involves the expansiveness of the power to
act, it is easy to understand why potentia is always associated with the joyful affects. As
Deleuze puts it:
joy is the realization (effectuation) of a power of action. I know of no powers of
action that would be wicked. The typhoon is a power of action, it must delight in
Taking delight (se réjouir) is always delighting in being what one is, that is, in
having reached where one is. Joy is not self-satisfaction, not some enjoyment of
being pleased with oneself, not at all, not the pleasure of being happy with oneself.
Rather, it's the pleasure in conquest (conquête), as Nietzsche said, but the conquest
does not consist of enslaving people, conquest is, for example, for a painter to
quest is. (Deleuze, 1989)
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When it comes to potestas, things get more complicated. It is clear that certain forms of the
exercise of power (potestas) may be an obstacle in the way of the effectuation of potentia,
especially those forms of potestas that aim at

1989). But is the exercise of potestas always bound to the sad passions? If a person or a
thing could be affected in two ways, either fortifying or diminishing the power to act, why

to act?
If we take a close look at the following passage from The Political Treatise, we get
a better understanding of how Spinoza frames the exercise of power in terms of potestas:
One person has another in his 'power [a] if he has him tied up, or [b] if he has taken
away his arms and means of defending himself or escaping, or [c] if he has instilled
fear in him, or [d] if he has so bound him to himself by a benefit that the other
person would rather conduct himself according to his benefactor's wishes than
according to his own, and wants to live according to his benefactor's opinion, not
according to his own. Someone who has another person in his 'power in the first or
second of these ways possesses only his Body, not his Mind. If he has him in his
'power in the third or fourth way, then he has made both his Mind and his Body
subject to his control but only while the fear or hope lasts. When either of these
is taken away, the other person remains his own master (Spinoza, 2016a, p. 512)
Besides the different objects for the exercise of power, body and/or mind, there is another
difference in how power functions in each of these four cases. The first involves a direct
physical intervention or violence; the power to act of the person on whom potestas is
exercised is reduced to its absolute minimum. The second scenario is similar to the first
one; while it does not involve a direct intervention or an explicit exercise of violence, it
nonetheless depicts a condition of pacification in which the power to act is considerably
limited. However, the third and the fourth depict a different situation: they both involve an
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alignment of the power to act, yet with a crucial distinction. One involves a certain
diminishment of the power to act by invoking a sad passion, fear; the other gives us an
insight into how the exercise of power could be accompanied by a passive joy, and thus
accompanied by an increase

even if a relative one and still involving a separation

in the

power to act.
Furthermore, the concept of potestas

(Terpstra, 2011, p. 296). I am not denying the existence of configurations in which potentia
and potestas

the power

regime running across the slave, the tyrant, and the priest

that Deleuze focuses upon, and

the corrupted forms of imperium that Spinoza explains in The Political Treatise
tyranny, plutocracy, and rule by the mob

namely,

are solid examples of an antagonism between

potentia and potestas.68 However, characterizing the relationship between these two
concepts of power solely as an absolute antagonism overlooks the complexity that

68

As Deleuze puts it:
And Spinoza creates a very strange portrait of the tyrant by explaining that the tyrant is someone
basis a kind of collective sadness.

The priest, perhaps for completely different reasons, has need

tyrant could laugh, and the counselors, the favorites of the tyrant could also laugh. It is a bad laugh,
a
is precisely a laugh that has for its object only sadness and the communication of sadness. What
does this mean? This is bizarre. The priest, according to Spinoza, essentially needs an action
motivated by remorse, introducing remorse. This is a culture of sadness. Whatever the purposes
cultivating sadness. The tyrant for his political power needs to cultivate sadness, the priest needs to
cultivate sadness as far as Spinoza can see, who has the experience of the Jewish priest, the
Protestant priest, and the Catholic priest. (Deleuze, 1980)
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one possible configuration
among the many.
potestas]
of the state extend, we must note that its 'power [potestas] is not limited to what it can
compel men to do from fear, but extends to absolutely everything it can bring men to do in

b, p. 297). So, if we are to conclude that the
relation between potentia and potestas is not primarily one of absolute antagonism, does
this mean that the difference between these two concepts of power is insignificant?
5.2 The Double Articulation of Power and Civil War
Even if we do not locate the concepts of potentia and potestas at extreme opposite poles

them, the distinction he makes between these two concepts of power is still of central
importance to our task of thinking power alongside civil war: how potentia and potestas
are articulated is indeed the source for an inherent volatility that marks the Spinozist way
of understanding politics, which in the end allows us to consider civil war as a real
possibility without equating it with power and at the same time without reducing power to
domination.
5.2.1 The Double Articulation of Power
So far, we have discussed the distinction between potentia and potestas, first from an
ontological perspective and then from the perspective of the theory of affects. Now, I want
to focus more closely on its political implications. To start from power in terms of potentia:
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potentia
involves the zero-degree of existence from an ontological standpoint, denoting an inherent
resilience and capacity for resistance. It also functions in this way from a political
perspective.69

ps us understand why

right with power in terms of potentia:
By the right and established practice of nature I mean nothing but the rules of the
nature of each individual, according to which we conceive each thing to be naturally
determined to existing and having effects in a certain way. For example, fish are
determined by nature to swimming, and the large ones to eating the smaller. So it
is by the supreme right of nature that fish are masters of the water, and that the large
supreme right to do everything it can, i.e., that the right of nature extends as far as
its power does. For the power of nature is the power of God itself, and he has the
is nothing but the power of all individuals together. From this it follows that each
individual has a supreme right to do everything it can, or that the right of each thing
extends as far as its determinate power does. (Spinoza, 2016b, p. 282)
Or, as he puts it in the Tractatus Politicus,

69

It is important to point out the difference between Spinoza and Agamben. The latter uses the concept of
bare life as an impoverished life stripped off from every conceivable right and as a passive object of sovereign
violence. As Filippo Del Lucchese writes:
Giorgio Agamben used the notion of bare life precisely in this sense, to define the most secret,
hidden outcome of politics and power. Natural life is not a presupposition for sovereign power or
for sovereignty itself. And sovereignty does not exercise itself in the natural world by raising
artificial barriers as it does for the contractualists in order to erect a fence around the sphere of
politics. Bare life is the result, rather, of the ultimate achievement peculiar to power that is tragically
played out at particular times in history by particularly atrocious figures of modern politics, in the
extermination camps, for instance. For Agamben, then, following in the wake of Foucault, the
production and reproduction of bare life, far from being a failure of politics, is actually its greatest
accomplishment: its hidden matrix, the very nomos of politics. But bare life, in this sense, is more
of a theoretical figure than a real thing. It is a radically negative concept intended to express the
lowest possible degree of hum
denies that bare life can exist at all, negating its ontological reality, if you will. The philosophy of
bareness of
life; and life is never submitted to the violent action of power as a purely passive object. (Del
Lucchese, 2009, p. 45)
understanding of life, on the other hand, designates a dynamic force in action that is always
growing and changing,
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By the Right of nature, then, I understand the laws of nature themselves, or the rules
according to which all things happen, i.e., the very power of nature. So the natural
Right of the whole of nature, and as a result, of each individual, extends as far as
its power does. Hence, whatever each man does according to the laws of his nature,
he does with the supreme right of nature. He has as much right over nature as he
has power. (Ibid., p. 508)
While at first glance there is an uncanny resemblance to the totalitarian formula of might
makes right
can

different subjects may possess70, what is at issue here is rather designating an unalienable
and irreducible right stemming from potentia, or the multiple ways of existence and
potentia

(Steinberg, 2018, p. 181).
Should we read this formulation as some sort of a longing for a pre-political or a
solitary existence in an idealized or romanticised nature, as it is in the case of Rousseau?
No, for two reasons. First, Spinoza abstains from establishing any kind of dichotomy
between natural and social life. Nature is omnipresent and univocal, and human societies
are not different in this regard: they are a part of nature, and any kind of socio-political
arrangement is governed by the same laws as everything else. Second, for Spinoza, there

70

As Spinoza puts it in Tractatus Theologico-politicus:
Now the supreme law of nature is that each thing strives to persevere in its state, as far as it can by
its of itself. From this it follows that each individual has the supreme right to do this, i.e. (as I have
said), to exist and have effects as it is naturally determined to do. Nor do we recognize here any
difference between men and other individuals in nature, nor between men endowed with reason and
those others who are ignorant of true reason, nor between fools and madmen, and those who are
sensible and sane. For whatever each thing does according to the laws of its nature, it does with
supreme right, because it acts as it has been determined to do according to nature, and cannot do
otherwise. (Spinoza, 2016b, pp. 282-283)
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is no such a pre-social or pre-political existence for humankind. While it is true that Spinoza
argues elsewhere that nature produces individuals rather than nations, tribes, or sects 71, he

defend himself, and no one alone can provide the things ne

a, p. 532). Indeed, for Spinoza, the life in common has another significant
advantage beyond just providing se

and hence, together have more ri

2016a, p. 513). In other words, the life in common or the social existence involves the
creation of a new composite social body, the multitude, whose power far exceeds each

on of
individual powers in a composite social body is not as simple as it might sound. Although

and the one which

71

As he writes in Tractatus Theologico-politicus

2016b, p. 317).

ividuals
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configuration is only possible when free human beings, or those who are led by the dictates
of reason, come together to act in a collective manner (Spinoza, 2016b, p. 289). However,
for Spinoza, as long as human beings are more inclined to act following their passions

traversed by multiple fault lines (Spinoza,
1985, p. 562). As this means a continuous oscillation between the diminishment of power
to act and its enhancement, there are no guarantees that every social interaction would lead
up to a greater power. Moreover, as members of a given socio-political community
continually act upon others and in return are acted upon by the others, any kind of
arrangement also brings potestas into the equation. In other words, the passage from
individuality to community involves a complex articulation of power rather than a simple
addition of potentia, it is also a matter of how potestas is exercised and distributed to an
potestas
296).
A key concept for understanding how potentia and potestas are related politically,

imperium. The concept of imperium could be translated as sovereignty, dominion, or the
authority to rule, and explained from two perspectives corresponding to the distinction
between potestas and potentia. From the perspective of potestas
coextensive with potentia
s

potestas is transferrable and can be united into a
-temporal concentration of power or the

sum of powers (summa potestas) and denotes a condition in which the right to rule, or the
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power to make others act in a certain way, is dislocated from each member of a given
society and concentrated in the hands of others (Steinberg, 2018, p. 181). This dislocation
may take three forms depending on how this right to rule is distributed in a given society:
of the common multitude, then

called an Aristocracy; and finally, if the responsibility for Public Affairs, and hence
a, p. 514).
From the perspective of potentia, however, sovereignty stands as a right determined
by the collective power (potentia) of the multitude.72
concept is unconventional: for Spinoza, sovereignty does not denote the absolute or the
uncontested power of a single person or a privileged caste over the rest of the society. This
right to rule
is nothing more than the Right of nature, determined not by the power [potentia] of
each person, but by the power [potentia] of a multitude, led as if by one mind. That
is, just as each person in the natural state has as much right as he has power
[potentia], so also the body and mind of the whole state have as much right as they
have power [potentia]. (Ibid., p. 517)
In other words, whether wielded by a king in a monarchy, a council made up of a certain
group of people in an aristocracy, or a council made up of the members of the community
in a democracy, sovereignty is only the right to rule derived by the collective potentia of
potentia) of the

72

For Spinoza,
This right, which is defined by the power of a multitude, is usually called Sovereignty [Imperium].
Whoever, by common agreement, has responsibility for public Affairs that is, the rights of making,
interpreting, and repealing laws, fortifying cities, and making decisions about war and peace, etc.
has this right absolutely. (Ibid., p. 514)
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end, the sovereign and the subject, the ruler and the ruled are all part of nature and all
belong to the multitude; the substantial question being how the multitude will govern itself.
Although the exercise of power in terms of potestas still stems from or depends on
the collective potentia of the multitude, this does not mean that potestas is a trivial concept
for understanding how the multitude governs itself. While it is true that the transference
that potestas signifies is still relative and not the qualitative change often implied in the
theories that envisage a substantive passage from the natural right to civil right, this does
not mean that it is merely fictional. As Negri notes,
[i]n fact, the passage from individuality to community does not come about either
through a transfer of power or through a cession of rights; rather, it comes about
contractual basis, is not a fiction; it is, instead, a natural determination, a second
It is a dislocation of power.
(Negri, 1991, p. 110)
In this sense, in the passage from individuality to community, potentia becomes mediated
through the relations of potestas and this indeed corresponds to a
force internal to the s
locate civil war in a conceptual framework like the one above? To answer this question,

5.2.2 Spinoza contra Hobbes
potentia and potestas, and his
political theory in general, constitutes both a critique of, and alternative to, the Hobbesian
theorization of the political realm in the passage from the state of nature to the civil state.
Spinoza articulates his position in this short fragment from the letter to Jelles dating 2 June
1674:
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With regard to political theory, the difference between Hobbes and myself, which
is the subject of your inquiry, consists in this, that I always preserve the natural
right in its entirety, and I hold that the sovereign power in a State has right over a
subject only in proportion to the excess of its power over that of a subject. This is
always the case in a state of nature. (Spinoza, 2002, pp. 891-892)
In this letter, three interrelated issues need closer attention, the first being how Spinoza
approaches the notion of the natural right. As we have discussed above, Spinoza formulates
the natural right as coextensive with power in terms of potentia, in terms of the power to
act and exist in a certain way. In this sense, the natural right, for him, can never be
surrendered or lose its central role of importance. The second is the limits of sovereign
power. As we a
limitless, indeed, only commensurate with the articulated power of the multitude. Third,
the state of nature, for Spinoza, is integral to the domain of politics, whereas Hobbes sees
a substantial break between the two. Not only do these three lines of difference constitute
the kernel of Spinozist political philosophy, but they are especially important for us in
creating a vantage point from which to rethink the relationship between civil war and
power.
The Hobbesian concept of the state of nature designated the pre-political condition
of humankind in terms of the bellum omnium contra omnes, war of all against all -- a
nature, people generally
do everything they can to preserve their lives according to their own judgement, at
whatever cost to their fellow humans and regardless of its conflict with traditional
a spatio-temporality marked by
an unrestrained freedom in which no one can overcome others by virtue of their own power
alone. For Hobbes, the only possible way to overcome this despicable condition is by
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forming a pact on the basis of a contract or covenant. This pact, however, can only function
to the extent that the common enemy is still present. When the common enemy ceases to
exist, the pact disperses, and the outcome is a slippage into the terrors of the state of nature.
Moreover, for Hobbes, a pact based solely on a contract, or a covenant, is not sufficient:
[a]nd Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a
man at all. Therefore, notwithstanding the Lawes of Nature, (which everyone hath
then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can (not) do it safely,) if
there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will, and
may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men.
(Hobbes, 2005, p. 133)
Fulfilling the conditions of a long-lasting peace is not so much of a matter of bringing
individuals together or the creation of a collective organization, but it requires the

solution Hobbes offers is a contract made by everyone with everyone in order to designate
a representative, be it to a person or an assembly, materialized in the image of the
Leviathan: the mortal God which expresses the supreme power of the sovereign. However,
the relative peace under the shadow of the mighty Leviathan has a hefty price: it demands
an unconditional obedience and the transference of all imaginable power to a supreme
authority or a sovereign.
Let us consider the distinction between potentia and potestas
At first glance, the distinction between these two concepts of power does not seem to be as
potentia
and potestas interchangeably without attributing a meaningful distinction, Carlo Altini

creation of the Hobbesian state can only be completed when potentia and potestas
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the sovereign exercises his power in accordance with the juridico-legal order. He is the
f potestas or the power to command. On the other hand, however, the
sovereign is not bound to the legal order as his subjects are. Indeed, the contract that
Hobbes envisions is to be made between the subjects, not with the sovereign. The
is absolute or transcends the juridico-political order. It is in this sense
that the creation of the Leviathan-state implies the coincidence of potentia (absolute power)
and potestas (ordained power) embodied in the figure of the sovereign.
However, from the perspective of the subjects, the terms of the relationship between
potentia and potestas

potentia is also

coextensive with the right of nature, albeit in terms of a capacity to dominate others.
However, given that Hobbes believes that no one can overcome others by virtue of their
own capacity, power in terms of potentia is completely ineffective in the state of nature.
For him, the realization of potentia can only be possible within the realm of civilit
potentia, in the form of potestas
goes side by side with its surrender (Ibid., p. 235).
The Hobbesian understanding of power involves the complete reduction of potentia
to potestas and functions only as a mere instrument of the state, in a political system based
on top-

denies there even is such a thing as popular power apart from its expression through the
state. Outside of sovereignty, the multitude is an anamorphous mob without any ability or
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-state, any
possibility for resistance and every reference to the natural right are effectively eliminated
at the very start.

thinkers who dares to interrogate the viability of this mode

power in terms of potentia can be fully surrendered to a sovereign or a state. Given that
potentia denotes the capacity to exist and act in a certain way, power in terms of potentia

another his power [potentia], or consequently, his right, in such a way that he ceases to be
l never be a supreme 'power [potestas] who can get everything to
b, p. 296). A complete transference of potentia is

As Sandra Leonie Field puts it, such a formulation points out the weakest point of the
Hobbesian position:
In theory, subjects transfer all right and power potentia to establish a sovereign as
summa potestas over them. But in practice, nobody can transfer all right and power
without limit: regardless of any transfer of right or promise of obedience, each
person
potentia
sovereign commands simply will not be carried out. The result is devastating for
sovereigns are more troubled by internal dissent than by external enemies, even
when they are technically absolute in the Hobbesian sense. (Field, 2020, p. 9)
For Spinoza, what is actually transferred is the right over the exercise of potestas, which
nonetheless corresponds to a proportional change in the relation of forces. The political
potentia, not on the
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basis of the contract.73 From the conceptual vantage point of potentia, however, even under
an extreme condition, wherein power is concentrated in the hands of a tyrant, this
separation is temporary; power as potentia continues to exist in a latent form and carries
the possibility of resistance in itself. The constitution of the political realm harbors struggle
or conflict, which Hobbes constantly strives to cast out; politics cannot be reduced either

the state of nature to
the political realm under scrutiny. At least at first glance, his account of the state of nature

. 219) and
he also sees a condition of permanent struggle before the foundation of the state. However,
as nature is omnipresent and univocal, and human societies are a part of nature, for Spinoza,
the state of nature could never be totally consumed and superseded in the emergence of the
political community. As Filippo Del Lucchese points out,
for Spinoza, the contract and the transfer of rights do not transform our nature.
Conflict and discord do not disappear like magic, therefore, after a sovereign power
has been instituted. Conflict will always be a part of politics, one that can never be
eliminated. On the contrary, another front of conflict will be opened up in
opposition to the sovereign, whose power must be actively approved at each instant
by the citizens in order to be preserved (Del Lucchese, 2009, p. 79)
The peace that is brought by the political structure of state sovereignty cannot be thought
of as everlasting. Just as other bodies in nature, the state is a composite body under the
threat of disarticulation depending on the encounters it endures. That means that, for

73

As Etienne Balibar puts it,
1998, p. 71).

152
Spinoza, no organization of the political community
aristocracy or a democracy

be it in the form of a monarchy, an

can be understood as a model of complete pacification. The

political realm always harbors struggle or conflict, albeit in varying degrees, and civil war
stands as a real possibility that can never be averted once and for all.
5.2.3 Thinking Civil War Through Spinoza
We will now consider how the concept of civil war manifes
Contrary to the Hobbesian approach, a Spinozist notion of civil war is an integral part of
the realm of politics: it does not frame civil war as a return to a pre-political condition of
savagery or as a complete breakdown of the socio-political order. However, at the same
time, it would be a stretch to argue that civil war functions as the paradigm for explaining
politics. One way to explain the status of
is through a particular affect that stands as the prime cause for rebellions against a
perceived injustice: indignation. In the third part of the Ethics, Spinoza defines indignation

glan

2019, p. 117). However, indignation does not appear to be among those passions Spinoza
regards as inherently bad but could be instrumentally good. However, it has an unusual
status among other passions, because of the peculiarity of the political contexts that it
emerges from.
We have previously discussed how power, in terms of potestas, can be exercised in
two ways besides physical coercion: either by enhancing or diminishing the power to act.
This difference corresponds to different kinds of administration or governance inciting
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joyful or sad passions, most notably hope or fear. 74 According to Spinoza, political regimes
that are established on the common hope of the multitude, regardless of whether it is a
monarchy, an aristocracy, or a democracy, are far more stable and durable than those that
function by inciting fear. From a Spinozist perspective, the political regimes that rely on
the administration of hope are those in which citizens adhere to the rules more or less by
their own volition, as they see these rules as beneficial. It is easy to understand that
indignation has nothing to do with political arrangements based on hope or generally joyful
passions. However, for Spinoza, indignation does not necessarily emerge from the regimes
based on sad passions or more specifically those that rely on the administration of fear
either.

emerges when political regimes based on the administration of sad passions become
unbearable75
mo
subjects become aware of these misdeeds and speak out against them, indignation erupts,
and will result in a radical transformation of the situation as soon as each person knows

multitude spreads as if it is a wildfire.

74

[h]ope is nothing but an inconstant Joy which has arisen from the image of a future or past
thing whose outcome we doubt; Fear, on the other hand, is an inconstant Sadness, which has also arisen from
(Spinoza, 1985, p. 505).
75
Spinoza defines the condition from which indignation emerges in the following way:
ity (or those who do so) to run, drunken or
naked, through the streets with prostitutes, to play the actor, to openly violate or disdain the laws he
himself has made, and at the same time to preserve his authority, as it is to both be and not be at the
same time. To slaughter and rob his subjects, to rape their young women, and actions of that kind,
turn fear into indignation, and hence turn the civil order into a state of hostility. (Spinoza, 2016a, p.
527)

154
There are three possible outcomes to the eruption of indignation. First, the tyrant
realizes the jeopardy of his position and makes some concessions to extinguish the dissent
of the multitude; things may get settled for a while, at least until the next time the tyrant

and thus pave the
this insurrection, he continues to rule as he intended. Third, the insurrection may well lead
to a civil war, either as a stalemate between the tyrant and the multitude, or in a scenario
in which the multitude manages to dethrone the tyrant but is unable to reinstate a stable
political regime, so that conflict takes the form of a series of localized and indefinite violent
confrontations.

existing political regimes and even less so if such a change is achieved by violent means,
civil war does not denote a return to a condition of pre-political savagery (Del Lucchese,
2018, p. 27). In Tractatus Politicus he writes:
Therefore, when disagreements and rebellions are stirred up in a Commonwealth
as they often are the result is never that the citizens dissolve the
Commonwealth though this often happens in other kinds of society. Instead, if
settle their disagreements while preserving the form of the
Commonwealth, they change its form to another. (Spinoza, 2016a, p. 532)
In fact, civil war does not have a purely negative meaning, that is to say,
reduced to a simple pathology of

Del Lucchese, 2009, p. 62). Speaking

-defense
and a selfpossibility, it serves a regulative role in
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however, civil war has a constituent role: it marks the dissolution of a corrupted political
order and reveals the lines of fault within the multitude, leading to the possibility of the

breakdown of the socio-political order and a relapse to pre-political savagery, civil war
means a reconfiguration of the relations of forces that shape the political realm.
5.3 Conclusion
Throughout this chapter, I have sought to advance a theoretical perspective on the
relationship between civil war and power through a re
philosophy. What kind of an alternative vantage point does a Spinozist reading like the one
above offers to us as compared to those of other theorists and philosophers whose work we
have discussed so far? To answer this question, we need to start with a short summary.
I started with a discussion on how Foucault posited civil war as the matrix of
relations of power and how his civil war thesis harbors a unique understanding of civil war
in its relation to power, and thus politics, and stands as one of the first studies that

to, the juridical framing of power, particularly to the Hobbesian conceptualization of
political power antithetical to civil war.
I have also discussed why Foucault abandoned the civil war thesis and
reconstructed his conceptualization of power from the ground up in his now well-known
analyses of liberal governance during the late seventies and the eighties. The weakness of
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successfully integrates civil war into the domain of politics, it does so by depicting a
situation in which a segment of society wages a war on the others. From such a theoretical
vantage point, all there is to see are repressive strategies deployed by the State apparatus,
an over-encompassing regime of domination, and multiple forms of resistance.

governmentality, however, present a substantially different conceptualization of power by
understanding it primarily as a productive network, rather than as an incessant social
conflict. Power, for him, no longer denotes a warlike relationship, but is better understood

life, and erect and organize productive po
formulation enables Foucault to think of power outside of what he calls the repressive
hypothesis , the downside of this transition is not only the absence of any kind of reference
to civil war, but also the decreasing role that is attributed to violence, conflict, and
eventually resistance.
Such a formulation poses conceptual challenges in understanding the current
political landscape. The world we live in is marked not only by intensified political
violence in different forms, civil wars raging in the global South, and their overspill to the
other corners of the globe, but also by the emergence of a new modality of politics that is
more and more becoming indistinguishable from latent civil wars. The asc
authoritarianisms

particularly the rise of neo-fascist movements that both fuel and feed

upon deepening polarizations

as well as multiple forms of struggle and resistance, most

visible in the waves of major protests and uprisings all over the globe, render civil war as
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a timely thematic and requires another kind of understanding of power that is capable of
giving an account of this volatility inherent to our present.
rs could
be seen as responses to this changing political landscape. In an epoch marked by the 9/11
attacks and the rampant exceptionalism during the soo the
conceptual framework of biopolitics: civil war, for him, is nothing other than the

perspective envisages biopolitics strictly in terms of the production of bare life under
sovereign exceptionalism. This not only leads to an erasure of the line of demarcation
between political violence and power, but also reintroduces sovereignty in a sense stronger
involves a reduction of civil
war to terrorism.

generalized civil war raging through the entire globe, although they offer a productive
esis from a Marxian perspective, their
interpretation of power is presented to us as the sum of techniques and procedures that
initiates and maintains capitalist subjugation and domination, and, from such a point of
view, these techniques of power are no longer distinguishable from the war itself. In other
words, Agamben along with Alliez and Lazzarato return to the position Foucault held in
the early seventies, without neither addressing nor offering a viable solution to the issues
that led Foucault to abandon it.
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Putting the concept of civil war into use as Agamben, and Alliez and Lazzarato do
carries a significant risk: as Hardt and Negri note in Commonwealth, doing so could lead

[e]verything is explained by sovereign power and the state of exception, that is, the
general suspension of rights and the emergence of a power that stands above the
law. Indeed evidence of such a state of exception is easy to come by: the
predominance of violence to resolve national and international conflicts not merely
as last but as first resort; the widespread use of torture and even its legitimation; the
indiscriminate killing of civilians in combat; the elision of international law; the
suspension of domestic rights and protections; and the list goes on and on. This
vision of the world resembles those medieval European renditions of hell: people
burning in a river of fire, others being torn limb from limb, and in the center a great
devil engorging their bodies whole. (Hardt & Negri, 2009, p. 3)
In other words, such a theoretical perspective makes us see nothing but relations of
domination and repression wherever we gaze upon, and more crucially, it makes us
overlook how the societies we live in are still traversed by regimes of production that now
subsume almost all aspects of our lives: the ever-reaching mechanisms and logic of the
market extending to every social sphere; the apparatuses of control and security that no
longer operate only via confinement or direct intervention but also by incentivizing and
modifying behaviours; and the processes of subjectification and desubjectification through
subtle yet effective modalities of power. In short, the model Agamben and Alliez and
Lazzarato provide us with neglects how decentralized and subtle regimes of power operate
through neoliberal forms of governance.
Hardt and Negri manage to abstain from depicting a condition of all-encompassing
domination and repression and articulate a more complex account. Written against the
backdrop of the alter-globalization movements and the new era of global war, their
coauthored work, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, offers a
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formulation of civil war as an incessant conflict between Empire and the multitude. As well
as being a theorization of a new global model of sovereignty in the service of capital, the
story Hardt and Negri tell us is one of resistance and the possibility for liberation. Hardt
and Negri do so by devising a model consisting of two modalities of power diametrically
rk on Spinoza, they locate a global
civil war in relation to the absolute antagonism between the constituent and productive

appropriation. Where such a formulation falls short, however, is in the dichotomous logic
it harbors. Situating civil war this way risks a Manichaean understanding of politics
wherein sides are clearly marked and attributes too much certainty to a condition that is
essentially uncertain and ambiguous.
L
it be seen as providing us with some sort of a general theory of civil war, of power, or of
both? By no means; the reading I suggest in this chapter neither attempts a theorization of
all the civil wars raging around the globe, nor pretends to answer the question of how power
operates in each and every context. This would not only exceed the scope and aims of this
dissertation but would also create a methodologically undesirable outcome: doing so would
essentially mean imposing theory on the material world in order to explain it, instead of
focusing on how modalities of civil war and power function in the localized, historical, and
contingent settings. What is this reinterpretation of Spinoza good for, then? I contend that
my reading of Spinoza provides us with a handy conceptual toolset and a theoretical
vantage point to make sense of our present for two interrelated reasons.
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First, Spinoza provides us with a productive way to analyze power. If not altogether
resolving the tension between the productive and repressive dimensions of the exercise of
power, his conceptualization at least enables us to think of power without being constrained
by a dichotomous logic

a persistent problem among the philosophers and theorists

discussed in the previous chapters. Spinoza does so by way of articulating power in a pair
of concepts, potentia and potestas, which function in a complementary yet at the same time
distinct way. In a fashion simi
potentia as the horizontal, immanent, constituent power, which is productive and
affirmative, and more importantly as the power to act and exist in a certain way. However,
when it comes to potestas, my interpretation substantially differs from the one Negri
suggests. Rather than associating it with the hierarchical and transcendental constituted
power of command, I reinterpret potestas as a relational and transitive type of power, or as
the power exercised over others. This enables us to raise a theoretical perspective through
which the exercise of power in terms of potestas depicts a spectrum in which power can
function in multiple ways, ranging from coercion by physical violence to a voluntary
commitment to power.

formulation of power is the way volatility imbues politics. Stemming from and depending
on the collective power of the multitude, power in terms of potestas cannot be exercised
without limits. In other words, from such a perspective, conflict plays a central role; it is
not a problem that waits to be solved or an obstacle that needs to be overcome, but an
integral aspect to how relations of power operate. Indeed, even under an extreme condition
in which all possible power is centrally concentrated, or in fact, in the opposite case
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wherein the exercise of power becomes extremely subtle and diffused, this Spinozist
perspective demonstrates how any regime of power is always constituted via volatile
relations between forces, and thus on highly fragile grounds.
Moreover, even if only implicitly, Spinoza provides us with a unique way to
understand civil war in its relation to politics. Rather than positing civil war as a prepolitical condition of savagery or a complete breakdown of the socio-political order, such
a perspective enables us to think of it as an integral part of the political life. However,
unlike the other theorists discussed, particularly Alliez and Lazzarato alongside Foucault,
Spinoza does not equate power with civil war or keep the distinction between them intact.
From such a point of view, civil war manifests as a violent and abrupt reconfiguration of
the relations of forces that shape the political realm following a condition wherein existing
forms of potestas became unbearable. This approach enables us to raise a theoretical
perspective that not only avoids establishing a mutual exclusivity between political power
and civil war without framing them within an either/or logic, thus giving rise to an
unresolvable dichotomy

but at the same time proceeds without reducing relations of

power solely to a warlike confrontation and all-encompassing domination. Moreover,
unlike Agamben, a Spinozist understanding of civil war does not harbor a negative
meaning and it cannot be reduced to a process of constituent political violence that lays the
grounds for sovereign exceptionalism. On the contrary, civil war appears as the
reconfiguration of forces in the body politic and can be
, thus signifies a birth of a new socio-political order from the
019, p. 116). Finally, unlike Hardt and
Negri, civil war cannot be seen solely as a conflict between the multitude and Empire, or
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between potentia and potestas; it also involves an internecine war within the multitude:
rather than being waged against/by a transcendent political entity, a Spinozist notion of
civil war denotes a process immanent to the domain created by the collective social body.
I contend that such a reading provides us with a theoretical vantage point that could
assist us in understanding the volatility of our socio-political contexts. In the last decade,
we have been witnessing a gradual transformation that is radically altering the fabric of the
societies that we live in. The years that passed within the context of rampant neoliberalism

the
market that would render old social divisions obsolete as some proponents of neoliberal
ideologies envisioned (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 4). However, this failure of neoliberalism did
not follow the exact course that the more optimistic critiques of the capitalist globalization
have envisaged, either. Although we saw the emergence of new and widespread forms of
resistance, these have not so far resulted in the invention of new lines of alliances that could
create alternative futures to counter the ever-deepening exploitation, the looming climate
catastrophe, and the racial injustices that capitalist globalization brings about.
On the contrary, we are witnessing the formation of a radically different political
terrain, facing, on the one hand, the rise of the far-right movements that seek to reverse the
hard-won rights of minoritarian political movements, and on the other, the emergence of
new forms of hybrid authoritarian government models led by the controversial figures such
as Donald Trump, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and alike whose power depends on their
tremendous successes to deepen the alr
mobilize their followers into taking political actions that would previously be deemed
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unimaginable
example

the storming of the Capitol Building on January 6th, 2021 is a perfect

increasing polarizations arisin

mask-wearing or vaccinations that is marked by an unprecedented escalation of political
violence.76
Yet at the same time, we did not exactly leave the regimes of power that operates
through the circuits of neoliberal governmental models behind. Political calculations and
procedures that run on the premise of the existence of rational agents, the figure of homo
economicus, who are expected to invest in their human capitals and compete with others in
the pursuit of maximizing their interest as self entrepreneurs, economic systems that strive
to achieve maximum growth and profit persist in a world where the vital resources are
becoming more and more scarce, the subtle techniques that aim to maintain control and
security mechanisms have never run as deep as they do today. What we are experiencing
can be seen as a strange hybridity in which authoritarian tendencies, neo-fascist desires,
widespread violence, diffused and subtle techniques of power, and market-driven politics
are tightly intertwined.

this chapter neither gives a definitive theoretical explanation of all these developments, nor
magically resolves all these issues and problems that may arise from thinking the
relationship between civil war and power. As I have demonstrated, thinking power with
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As Wendy Brown writes,
From the viewpoint of the first neoliberals, the galaxy that includes Trump, Brexit, Orbán, the Nazis,
or the German Parliament, the fascists in the Italian Parliament, is turning the neoliberal dream into
a nightmare. Hayek, the ordoliberals, or even the Chicago school would repudiate the current form
of neoliberalism and especially its most recent guise (Brown, quoted in Lazzarato, 2021, p. 8;
Brown, 2019).
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civil war is indeed an arduous task riddled with several pitfalls, but it nonetheless provides
us with a way for generating an understanding of civil war in its uncertain relationship to
politics. More precisely, this alternative Spinozist approach allows us to rethink the
relationship between civil war and power without being constrained by a dichotomy
between repressive and productive sides of power, and at the same time, without a
ratification of domination and sovereignty. To borrow from Deleuze and Guattari, such an
interpretation provides us with conceptual tools that would be handy for mapping the
relationship between civil war and power at a molecular level: while not fully explicating
the entire dynamics of contemporary politics, it nonetheless gives us a theoretical vantage
point for identifying the limits of the exercise of power and thus the potential fault lines in
the societies we live in. I argue that such a trajectory renders itself valuable, especially in
the face of this strange overlap between the culmination of diffused forms of political
violence, deepening polarizations, and the subtle and diffused techniques of exercise of
power characterizing our epoch.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
The primary aim of this project has been to build up a theoretical inquiry that explores the
relationship between civil war and power. I have focused on the work of Michel Foucault,
Giorgio Agamben, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Eric Alliez and Maurizio Lazzarato,
and Baruch Spinoza to map out a lineage of thought through which civil war was posited
as an immanent aspect to politics, rather than a pre-political condition of savagery or a
complete breakdown of the socio-political order. Although the theorists and philosophers
whose work I have discussed so far seem to share this fundamental axiom, when it comes
to the question of how power should be thought of in relation to civil war, their answers,
at times radically, diverged from each other. While exploring the volatile and uncertain
conceptual relationship between civil war and power, one of the main themes emerging
from this dissertation is the unresolved tension between the productive and repressive sides
of power within the theoretical framework of civil war. I traced this tension back to

theorists position themselves in relation to this aporia. Out of this analysis, I then
considered the success and failure of their attempts to resolve such a tension. Finally, I
offered an alternative reading of Spinoza with the intention of formulating a conceptual
passage that avoids the dichotomous logic

a persistent problem among the philosophers

and theorists that we have discussed in the previous chapters

and ratification of

domination and sovereignty. Before saying a few words on why this theoretical
investigation matters, especially today, and pointing out the potential research agendas it
may open, I would like to summarize what I have discussed so far.
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civil war as the matrix of
relations of power and his decision to abandon such a position in the following years. In
Foucault's works dating to the early 70s, most notably the Collège de France lectures
between 1972 and 1973, the notion of power denotes a warlike relationship; civil war
stands as the model explicating both the exercise of and resistance to power, delineating a
dynamic in which conflict operates as the driving force. The civil war thesis was a product
d what he calls juridical theories of power and
confines of the state form. Power in these formulations no longer appears as a phenomenon
originating from or depending on the political structure of sovereignty; rather, it is
intelligible through an analysis of the tactics and mechanisms of domination and of various
forms of resistance to them. Understanding how power operates then becomes a question

the uses made of the l
war thesis entails the replacement of the juridical understanding of power with that of a
-repressionthesis was short-lived: he reaches an impasse
soon after becoming aware of the risk that an equation of power with domination may give
rise to a radical denunciation of power, and thus neglects the way power can also function
as a productive network. Foucault abandons the civil war thesis and reconstructs his
conceptualization of power almost from the ground up. I locate two turning points in
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relationship: first, within the theoretical framework of biopolitics that emerges in the first
volume of History of Sexuality and throughout the 75-76 Collège de France lectures, and,
second, within his analyses of governmentality starting from the second half of the 1970s.
iopolitical framework offers a new way to understand power in terms

(Foucault, 1978, p. 137), his concept of governmentality situates power in terms of

Such a transformation enables Foucault to overcome the risk of reducing power to

war thesis. The tension between the repressive and productive dimensions of power seems
to be resolved, much in favor of the latter. However, in doing so, any kind of reference to

between civil war and power provides a potent critique of and alternative to the way this
issue is handled in the Hobbesian political theory. However, I also showed that there was
another outcome: as well as civil war, this new understanding of power casts questions of
struggle, domination, and political violence out of the analytical frame. This change
becomes more
formulations stand as one of the earliest analyses of neoliberalism in the wake of its
historical emergence and provide us with an extremely rich perspective for rethinking how
power functions in such regimes, it at the same time risks overlooking the repressive
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dimension of neoliberalism: the violence that neoliberalism is both founded upon and
carries within itself is

concept of civil war in their own works.
an
f civil war that arises from his 2001
seminar at Princeton University. I discussed how Agamben posits civil war as the paradigm
of politics and considered whether his account makes space for rethinking civil war in the

positing civil war as the paradigm of politics. For him

conceptualization to a certain extent, there is a crucial difference between these two
thinkers. For Agamben, civil war does not denote a dynamic field of relations of power
outside the sphere of sovereignty

delineating an alternative model to that of sovereignty
nsists on how sovereignty and civil war are

tightly interwoven: civil war, for him, is nothing other than the originary political violence
that both initiates and shapes the juridico-political structure of sovereignty. Rather than
advancing a model of civi
emphasis is on the intensified degree of political violence it entails.
This is the point from which Agamben establishes a conceptual connection between
civil war and biopolitics, in which civil war marks the threshold of politicization.
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exposure to death and the production of bare life through the sovereign ban. For this reason,
the concepts of civil war and biopolitics conflate and become almost indistinguishable from
each other. Although Agamben seems to have established a link between biopolitics and
civil war, this is only possible due to his understanding of biopolitics purely in terms of
thanatopolitics. Agamben completely strips off the productive dimension that we can locate
in the Foucauldian conceptualization of biopolitics, and, in his formulation, it is no longer
possible or even meaningful to discuss any kind of tension between the productive and
repressive dimensions inherent to the concept.
Following this analysis, I then interrogate the close affinity Agamben establishes

in the wake of an epoch marked by the 9/11 attacks and the
rampant exceptionalism of the sonot surprising that Agamben resorts to the idea of terrorism as the fundamental paradigm
for understanding our contemporary world; terrorism perfectly fits his conceptual
framework for delineating a zone of indifference where the production of bare life,
intensified political violence, and the sovereign exception become intertwined. However,
such a theoretical perspective, besides attributing a purely negative connotation to civil

civil war is not a play between various forces with an uncertain outcome

it has a

predetermined role: grounding politics through an originary violence. In this way,
Agamben proposes more of an overstretched conceptualization of terrorism rather than one
that of civil war.
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f
civil war, his formulations erase the line of demarcation between political violence and
power; thus, it gives rise to a quite restricted understanding of the latter purely in a negative
sense or in terms of domination. For Agamben, power is equated with domination or

overcoming the problematic aspects of the civil war thesis, which eventually led Foucault
to abandon it, Agamben deepens them.

unsuccessful way to rethink civil war; his theoretical perspective is thought-provoking and
opens productive discussions for our contemporary political contexts. His focus on the
notion of the state of exception sheds light on political regimes that rely upon an
unprecedented degree of polarization and use of intensified political violence. Moreover,
one particular aspec
thinking about civil war as an erasure of the line of demarcation between economy and
politics

a locus where governmental and juridico-political rationalities merge. Such a

reading offers a particularly potent means for examining the relationship between civil war
and contemporary modes of capitalism.

Lazzarato, and Hardt and Negri push such a line of thinking to its limits when they locate
civil war within the circuits of global capitalism. To start with Hardt and Negri, their
coauthored 2004 book Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire depicts a
s becoming a general phenomenon,
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civil war. Their formulation delineates a polarization between Empire, the tendency for the
emergence of a global system of control and machine of command in the service of capital,
and the multitude, a democratic project in becoming that could bring the post-capitalist
future through collective struggle. Hardt and Negri marshal the notion of civil war to
describe the incessant conflict between these two forces that shape our contemporary world
both on global and local levels.

power without running into the same pitfalls that Foucault encountered with his civil war
thesis. Hardt and Negri do so by devising a significantly different way to understand power
in two opposing directions: the polarity they attribute to the relationship between Empire
and the multitude is grounded upon the antagonism they locate between two modalities of
power, potentia and potestas
Spinoza. While the former concept implies the horizontal, immanent, affirmative power
which is productive and constituent, the latter designates the hierarchical, transcendental,
constituted power of command and appropriation. In positioning civil war at the caesura

constituted power of capitalist command, Hardt and Negri manage to abstain from painting
an overand Negri argue that we need to displace our obsession with sovereignty, fascism, and
l as theorizing the intensified degree
of subjugation and subsumption in global capitalism, the story Hardt and Negri tell us is
one that emphasizes resistance and subversive politics.
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articulation
of power. The absolute antagonism Hardt and Negri locate between the repressive forces
of a global structure of sovereignty, Empire, and the productive and subversive networks
of constituent power, the multitude, carries the risk of giving rise to an almost Manichean
narrative that describes the world we live in as the conflict between good and evil. Hardt

essentially uncertain and ambiguous: it is questionable whether it is possible to fit every
kind of conflict or civil war into an antagonistic model where the opposing sides are defined
so clearly.
When it comes to Alliez and Lazzarato, I have primarily focused on their
formulations arising from their coauthored 2016 book Wars and Capital (Alliez &
Lazzarato, 2016). Written in the aftermath of political upheaval that began with alterglobalization

accelerating with the occupation movements and popular uprisings of the

early 2010s, and the rise of neofascist movements

Alliez and Lazzarato also stress the

formulations, in their writings, Alliez and Lazzarato hold a significantly less optimistic
point of view. They depict a generalized civil war raging through the entire globe: having

waged by financialized capitalism, targeting entire populations on a global scale (Ibid., p.
27).
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accumulation into the conceptual assemblage, they extend the scope of the civil war thesis
in a way that now tends to neoliberal modes of governance. In fact, for Alliez and
s,

theoretical perspective and has the capacity for germinating discussions on the basis of a

that the story Alliez and Lazzarato tell us is a one of a unilateral system of domination;
power is presented to us more or less as the sum of techniques and procedures that initiates
and maintains capitalist subjugation. I have pointed out two problematic outcomes: first,

ways due their embracing of a radical denunciation of power. It especially neglects to
explain how regimes of power at work in late capitalist societies function as multiform
processes of subjectification and desubjectification diffused through the circuits of capital
and market relations. Second, such a formulation overlooks the difference between war and
power, flattening any meaningful distinction between power, violence, and domination. In

viable solution to redirect from the strong emphasis on repression inherent to the civil war
thesis.

tion
to civil war, focusing on his articulation of power in terms of potentia and potestas and
how his approach differs from Hobbesian understanding of the political in the passage from
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oza served as a point
of departure for my discussions on the distinction between the two concepts Spinoza uses

conceptualization of potentia as the power to act and exist in a certain way and, more
importantly, as the productive, immanent, and affirmative constituent power

both as a

source for resistance and as the grounds for any kind of political arrangement or
organization. However, when it comes to potestas, my interpretation of the concept
substantially differs from the one that Negri suggests. Rather than associating it with the
transcendental, hierarchical, and constituted power of command, I reinterpret potestas as a
relational and mediated type of power through which coercion or domination is one of the
possible ways in which power may be exercised. I have discussed how potentia and
potestas are irreducible to each other, yet still function in a complementary way, rather
than denoting purely a relationship of antagonism. The way in which I interpret Spinoza
work, if not resolving the tension between the productive and repressive sides of power, at
least enables us to conceptualize power without being constrained by a dichotomy which
limits many philosophers and theorists keen on integrating civil war in their formulations
of power.
After a thorough discussion on the distinction between potentia and potestas, I

philosophies. I focused
from the state of nature to the civil state and the reduction of potentia to potestas embedded
in his formulation that asks for unconditional obedience in favor of security. I have
discussed how, for Spinoza, the state of nature can never be completely consumed and
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superseded by the emergence of the political community, and conflict plays an essential
role in politics rather than denoting a pathology of the political life. Coupled with the
primacy he attributes to potentia, I showed how civil war, in contradistinction to the
Hobbesian formulation, serves an integral function in politics as a reconfiguration of the
relations of forces that shapes the political realm, rather than denoting a pre-political
savagery or a complete breakdown of the socio-political order. As conclusion, I
demonstrate how a Spinozist theoretical perspective might enable us to rethink the
relationship between civil war and power without conflating them

as we have seen in

previous discussions, doing so could easily end up with advancing an all-encompassing
notion of domination

yet still in an immanent way.

Now, why does a study like this matter and what kind of potential research
trajectories this dissertation may open up? This dissertation offers a vantage point to the

work in which civil war is posited integral to the domain of politics. For any future
researcher interested in understanding civil war outside the domain created by the
canonical Western political tradition, which locates civil war in the outer margins of the
political, this dissertation may function as a map of various strategies and approaches
employed by several theorists and philosophers. While this dissertation does not magically
resolve all the issues and problems emerging from these thinkers

nor does it give a

definitive theorization of the relationship between civil war and power in each and every
context

I believe the discussions arising from this dissertation nonetheless provide the

reader with a conceptual framework that would come in handy for rethinking civil war in
its relation to political power.
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This dissertation also provides the reader with a theoretical vantage point to tend to
our contemporary political environment, one riddled by a modality of politics that is
becoming indistinguishable from latent civil wars, whether it is the ascent of the far right,
the ever-deepening polarizations, or seemingly irreconcilable conflicts and multiple forms
of resistance. However, this study differentiates from the mainstream appropriation of the
The
Next Civil War: Dispatches from the American Future

How Civil

Wars Start: And How to Stop Them. Rather than presenting civil war as a disastrous
political constellation yet to come, or as a consequence of the erosion of democratic
institutions, it strives to advance a perspective from which civil war could be rethought of
as an integral aspect to politics (Marche, 2022; Walter, 2022). Moreover, this dissertation
also highlights how a presentation of civil war as the sole paradigm for politics or as the
matrix of the relations of power risks a framing that reduces power to relations of
domination wherever it gazes, thus overlooking the ever-reaching mechanisms of the
market, the apparatuses of control and security, and the processes of subjectification
through subtle techniques of power operating in neoliberal forms of governance.
In the end, this dissertation delineates a theoretical perspective for rethinking
contemporary politics at the nexus between civil war and power. Stressing the relationship
between civil war and power offers a generative trajectory for future studies, especially in
a context such as ours marked by the convergence between, on the one hand, widespread
and intensified forms of political violence, deepening polarizations, irreconcilable
conflicts, and, on the other hand, the ever-reaching mechanisms of the market, the
processes of subjectification and desubjectification through subtle yet effective techniques
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and procedures of power at work in neoliberal forms of governance that characterize our
epoch.
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